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IJORDANIAN ORIENTATIONS
A. Introduction.
Through a series of critical turning points as viewed
through the eyes of leading Jordanian decision makers, first and
foremost by King Husayn himself, Jordan has developed a set of
fundamental orientations toward the actors involved in the Pales-
tine question and the relationship between the Hashemite kingdom
and the Palestinians. The examination of these orientations--a
kind of natural filter through which our facts are integrated
into established patterns of cognition--is a particularly fruit-
ful method for the study of the continuity of complex foreign
policy issues, as demonstrated in Michael Brecher's study of
Israeli foreign policy. 1
There is every reason to assume that this approach will
prove to be particularly valuable for the study of Jordanian-
Palestinian relations. First, there is the factor of congruence
in the fact that the modern dimensions of the issue developed
simultaneously with the establishment of Hashemite rule in the
Arab world in the course of World War I and the political reali-
zation of the Zionist idea in the Balfour Declaration and the
Palestine mandate. This factor is strongly reinforced by the
dynastic and personal dimensions of the Hashemite family. King
Husayn has ruled for over half of the modern Hashemite political
1. Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (London,
Oxford University Press, 1972), see especially Chapter 11, pp.
229-250.
era--an era beginning with his great-grandfather's proclamation
of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916. In virtu-
ally every formal speech of King Husayn on the subject of Pales-
tine, and in most of his shorter remarks and interviews, there
are extensive references to this family heritage and history.
Clearly, such references are considered by the monarch, and
rightly so, to enhance the legitimacy of his current policies.
They are even more valuable in aiding our understanding of the
thought processes through which these policies were decided.
Finally, there is the powerful factor of regime type. There are,
to be sure, continuities to be found in the foreign policy orien-
tations of any established regime due to ideological factors,
elite education and experience and the very process of dealing
with recurring geopolitical realities. But to a monarch ap-
proaching the fifth decade of his reign, the political crises of
the past are not merely dry chapters of history books. Rather,
they are the vivid memories of his grandfather assassinated
before his eyes, of his broken army streaming across the Jordan
river bridges in defeat with only six of its one hundred eighty-
six tanks, or his capital virtually taken over by thousands of
Palestinian guerrillas calling for his removal.
These considerations lead to the examination of foreign
policy decision making and, particularly, of Palestinian policy.
Aside from its excellence as a study of a crucial turning point
of Jordanian history, Jordan in the 1967 War by Samir A. Mutawi
presents the most detailed available account of this process. 2
Although some differences are noted from the early years of King
Husayn ' s reign, clearly the model is one of a traditional Arab
patriarchal regime. This model is reinforced by the extent to
which Jordan's very survival has been dependent on relations with
other nations and by the monarch's long reign--making him the
senior statesman of the Arab world. Former prime minister Zaid
Rifai explained this system as ..."a highly personalized system
of government in which decisions are made by the King, through
the influence of the Kings advisers and in some cases by the
prime ministers and his cabinet. It is not an institutionalized
process. It is a fact of life in Jordan that we do not have an
institutionalized process of decision-making." 3 Beyond the
person of the monarch, however, there is a ruling elite of the
King's trusted aides and friends including the Crown Prince,
Hasan ibn Talal, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Royal
Hashemite Diwan and the army. This ruling elite has the ability
to modify decisions through control of information, its advisory
role and its influence through the choice of a particular method
of implementation. It would be a mistake, however, to look at
this as a completely closed totalitarian system. The essence of
a traditional patriarchal system in the Arab world rests in the
process of consultation. Thus, even though parliamentary insti-
tutions, elections, political parties and a free press have
2. Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1987), Chapter 1, pp. 1-18.
3. Ibid , p. 7.
enjoyed only sporadic effectiveness in Jordan's history, Mutawi
concludes: "The ideology of popular participation in Jordan
cannot be ignored. . . . Popular sentiment expressed through par-
liament and public disturbances played a significant role in
influencing the decision that Jordan should participate in the
1967 war." 4 This "popular" element in Jordan's Palestine policy
is the most difficult aspect to evaluate in the absence of formal
institutions and the constant of the presence of the efficient
security service, but it is not to be neglected. It is part of
the basic self-definition of both Jordanians and Palestinians.
In the past year, following the renunciation of responsibility
for the West Bank and rioting in southern Jordan over economic
austerity and governmental corruptions, King Husayn responded by
dismissing Prime Minister Rifai and holding the November 1989
parliamentary elections. Clearly, such moves indicate a funda-
mental reorganization of the political system, including the
drafting of a "National Charter." Popular attitudes demanding
more formalized participation, stifled through a three decade ban
on political parties and a two decade period of martial law, have
begun to influence a period of almost revolutionary change in
Jordan.
B. The Pan Arab Dimension.
"How many in the young generation of Palestinians or Arabs
know that the Palestinian body politic under the mandate was





looking for union with Jordan out of loyalty to the princi-
ples of the great Arab Revolt consecrating union which was a
living force in their hearts, and another looking for inde-
pendence within a Palestinians state? How many are aware
that the decision of the Palestinian people to unite with
Jordan was a victory for the idea of Arab unity prevalent
at that time?... How many of the young generation realize
that national identity and not state identity was the preva-
lent notion in the forties and fifties and that it consti-
tuted the essence of prevalent Arab political thought
then?.... The period of union between the two banks preced-
ing June 1967 was a living model of a larger union to which
all Arabs aspired at that time." 5
The primary attitude shaping the Jordanian view of the
Palestine issue is that of pan-Arabism, as revealed most vividly
in this quotation from the address of King Husayn to the extraor-
dinary Arab summit in Algiers in June 1988. There are two
related but distinct aspects to consider in this attitude. The
first is the historical role of the Hashemites in this century,
including their involvement in Palestinian politics, stemming
from their claims to the leadership of a broad pan-Arab, nation-
alist movement aiming the independence and unity of the Arab
world as a whole.
5. "Husayn Addresses Summit," as reported in the Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service, Daily Report, Middle East and Africa , 9
June 1988, p. 8. (Hereafter this publication will be referred to
as FBIS)
.
The office of Sharif of Mecca, to which Sharif Husayn ibn
Ali was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in 1908,
was a traditional and religious position. It recognized the
special status of the Holy Cities and the province of the Hejaz
in the world of Islam. It was traditional in the Ottoman empire
for the sultan to appoint a sharif, or noble, of the Prophet's
clan, the Banu Hashim, to administer the province jointly with
an Ottoman governor—since God himself had chosen this clan to
produce His greatest Prophet. This high status was indicated in
the tradition of the Prophet: "Allah chose Isma'il from the sons
of Ibrahim and from the sons of Isma'il the Banu Kinana and from
the Banu Kinaua the Kuraish and from the Kuraish the Banu
Hashim." 6
Soon after his appointment, however, changes within the
Ottoman Empire brought about by the "Young Turk" revolution of
1908, including the deposition of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II and the
increased Turkish nationalism of the regime, led Sharif Husayn to
reevaluate his relationship to Constantinople—now dominated by
the Committee of Union and Progress. With the outbreak of World
War I, this reevaluation resulted in his decision to break with
the traditional allegiance to the Sultan and form an alliance
with the newly emerging forces of Arab nationalism. One of his
sons, Faysal, was sent to Damascus to consolidate ties to the
Arab nationalist society, al-Fatat . Correspondence was also
initiated by Sharif Husayn with the British High Commissioner in
6. "Sharif," in H.A.R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers, eds., The Shorter
Encyclopedia of Islam (Mouten, The Hague, 1974), p. 529.
Egypt. Sir Henry McMahon on July 15, 1915, to learn of the
support he could expect on behalf of the Arabs for rebelling
against the Ottoman Empire.
A compelling explanation of Sharif Husayn's attitudes is
suggested by Mary C. Wilson in her recent history, King Abdullah.
Britain and the Making of Jordan . Although not lacking in per-
sonal ambition to consolidate his family rule in the Hejaz. The
Sharif of Mecca needed a more impressive justification for break-
ing with the largest Islamic state and allying himself with the
largest Christian empire.
"He also needed a justification, a large sweeping histor-
ic cause where moral imperative would be able to drown out
criticism. An Arab, of the line of the Prophet, he found
such an identity and such a cause in the nascent ideology of
Arab nationalism. This movement, born and nurtured in
Damascus, Beirut and Cairo, provided both the legitimacy of
purpose and a large framework of endeavor to justify and
ennoble Husayn's dynastic ambitions." 7
Abdullah, however, never relinquished his own ambitions for
a larger role in the Arab world. Initially, his ambitions cen-
tered on the Arabian peninsula itself, but his disastrous defeat
at the hands of the Saudi ikhwan in 1919 forced him to look
northward. Next, he hoped to gain Iraq after twenty-one Iraqi
delegates to the General Syrian Congress of March 1920 in Damas-
7. Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah
r
Britain and the Making of
Jordan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 26.
cus proclaimed him to be king of Iraq (the Syrian delegates had
selected his younger brother, Emir Faysal, to be king of Syria). 8
When Faysal was driven from Syria by the French in July
1920, Abdullah responded to the appeal from Arab nationalists in
Amman and set off with a military force from the Hejaz. The
territory which eventually became Transjordan had been allotted
to the British Palestine mandate by the San Remo Conference in
1920, but had actually been administered since the end of the war
by Faysal' s Arab government from Damascus. The settlement
imposed by the British as a result of the Cairo Conference of
1921 was to placate Arab nationalism and fulfill their wartime
commitments to the Hashemites through the establishment of an
Iraqi kingdom under Faysal and an Emirate of Transjordan under
Abdullah (both under League of Nations mandates). 9 They had al-
ready recognized Husayn as King of the Hejaz. Winston Churchill,
the British Colonial Secretary who had convened the Cairo Confer-
ence, went to Jerusalem in order to explain the decisions reached
at Cairo. There Abdullah suggested either the unity of Transjor-
dan and Palestine or of Transjordan and Iraq under an Arab ruler.
Churchill countered by offering him Transjordan alone for six
months and a subsidy of 5,000 pounds, provided that he check
anti-French and anti-Zionist activity. Should he be successful,
this might lead to a change of heart with the French agreeing to
8. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs , 4th ed.
(Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 96
9. Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab
World , The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore and London, The




his installation as Emir in Damascus—which Britain would support
but could not guarantee. "For Abdullah, Transjordan was but the
threshold to greater power. He expected, at first, to move on to
Damascus. In later years he hoped to unite Transjordan with any
willing neighbor." 10
Although Palestine was not the primary focus of these ambi-
tions, which centered on Syria but included Iraq and even a
return to the Hejaz (from which the Hashemites had been ousted by
the Saudis in 1925) , neither was Palestine excluded. When the
British Royal Commission (the Peel Commission) issued its report
in 1937 during the Arab Palestinian's uprising against Zionist
immigration, calling for a partition of Palestine with the Arab
portion to be incorporated into Transjordan, Abdullah, not sur-
prisingly, endorsed the idea. Some of his partisans in Pales-
tine, however, were forced the flee for their lives and even his
major supporters, the al-Nashashibi clan, publicly disassociated
themselves from this policy. There was a revival of "Greater
Syria" agitation during World War II, but Abdullah found he faced
opposition not only from his Arab opponents but from his own
family, the Iraqi Hashemites. Prime Minister Nuri Pasha as-
Said, who had been the chief of staff of the Arab Army during the
Great Arab Revolt, put forward his own plan of Arab unity in the
"Fertile Crescent," uniting Iraq and Syria. Eventually, the end
result of all these plans was the creation of the League of Arab
States in 1945. Although propaganda spoke of this as a step
10. Wilson, op. cit. . p. 53.
towards Arab unity, in fact it was founded on the principle of
the association of sovereign independent states.
In the end, of course, Abdullah's pan-Arab visions came to
be fulfilled to a limited though significant extent as a result
of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. Negotiations with the British,
Americans, the United Nations (and even the Zionists directly)
failed to come up with a peaceful means to implement the United
Nations Partition Resolution, No. 181, of November 1947. Two
days before the end of the mandate in May 1948, the Arab League
invested Abdullah with the title of supreme commander of the Arab
forces, but it was a title without authority. Each Arab army
fought on their own (although there was some coordination between
the two Hashemite armies of Jordan and Iraq) . The war ended with
the TransJordanian Arab Legion the only effective Arab force left
in Palestine. Politically, the "all-Palestine" government of the
mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni, the leading Palestinian
nationalist of the inter-war years and bitter foe of the Hashe-
mites, was recognized by the Arab League but it was clearly a
client of Egypt.
More for the lack of any reasonable alternative than in any
great enthusiasm, the Palestinians under Jordanian administration
came to accept the necessity of the union with Transjordan. In
the elections of April 1950, even the anti-Abdullah elements
decided to participate and at least five of the twenty deputies
elected from the West Bank could not be described as pro-Abdul-
lah. The motion to unify the West Bank and Transjordan was
passed unanimously on April 25, 1950.
10
The Arab League pressured Abdullah to state that this union
was only temporary, but they did not expel Jordan when he failed
to do so. The core of the Arab states' opposition to the union
of the two banks under Abdullah was that it would lead to the
disappearance of the Palestine issue, people and the very name of
Palestine from the map of the Middle East. This violated the
basic tenants of Arab nationalism—to which all governments, in
some degree, based their own legitimacy. Additionally, it ac-
knowledge their bitter and totally unexpected defeat at the hands
of the despised Zionists.
"The majority Arab position thus left Palestinian rights
intact, at least in theory, implying a continuing struggle
with Israel, diplomatically and economically if not mili-
tarily, until Israel should in some way recognize those
rights. It was just those rights, however, that Abdullah
was apt to concede, for his ambitions required the disap-
pearance of Palestine as surely as did Zionist aims." 11
Although Abdullah was assassinated on the steps of the
al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem on July 20, 1951, his achievement of
the union of the two banks of the Jordan continued for another
sixteen years both de facto and de jure. For another twenty-one
years, it remained de jure until it was severed in July 1988 by
the hand of his grandson, who had been at his side at his death.
Gradually but ungraciously, the Arab states recognized the utili-
ty of Jordan's leading role in the Palestine issue... "for Jordan










Nevertheless, the Arab dimension of Jordan's Palestine
policy continued to evolve through three distinct phases from
1951 to 1982. In the first phase until 1967 and to some extent
into 1970 Jordan was forced to conform, at least in public, to
the pan-Arab consensus. This was the era coinciding with the
domination of Arab politics by the charismatic figure of Gamel
Abdel Nasser and with the youthful and untested leadership of
King Husayn. For some years, however, the primary focus of what
came to be known as "radical Arab nationalism" or even "Nasser-
ism" downplayed the issue of Palestine. Instead it focused on
anti-western imperialism (British, French and, later, American)
,
on political and social revolution to overthrow traditional
conservative Arab regimes, and on the achievement of Arab unity
once these objectives were attained. The theory was that the
Arabs would be united, reformed and ready to challenge Zionism in
Palestine. The focus on those issues was cold comfort to the
Hashemite monarch, indeed, for Jordan was a prime example of
everything the ideology of radical Arab nationalism was fighting
to remove. Husayn managed to survive through a combination of
compromise and conformity mixed with firmness and courage - -
along with a large element of luck. Thus, he gave up on his
policy of joining the Baghdad Pact, dismissed Glubb Pasha from
command of the Arab Legion and accepted an Arab subsidy to re-
12. Ibid. , p. 214.
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place his lost British financing. Simultaneously, however, he
faced down pro-Nasser military coups, dismissed his radical Arab
nationalist prime minister. Sulayman Nabulsi, and welcomed
British troops back in 1958 when threaten by the overthrow of his
Iraqi Hashemite cousins.
The establishment of several Arab revolutionary states in
this period led, in fact, to greater flexibility in Arab rela-
tions. If there was no Arab consensus, or merely a rhetorical
one, Husayn was free to maneuver. True, the establishment of the
Palestine Liberation Organization as a result of the first Arab
summit in 1964 was an ominous portent for Jordan, but its immedi-
ate impact was minimal for it was largely an instrument of Nass-
er's policy and Nasser had no intention of risking a direct
confrontation with Israel. Thus, Husayn was able to close down
its offices with impunity when it challenged his authority by
claiming to represent the Palestinian citizens of Jordan. Even-
tually, however, Husayn' s (and Nasser's) luck ran out.
In 1967 the escalating rivalry between the radical Ba ' th
regime in Syria and Nasser led to a general Arab consensus to
confront Israel militarily, with the expectation that a short,
inconclusive war would benefit the Arabs politically even if they
"lost" on the battlefield (as had been the case in the Suez War
of 1956) . There was also the hope, perhaps even the expectation,
that if the Arabs were unified on an Eastern front as well as in
the Sinai and prepared for war instead of being attacked by
surprise as in 1956, they could win a military victory. In any
case, Husayn felt he could not stay on the sidelines. Domesti-
cally, Israeli border raids aroused public opinion, especially on
13
the West Bank, while an Arab consensus made it impossible to
remain uncommitted. The King personally took the step of placing
his army under Egyptian command with disastrous consequences as
the Egyptian general (misled by his own government's mythical
victories) altered Jordan's established defensive strategy. As a
result, the war was short but hardly indecisive. Jordan lost all
of the territory it had saved for the Arabs in 1948. Syria's
defeat and loss of territory in the Golan discredited the radical
Ba'th regime, contributing to its overthrow by Hafez al-Assad in
1970. Nasser never regained the charismatic leadership role he
had played so dramatically before, while the traditional oil
states of the Arabian peninsula under the astute leadership of
King Faysal of Saudi Arabia gained more influence following the
ending of Egypt's military adventure in Yemen and their subsidiz-
ing of the shattered economics of the "front line" states, in-
cluding both Egypt and Jordan.
The challenges facing Husayn stemmed from the economic and
political crisis caused by the loss of the West Bank. The defeat
of the Arab states finally discredited the Palestinian myth that
they would be saved by their Arab brethren. The PLO, established
as a front organization of the Arab states in order to disguise
their own inadequacies in rhetoric and bureaucracy, now became a
genuine revolutionary organization with leadership passing to the
guerrilla fedaveen organizations. Although these organizations
had different policies towards the Jordanian regime, none could
accept limitations on their freedom of action versus Israel and
some openly called for the overthrow of the Hashemites and the
14
establishment of a Palestinian state in Jordan as a necessary
preliminary to the regaining of Palestine itself. In his shaky
domestic position Husayn made every effort to compromise with the
PLO. While some Arab states, in particular the radical Ba ' th
regime of Syria, encouraged the anti-Hashemite activities of the
fedaveen. on the whole the Arab consensus was a source of support
for Jordan. The rhetoric of the post-1967 war Arab Summit at
Khartoum was suitably radical but the support for the drafting of
the Security Council Resolutions 242 demonstrated real support
for a political solution. Nasser, more than anyone, realized
that Husayn' s moderate and favorable image in the West was pre-
cisely the image the Arab states, including Egypt, needed to
project if they were to have any hope of regaining their lost
lands. Thus, in his study of Nasser's Arab politics, Malcolm




Finally, in September 1970, the open challenge of the Pales-
tinian fedayeen , as demonstrated in the hijacking of three west-
ern airlines to a disused Jordanian airfield, could no longer be
tolerated. Husayn 's own army demanded action and was on the
verge of mutiny. A series of Arab conferences, interventions and
truces followed, in the course of which Nasser died of a heart
attack, but nothing changed the reality that the military forces
of the PLO fedaveen . along with a good many innocent civilians in
the refugee camps, were killed and the PLO was eventually driven
13. Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War. Gamal ' Abd al-Nasir and
His Rivals. 1958-1970





out of Jordan. The Arab states deplored this, but only Syria
sought to intervene militarily and their forces were defeated by
the Jordanian army and air force. It turned out that the govern-
ment overthrown was not in Amman, but in Damascus. Faced with
the choice of deferring to a pan-Arab consensus and survival, the
Hashemite regime had chosen survival. And faced with a choice
between the PLO and King Husayn, Nasser had chosen the Hashemite
monarch. "The supreme irony of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir's career was
that he died in the act of shielding his old enemy Husayn, at the
expense of his old clients the Palestinians." 14
Emboldened by this success, Husayn set out in 1972 to shape
an Arab consensus on the Palestine issue by himself. His "United
Arab Kingdom" proposed a union of the two banks with separate
Palestinian and Jordanian governments with an overall central
government controlling security and foreign affairs. Of course,
this ignored the wishes of the PLO--now rebuilding its organiza-
tions in Beirut. Nothing came of this although major features
continue to surface in various peace plans down to today. The
Arab consensus instead moved once again in 1973, given the lack
of any flexibility on the part of Israel and the disinterest of
the international community, to the option of a more carefully
prepared military and economic action aimed at demonstrating to
both Israel and the West that Israel could not sit forever on her
conquests. Jordan went along with this consensus, but in view of
its weakness and his own caution following the results of unques-
14. Ibid. . p. 153.
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tioning support of the Arab effort in 1967, Husayn's military
action was confined to the belated dispatch of a force to fight
alongside the Syrians on the Golan. Husayn hoped to be included
in the territorial adjustments which had led to new armistice
lines between Israel and Syria and Israel and Egypt. The United
States was drawing up plans for this in 1974, but these were
abandoned as was the international peace conference at Geneva.
Instead, in a very significant move, the Arab summit at
Rabat in 1974 adopted a crucial resolution recognizing the PLC- as
"the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people.
Jordan fought against this resolution with all its strength. It
pointed out that it would greatly complicate or make impossible
the implementation of UN 242, which was the accepted internation-
al basis for a settlement. Finally, Jordan was forced to accept
this resolution, which at least had some effect in moderating the
position of the PLO mainstream. This mainstream, led by Arafat,
accepted the interim goal of the establishment of a Palestinian
state on any territory of Palestine that might be recovered from
Israel. By implication this meant the acceptance, at least
temporarily, of a two-state solution sharing Palestine with
Israel. For some PLO groups this was too much to accept. They
broke with Arafat and Abu Nidal's "Fatah Revolutionary Council"
unleashed a terrorist campaign primarily aimed at the moderate
PLO leadership.
In the mid 1970's Jordan, in effect, withdrew from the
active role it had taken in shaping the Arab consensus since
1967. This phase lasted until after the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in 1982. Husayn felt that any real hope for negotiations
17
had been killed through a combination of the indifference of the
international community. Israeli intransigence and by the Arabs'
own actions in giving a veto power to the PLO by their investing
them with the legitimacy of being "the sole legitimate represen-
tative. "
A new and most revealing test of Husayn's fundamental
attitudes toward the Arab factor of his Palestinian policy came
as a result of the Camp David negotiations of 1978. Even though
the "Framework of Peace in the Middle East" agreed to between
Sadat and Begin on September 17, 1978 provided for a key Jordani-
an role in the West Bank and Gaza, a "self governing authority"
for a five year transition period, and the recognition of "the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just re-
quirements," Jordan refused to participate in the negotiations
envisioned and later actually conducted between Egypt and
Israel. 15 In King Husayn's view... "they were not committed to a
comprehensive settlement. . .they dealt with the Palestinian aspect
of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of establishing autono-
my for the Palestinians that does not give them their natural
legitimate right of sovereignty on their own soil." 16 Instead,
Jordan endorsed the actions of the Baghdad Arab Summit to condemn
Egypt for its "deviation from the Arab ranks" by severing diplo-
matic relations and suspending Egypt's Arab League membership.
15. "Camp David Framework for Peace," Quoted in Walter Z. Laqueur
and Barry Rubin, eds . The Arab-Israeli Reader . 4th ed., revised
(New York, Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 611-12.
16. "Husayn Addresses Summit," Amman Domestic Service in Arabic,
text, as reported in FBIS (9 June 1988), p. 9.
18
Despite the fact of a settlement between the most important Arab
state and Israel, the promised withdrawal of Israeli forces on
the West Bank, Jordan's proposed role in shaping a final settle-
ment along with elected Palestinians, the active role of the
United States at the highest level and Jordan's strained rela-
tionship with the PLO, Jordan was unwilling to be even the second
Arab state to break ranks on the Palestine question. Of course,
the Baghdad Summit did provide a cash bonus in the form of sub-
stantial subsidies from the oil states to the "front-line"
states, as well as the PLO, but every indication is that Jordan
would have refused to go along with the proposed Camp David
framework even without such inducements.
The overall record of Jordan's views on Par-Arabism thus
reveals three fundamental positions:
1. There is a genuine ideological commitment based upon
historic role of the Hashemites as the leaders of "The Great Arab
Revolt." Jordan has the right and duty to attempt to influence
the formulation of a pan-Arab position or even to pursue an
independent policy in the absence of an agreed upon Arab posi-
tion. Jordan's long and intimate experience with this question,
as well as its dangerously exposed position facing potential
Israeli aggression, should give its views a special weight in the
establishment of a pan-Arab consensus.
2. In matters involving internal security Jordan will take
whatever actions it deems necessary, even if those go against the
prevailing Arab consensus.
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3. Jordan will not disregard an established Arab consensus
however much it disagreed with its formulations (as in the Rabat
1974 decision on the PLO) or however enticing are the promised
rewards (as in the Camp David framework)
.
Would Jordan ever violate these principles? In a particu-
larly revealing interview in February 1988 King Husayn himself
admitted that he would:
"I will tell you a little secret. I challenged the United
States repeatedly after 1967 by saying: If you can guaran-
tee that I will recover all my lost territory, including
East Jerusalem, I will be ready to go with you in any
direction that will lead to that goal. However, I know that
the United States can never promise me that. Under no
circumstances will I march in a direction that will only
complicate efforts to solve the entire problem." 17
Thus, he would hypothetically, but the hypothetical preconditions
for such an action would, in fact, be impossible to attain.
C. The Israeli Dimension. .
"It has been my destiny to experience the various phases of
the Palestine tragedy, as well as the results of the imple-
mentation of Zionist plans drawn up by forces which know
what they want and carry out what they have planned, stage
by stage. I have not seen or observed any emergence of the
long-awaited Arab plan which would be capable of defending
17. "King Husayn Comments on Uprising, Peace Process," interview





the just cause of a brotherly and dear people who surely
deserve better than their continued plight currently holds
for them." 18
King Husayn's fundamental dilemma versus Israel is succinct-
ly expressed in this quotation from the speech announcing his
suspension of coordination with the PLO in an effort to enter
into peace negotiations under the auspices of an international
conference. Israel is viewed as a mortal danger to both Pales-
tine, first and foremost, but to Jordan and the Hashemites as
well. There is a strong belief that, had the positions advocated
by his grandfather and himself been accepted when they were
advanced, the position of the Palestines would be much better off
now than is their actual plight. Thus, he did not hesitate to
defend Abdullah's position calling for the acceptance of the 1947
United Nations Palestine Resolution:
"The late King Abdullah ibn al-Husayn sacrificed his life in
his sincere effort to save the biggest part of Palestine.
Through his sharp discernment, he knew the significance of
the historical phase through vehicle our nation was passing




King Husayn is correct in pointing out the long and direct
experience of his family with Zionism. In January 1918, only two
18. "Hussein's February 19 Speech on the Peace Process," Official
Jordanian Translation, Message from AMEMBASSY, AMMAN to SECSTATE,
WASH, D.C. 2114, Sect. 27 of 28, 19 Feb 1986.
19. "King Husayn Address," Amman Domestic Service, 22 November
1984, as reported in FBIS, 26 November 1984, p. A-14.
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months after the announcement of the Balfour Declaration, D. G.
Hogarth, head of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, paid an official visit
to Sharif Husayn in Jidda in order to explain the declaration.
His explanation was that, "Jewish settlement in Palestine would
be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the political
and economic freedom of the Arab population." 20 This explanation
was confirmed when a Zionist delegation, headed by Dr. Weizmann
himself, stopped in Cairo on its way to Palestine in March of
that year. In June, Dr. Weizmann visited Emir Faysal's camp near
Aqaba where he reaffirmed that the Zionists had no intention of
working for the establishment of the Jewish government. Finally,
in January 1919, under strong British pressure and in hopes of
their fulfillment of pledges made promising Arab independence,
Emir Faysal signed an agreement with Dr. Weizmann in London to
work, "through the closest possible collaboration in the develop-
ment of the Arab State and Palestine." 21 Although this agree-
ment, which was not authorized by King Husayn, clearly acknowl-
edge two entities—an Arab State and Palestine—calling for the
determination of "definite boundaries" between them, its declared
aim was the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. The Hashe-
mites had no quarrel with the official explanation of this decla-
ration as conveyed to them by both the British government and the
20. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Beirut: Khayat's, 1955),
p. 268.
21. The text of the agreement is given in Ibid . . Appendix "F,"
pp. 437-39.
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Zionist officials. Faysal, however, took the additional precau-
tion of adding a postscript in his own hand:
"Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in
my memorandum dated 4th of January 1919, to the Foreign
Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in
the above articles. But if the slightest modification or
departure were to be made (in relation to the demands in the
Memorandum) I shall not then be bound by a single word of
the present agreement which shall be deemed void and if no
account of validity, and I shall not be answerable in any
way whatsoever." 22
In the end, of course, Faysal 's fears instead of his hopes
proved to be correct. The British still continued to hope for
the endorsement of King Husayn of their Middle Eastern policies,
especially as they related to Palestine. Even though they made
the signing of an alliance and the continuation of their subsi-
dy, both vital for the defense of the Hejaz against the Saudis,
conditional on King Husayn' s endorsement their Palestine mandate,
he refused to do so and was driven from the Hejaz in 1925. His
great-grandson referred to this in his address to the 17th Pales-
tine National Council: "Al-Sharif Husayn, and rest his soul in
peace, sacrificed his throne in defense of Palestine's Arabism
when he refused to sign the treaty with Britain unless it provid-
ed for the cancellation of the Balfour Declaration." 23 What King
Husayn forgets to mention, however, is the fact that this refusal
22. Ibid .
23. "King Husayn Address," loc. cit
.
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was against the advice of Emir Abdullah, who had, in fact, nego-
tiated a treaty for his father with Colonel T. E. Lawrence in
1921. 24 Clearly, Abdullah was aware that the Zionists and an
important element of the British government wished to include the
Trans-Jordanian portions of the Palestine mandate into the Pales-
tine Mandate administration, and thus in the implementation of
the Balfour Declaration. This was strongly advocated by Sir
Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner of Palestine. 25
From the direct experience of his family, thus, Husayn
reaches his assessment of Israel goals, which have, in his view,
dual motives:
"To occupy the land of Palestine and expand the territory of
Israel. ...Expanding Israeli territory, through occupation
of Arab lands, would fulfill one of Zionism's cherished aims
while at the same time achieving from their point of view a
security need arising more from psychological considerations
than from those of space, distance and topography." 26
The psychological dimension arises from the fact that Israel was
planted on expropriated Arab lands, making its acceptance and
co-existence with the larger Arab body a large problem, a problem
which it attempted to solve by force. .. "embarking on a vicious
circle: the more force it used to impose itself, the greater Arab
qualms and rejection, which in turn served to fuel Israel's fears





26. "Husayn 's Feb 19 Speech on the Peace Process," op. cit. . Sec.
03.
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growing from an awareness of the resentment of its imposed crea-
tion in the midst of a vast sea of Arabs, and, consequently, to
trigger greater security concerns." Thus, although the neighbor-
ing Arab countries accepted Israel's existence though UN Resolu-
tions 242 and 338 in 1967 and 1973:
"Israel resorted to procrastination in order to gain time
to create new facts in the occupied territories as a prelude
to annexing them. . . In order to impose its will by force,
Israel continues to hold on to the concept of security based
on territorial expansion and military strength." 27
This negative assessment must be balanced against the fact
that, given the choice between the loss of his throne and asking
for Israeli military support in response to Syrian armed inter-
vention in support of the PLO in September 1970, King Husayn was
willing to appeal in the last resort, through the U.S., for
Israeli military support. Even in this case, he was suspicious
that Israel would take advantage of the crises to launch a ground
attack designed to capture Jordanian territory. 28 Thus, he pre-
ferred American air support over Israeli and Israeli ground
actions on Syrian soil versus intervention in Jordan. In the
end, neither American nor Israeli military support was necessary
although their well publicized preparations might have induced
27. "Husayn 's Feb. 19 Speech on the Peace Process," op. cit. , Sec
03.
28. Donald Neff, "Origin of US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation,"
American -Arab Affairs , No. 21 (Summer 1987), p. 80; see also
William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1977) , Chapter IV.
25
caution in Syria and certainly emboldened the Jordanians. In
fact, the Syrian armored attack was doomed once the Syrian Air
Force refused to provide it cover due to the internal struggle
between the air force commander, Hafez al-Assad, and other ele-
ments of the Baath Party loyal to Salih Jedid. The intermediary
role of the United States simultaneously served to guarantee that
an Israeli intervention would not be turned into an attack on
Jordan as well.
Israel's goal is to perpetrate its occupation with the aim
of gradually expropriating and absorbing the territory. Its next
goal is to separate the Palestinian people from the land. There
are, according to King Husayn, three options available to the
Israeli leadership to accomplish this:
1. "The first argues for the annexation of the greater and
less densely populated part of occupied Palestinian
territory, and a return to Jordan of the remaining and
more densely populated segment. It is referred to as
the Jordanian option, which we have rejected."
2. "The second option calls for annexing the entire terri-
tories and granting autonomy to the Palestinian inhabi-
tants without sovereignty over their land, on the
grounds that they are a large foreign community living
in Israeli territory. This is an attempt to separate
the Palestinians from their land as a prelude to their
eviction when conditions permit. The Palestinians have
rejected this option, and so have we."
3. "The third option demands the annexation of territory
and the eviction of the inhabitants east through mili-
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tary force. This prospect, however, does not lend
itself to mere rejection but requires much preparation
on our part to ensure that it does not happen." 29
In examining all three of these options in a later speech, the
King pointed out that, "Israel... draws up its expansionist
policy on the basis of solving the Palestine question either in
or through Jordan, at the expense of both Palestine and
Jordan." 30
Nevertheless, the Hashemites do not feel that a compromise
with Israel, in the context of the UN 242 Resolution and the
recognition of Palestinian rights, is impossible. When asked by
a BBC reporter if there was anything that Jordan could do to make
life easier for Shimon Peres, Crown Prince Hasan denied that
Jordan could do anything to influence Israeli politics.
"We have no indications that the present formula of the
government of national unity is going to change at all...
Our only hope is that whichever incumbent will have the will
to go out on a limb if and when the context is right, to say
that Israel can once again become a part of the region and
can contribute in a cooperative effort to develop the re-
gion. " 3 1
29. "Hussein's Feb 19 Speech," Sec. 05.
30. "Husayn Addresses Summit," Amman Domestic Service, 8 June
1988, as reported in FBIS, 9 June 1988, p. 11.
31. "Crown Price Hasan Interviewed on PLO, Syria, Israel," Amman
TV, 29 May 1966, as reported in FBIS . 30 May 1988, p. F-2
.
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The fact remains that the Jordanian government did divide Pales-
tine with Israel in a relatively stable and peaceful relationship
between the 1948 and 1967 wars and it was viewed afterwards, at
least by one of Israel's major parties, as a viable partner in a
renewed partition of the occupied territories in the so called
"Jordanian option."
A major reason cited for Jordan's rejection of this option,
and probably the most important one, is the fact that this would
flaunt the Arab states' consensus as well as alienate more Pales-
tinians than it would please
—
given the limited amount of terri-
tory that even a Labor Party government would return. However,
even a narrow assessment of Israeli aims can raise questions on
the viability of such an agreement. Before the rise to promi-
nence of the Israeli right wing and under what was probably the
weakest government in Israeli history, that of Levi Eshkol
,
Israel launched a massive "retaliatory" strike at the Jordanian
West Bank village of Samu in November 1966. Supposedly, the
cause of the "retaliation" were some of the first raids of the
then Syrian-sponsored Palestinian fedayeen groups. This attack
caused dangerous rioting on the West Bank, as Palestinians de-
manded that they be given arms for self defense, since the gov-
ernment was unable to defend them. Even more importantly, it
altered Jordan's strategic view of Israel, for it had made no
distinction between a status-quo Arab state, Jordan, and the
aggressive Syrian regime which had actually sponsored the feda-
veen operations. Thus, there was a deep suspicion that Israel
was trying to provoke the Jordanians into a rash counterattack or
to cause the dispersal of forces from their defensive positions
28
in a futile attempt to defend every West Bank village as a pre-
liminary to the conquest of the entire West Bank. In the end,
these considerations figured prominently in Jordan's decision the
following year to join the combined Arab eastern front command
leading to the disaster of 1967. 32
Obviously, circumstances now are different, but even more
dangerous for Jordan. Perhaps the best assessment of this
position has been stated by the leading Israeli specialist on
Jordan, Dr. Asher Susser of Tel Aviv University's Dayan Center
for Middle Eastern Studies:
"From the Jordanian point of view, there is a big difference
between Israel under a Labor government, which believed in
negotiating with Jordan for the purpose of returning the
West Bank to Jordanian control, and a Likud government,
which does not believe in territorial compromise. There are
even elements in Likud which believe in making Jordan a
Palestinian state. Thus a right-wing government in Israel
is perceived by the Jordanians as a threat, whereas a Labor
government is perceived as a potential ally." 33
D. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
"Dealing with the world necessitates permanent flexibility
and dynamism. Let us remember that slogans will not be
32. Al-Mutawi, op. cit.
. pp. 69-84.
33. Asher Susser, "King Hussayn Profiled," The Israeli Economist
(Feb 1989), pp. 9-10, as reported in Joint Publications Research





raised if they become chains which tie those who raise them
and prevent them from moving and maneuvering." 34
From the long-range perspective of the Hashemites, as well as
from his personal experience. King Husayn clearly expects that
any settlement of the Palestine issue will necessarily involve
the major powers - just as major powers were involved in its
creation. King Abdullah, of all the sons of Sharif Husayn, was
always considered by both the British and Arabs to be the premier
diplomatist of the Hashemites. Through this ability, more than
through any inherent strength of his positions, Abdullah was able
to transform the chaotic post-war position of 1920-21 into a
kingdom of his own. If anything, this hereditary skill seems
even more evident in the hands of his grandson as is amply
attested to by the survival of a weak, artificial and dependent
state with the direct and indirect support of a diverse group of
foreign supporters - British, Americans, Egyptians, Saudis - and
even occasionally Israelis.
It is a fact that all of the parties involved in the 20th
century conflict over Palestine have to consider Jordan as, in
one way or another, a key part in any solution. This, in turn,
has served as a major factor in the legitimization of the Hashe-
mite rule. As a noted Palestinian editor and scholar pointed
out, "Palestine is the number one role for King Husayn; it gives
34. "King Husayn Addresses 17th PNC Session," Amman Domestic
Service, 22 Nov. 1984, as reported in FBIS, 26 November 1984, p.
A-14.
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Jordan the international weight it would not otherwise have." 35
As we have already noted, the solutions proposed at both levels
of the Israeli political spectrum involve the solution of the
Palestine problem through Jordan, with the Labor Alignment fol-
lowing its "Jordanian option" involving the return of some terri-
tory, while Likud '
s
solutions of either autonomy or annexation
would lead in the longer or shorter run to demographic and polit-
ical movements which would transform the Hashemite Kingdom into
the Palestinian state.
In the aftermath of the 1967 war King Husayn played a key
role on behalf of the Arab states, with the cooperation of Presi-
dent Nasser, as their envoy to the international community. In
November 1967, those efforts were rewarded by the passage of the
unanimous Security Council Resolutions 242, embodying the basic
principle of the exchange of occupied land for peace. 36 As a
practical matter, the participation in and subsequent guarantees
of a settlement would necessarily have to involve the interna-
tional community, particularly the two superpowers. This view
was stressed by the monarch in his televised address to the
National Association of Arab-Americans in 1985:
"We believe," he said, "that the Middle East crisis has such
global significance that it cannot be settled in isolation.
The area has often been said to be the powderkeg that could
set off World War III. It surely is a legitimate interest
35. Personal interview, Mohammed Hallaj , editor of Palestine
Perspectives , May 1986.
36. A1-Mutawi , op. cit., pp. 177-80.
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of other relevant parties to participate in negotiations
designed to ensure such a catastrophe never occurs... We
feel that such participations will also add credibility, to
the international guarantees that will be required to imple-
ment whatever solution is reached." 37
The principle of land for peace in UN 242, coupled with the
principle of international negotiations in UNSC Resolution 338 of
1973, thus offer the best, and probably the only, hope for a
permanent settlement. They have formed the basis for other
proposals, including those of the United States and those pro-
posed by the Arab summit at Fez in 1982. King Husayn pointed out
this political reality in his address to the Palestine National
Council meeting in Amman in November 1984: "The existing
conditions in the Palestine, Arab, and international arenas
prompt us to adhere to Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis
for a just, peaceful settlement. The principle of territory in
exchange for peace is our guideline for any initiative we may
present to the world. 38
Certainly, a key element in the importance of the
international context is the necessity of United States involve-
ment in the peace process. As Israel's major foreign backer, it
is certain that American guarantees are the only ones that might
bring Israel to relinquish territory on the West Bank in exchange
for peace. However, American participation has to be in a broad-
37. "Husayn Addresses Annual Convention of Arab-Americans," Amman
TV in English, 4 May 1985, as reported in FBIS, 6 May 1985, p.
F-2.
38. "King Husayn Addresses 17th PNC Session," op. cit. . p. A-17.
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er international context, such as that specified by United Na-
tions' Resolutions 242, and 338, leading to the Geneva Conference
following the 1973 war. The only logical alternative is for the
United States to participate as a broker in what are, essential-
ly, bilateral negotiations with Israel. Jordan's experience
with these kinds of negotiations have been highly unsatisfactory.
In the disengagement negotiations following the 1973 war, accord-
ing to King Husayn, "Jordan was shunned from the peace process
which was led by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
It transpired that the peaceful efforts were devoted to the
Syrian and Egyptian sides, and not to the Palestinian side," 39
Jordanian rejection of the Camp David accords has already been
described.
Indeed, Jordan could logically conclude from the fact that
its participation in the Camp David autonomy negotiations had
been assumed as a given by the United States (as well as by Egypt
and Israel) without its consent, that it would have little chance
to protect its own interests - let alone secure any acceptable
solution for the Palestinians - through bilateral negotiations
brokered by the United States. It is thus much more preferable
to assure the participation of the United States in the broader
internationally recognized context of UN 242, to which the United
States as a party to that resolution could hardly object.
Jordan's dilemma vis-a-vis the United States rests on funda-
mental contradiction. On the one hand, any settlement with
39. Ibid. , p. A-15.
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Israel depends upon the active leadership and participation of
the United States as an honest broker in the negotiations. On
the other hand, in the words of King Husayn to the extraordinary
Arab Summit convened to respond to the "intifadah",
..."the United States adopts no foreign policy in the Middle
East other than support for Israel. Its behavior toward the
Arab-Israeli conflict is, unfortunately, based on a policy
of crisis management. The United States does not embark on
any political move or peace initiative except after the
eruption of the situations in the region in the form of
wars." 40
The problem for Jordan is that these wars, while presenting at
least a hope of American action in response to a crisis, simulta-
neously pose direct threats to Jordan itself. Even worse is the
fact that Congressional forces, whose consent is necessary for
aid and military sales needed to sustain Jordan's independence,
are increasingly likely to tie those forms of bilateral relations
to Jordan's acceptance of direct negotiations with Israel. Thus,
although the Reagan Administration was opposed, Congress insisted
in 1985 that arms aid would not be approved unless "accompanied
by a Presidential certification of Jordan's public commitment to
the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly
with Israel under the basic tenets of resolutions 242 and 338.
"
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40. "Husayn Addresses Summit," Amman Domestic Service in Arabic, 8
June 1988, as reported in FBIS, 9 June 1988, p. 12.
41. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hear-
ing
,
Proposed Arms Sales to the Kingdom of Jordan, (99th Con-
gress, First Session, 10 October 1985, p. 3.
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In the short term, these dilemmas over arms could be solved by
turning to other suppliers, such as the Soviet Union, France and
the U.K. In the longer term, however, given Israel's already
strong position and the unmistakable rightward shift of Israeli
politics, what had been an unfortunate but tolerable status quo
was being swiftly transformed into a direct threat to Jordan's
very existence. Jordan's fundamental strategy, therefore, must
be to take maximum advantage of situations of crisis to involve
the United States in a search for a settlement, and such a search
will, inevitably, lead to a broader international context along





King Husayn's policies on the Palestine question revolve
around the realities of the divisions of the Palestinian people
created as a result of the 1967 war. Similarly, these same
divisions gave rise to the emergence of the PLO as an independent
umbrella organization of Palestinian parties and organizations.
Jordan's policies towards the Palestinian question are unique
among those of Arab states in that they must deal simultaneously
with all segments of the divided Palestinian people, with the
sole exception of those incorporated as Israeli citizens in the
1949 boundaries of Israel. Only the PLO, which in theory refuses
to recognize any divisions in the whole Palestinian nation in-
cluding those Palestinians who are now Israeli citizens, has a
more comprehensive policy. For Jordan, the relevant segments of
the Palestinians can be reduced to three broad categories:
1. The Jordanian-Palestinians of the East Bank;
2. The Palestinians under Israeli occupation in the West
Bank, Jerusalem (former Jordanian territory) and the Gaza
Strip. . .usually known as "The West Bank," even though Gaza is
fast approaching the population of the West Bank proper.
3. The Palestinians in the Diaspora, principally in the
Middle East, but in Europe, the United States and elsewhere as
well.
The Jordanian-Palestinians of the East Bank are the most
neglected segment in the analysis of Jordanian policy, yet in all
36
probability they are the most relevant segment from the point of
yiew of the Hashemites. Although the government attempts to
downplay their numbers and there is no separate count of them,
except those who are still in refugee camps or claiming United
Nations refugee aid, they are clearly a majority and possibly a
two-thirds majority of the population of the East Bank. As a
legacy of the PLO-Hashemite Jordanian Civil War of 1970-71, these
are usually thought of as impoverished, radical and discontented
refugees, and at least potential supporters of the overthrow of
the Hashemites and the establishment of a Palestinian state in
Jordan as the stepping-stone for the liberation of all of Pales-
tine. But, from the Hashemite point of view, their greatest
success story over the two decades since the 1967 war has been
the gradual integration of most of these into the fabric of
Jordanian society, including prominent governmental and royal
court positions, and their domination of the economic and intel-
lectual life of the state. These accomplishments are apolitical
in the active sense (since all overt political activity was
banned in Jordan until 1989) , but they are of tremendous politi-
cal impact in the larger sense. Certainly, this community main-
tains a special interest in the fate of Palestine, particularly
the West Bank, and have continuous familial, social and economic
ties to the Palestinians of the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Most of these ties could only be maintained through the unspoken
modus vivendi represented in the Israeli "open bridges" policy
and the de facto cooperation of Jordan and Israel.
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They have benefited, as have the original East Bank Jordani-
ans, from a situation of general economic prosperity, sustained
by Arab and Western aid as well as by the employment remittances
and employment opportunities in the Gulf. Administratively, the
Jordanian state has provided a stable, free and effective govern-
ment services to all citizens. Although by no means a democracy,
it compared not unfavorably with neighboring Arab regimes, which




Jordan's Palestinian policy is probably most closely attuned
to the views of this segment and, in all probability, their views
are closest to King Husayn's personal views. In fact, King
Husayn's own views are more "pro-Palestinian" than those of his
most loyal "East Bank" elite, tribal and military supporters,
including his own Hashemite family. This policy in the 1967-88
period was based on three related premises:
1. Jordan continued to hold de jure sovereignty over the
West Bank and East Jerusalem;
2. This fact was recognized by the UN 242 and 338
resolutions, supported by the Arab political consensus, the
international community and the Israeli Labor Party. Thus, the
only feasible way for the return of the West Bank to Arab rule
was through the reestablishment, through some form of interna-
tional agreement, of Jordanian sovereignty;
1. The best survey of contemporary Jordan, although prior to the
intifadah and the resumptions of Jordanian political activities
in 1989, is that of Arthur R. Day, East Bank/West Bank. Jordan
and the Prospects for Peace . (New York: Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 1986) .
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3. The PLO's rejection of UN 242 and its reliance on the
Arab endorsement of their position of "Sole Legitimate Represen-
tative" of the Palestinian people at the 1974 Rabat Summit, was
ineffective because there was no political or military means to
force Israel (backed by the United States) to recognize this
position. Indeed, Arab support for this position was modified in
practice by their simultaneous support for UN 242.
Thus, the real choice for the Jordanian-Palestinians was
between someone who had a possibility of getting back the West
Bank through negotiations (King Husayn) and someone who, either
because of his character or because of the different constituen-
cies he had to appeal to, vacillated between a political settle-
ment, a military solution through guerrilla war, or a long-term
policy of strengthening the PLO in preparation for a decisive
struggle at some later date (Arafat) . This last policy, in fact,
became the dominate one of the mainstream PLO from 1970 to 1982.
The danger of such a strategy was obvious, and many even within
the PLO admitted privately that it tended to become self-inter-
ested bureaucratic and political empire building by an entrenched
and unresponsive leadership as symbolized by the PLO "state
within a state" in Lebanon. 2
From the Hashemite monarch's point of view, his policy
towards the Palestinian question yielded a number of dividends.
First of all, should this policy actually result in the regaining
of the substantial portion of the occupied territories, difficult
but not impossible, it would certainly add to his prestige in the
2. Personal interview with a PLO official, 1986.
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Arab world and among the Palestinians as a whole. Personally, it
would erase the stigma of being the Arab leader who had lost all
of historic Palestine to the Zionists. Unlike Sadat's policies
at Camp David, which were seen in the Arab world as the abandon-
ment of the Palestinians for the sake of Egyptian self-interest,
a Jordanian-Israeli peace settlement acceptable to Jordan would
mean the freeing of over a million Arabs from Zionist rule and
the regaining of the Holy City of Jerusalem. Should this be
achieved, the PLCs insistence on its role as "the sole legiti-
mate representative" would seem hollow indeed. In fact, there
was every reason to believe that if this outcome seemed possible
Arafat would be forced to negotiate a junior role for the PLO in
backing the negotiations and hoping to lead a Palestinian section
of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian United Kingdom. This was the
actual position of Arafat during the period of the Husayn-Arafat
Agreement of 1985. The acknowledgement of the separate identity
of Palestinians under the United Kingdom plan, coupled with the
reality of Jordanian control over foreign policy and security (as
well as what would be a domination of the economy by the now much
more highly developed East Bank) would satisfy the natural sympa-
thy of the Jordanian-Palestinians for their brothers and would,
in fact, open many new opportunities in the unified economies and
government for the Jordanian-Palestinians.
On the other hand, should this policy not succeed in regain-
ing the occupied territories, which was in all probability the
most likely outcome, the existing stalemate of "no war, no peace"
was by no means without advantages of its own.
40
1. It created a common interest of the Jordanians and
Israelis in the suppression of the radical PLO elements which
might disturb the rule of either the Hashemites on the East Bank
or the Israelis on the West Bank.
2. The "no war" position kept Jordan's position as a
recipient of Western political, economic and military aid,
especially from the United States, while the "no peace" position
kept the support of the rich Arab states, including direct
financial subsidies as a "front line" state. This support, in
turn, provided the basis for Jordan's economic prosperity and
internal stability.
3. It kept the PLO embroiled in its internal conflict
between its "realist" wing of Arafat seeking a political settle-
ment and its radicals, particularly George Habbash, seeking a
military solution through guerrilla warfare and the overthrow of
"reactionary" Arab regimes as a necessary preliminary.
4. All parties interested, even if in the long run, in a
political settlement, including Israel, the West, the Soviets and
the major Arab governments, had an interest in the preservation
of Jordan from both internal and external threats. .. such as the
radical PLO parties and factions, and the Syrians. To the extent
that Arafat shared this objective, the mainstream of the PLO was
a de facto , albeit silent, ally of King Husayn. An analysis of
their policy in the post-1970 period demonstrates that their
policies were in fact parallel and complementary. Arafat concen-
trated on the construction of a PLO "state within a state" in
Lebanon. In theory this was designed eventually to confront
Israel militarily but in reality it reasserted the PLO's claim to
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be a party to a negotiated settlement following the destruction
of its Jordanian bases in 1970-71. Although this participation,
and indeed exclusive representation, was guaranteed by the Rabat
Summit declaration of 1974, it would have little reality without
some territorial or organizational base. A purely "paper" organ-
ization would soon loose the support of the Palestinians in the
Diaspora, not to mention the West Bank. For his part, King
Husayn was free to pursue his policy of building the Jordanian
state as the bastion against further Zionist expansion to the
East while simultaneously playing his international and Arab role
as the indispensable Arab party in any peace process based upon
the United Nations 242 and 338 resolutions.
5. The uncertainties of a negotiating process, the repre-
sentation of Palestinians under the situation of Israeli occupa-
tion of Jordanian territory, as well as the continuation of a
formal state of war, together served to justify the suspension of
the Jordanian Constitution, including the holding of elections
and martial law restrictions on political activities, the press
and other democratic freedoms.
The beauty of King Husayn 's Palestinian polities lay in the
fact that, ordinarily, they required very little expenditure of
effort or resources and, consequently, low risks of great losses.
The principal forms of activity in their implementation, in
practice, lay in a seemingly endless series of state and private
visits, international, Arab and academic conferences, and the
reception of a stream of foreign visitors. Aside from the fact
that King Husayn, as well as Crown Prince Hassan, found such
42
intellectual exercises congenial and even stimulating, they
served to reinforce the politically advantageous role of the
Hashemite monarch as the elder statesman of the Arab world...
a
role which would inevitably lead to a prominent position in any
political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Major changes in these politices, especially if they
involved a Jordanian initiative, came about only in response to a
very marked change in the environment and only when there was a
clear and present danger to Jordanian interests or an equally
clear opportunity for a major gain. In the 1970s there were two
such initiatives: the move against the PLO in the Jordanian
Civil War of 1970-71 and the proposal of the United Kingdom plan
of 1972. In the 1980s there were three: the Husayn-Araf at
agreement of 1985, the repudiation of this agreement by King
Husayn in 1986 and the renunciation of Jordanian sovereignty over
the West Bank in 1988.
B. The Jordanian Civil War of 1970-71
This event was the gravest challenge to the existence of the
Hashemite state in Jordan in its entire history. Although more
has been written of it than any other event in the history of
Jordanian-Palestinian relations, its impact on Jordan's subse-
quent politices towards the Palestinian question have rarely been
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addressed systematically. 3 To do this, we must return to the
period immediately following the defeat of the 1967 war.
Jordan's initial position following the disaster of June
1967 was based on two contradictory premises. The first was the
political premise of regaining the occupied territory on the West
Bank through negotiations based upon the UN 242 Resolution of
November 1967. This had the advantage of the support of
unanimous Security Council and the consensus of the Arab states,
which included the shaken but still formidable figure of Egypt's
Nasser. The second premise was the drastic decline in Hashemite
prestige and Jordanian internal security coupled with the rise of
the Palestinian guerrilla organizations to prominence and eventu-
ally to their take-over of the PLO. Thus, King Husayn felt it
necessary to declare "We are all fedayeen now" and to allow the
formation of a number of Palestinian armed formations on Jordani-
an territory.
The contradictions inherent in this policy grew too great to
sustain in the summer of 1970. Although Arafat still wished to
continue cooperation with King Husayn, at least as a tactic, the
radical PLO organizations led by the PFLP were openly challenging
the authority of the Jordanian government even in the capital,
and were clear in their intentions to remove the Hashemites in
favor of a Palestinian government on the East Bank. Israeli
retaliation against the PLO was devastating the Jordan Valley and
3. The best accounts of this period are those contained in Wil-
liam B. Quant, Decade of Decisions (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1977) , and Malcolm H. Kerr, The
Arab Cold War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971)
.
44
threatened to engulf the entire kingdom in a full-scale war, for
the fedayeen headquarters were located right in Amman itself.
The most fervent Hashemite supporters, even within the elite
bedouin combat units of the army, were becoming so humiliated
with the passivity and hesitation of the monarch that there was a
danger to their continued loyalty. There were still 20,000 Iraqi
troops (controlled by a Ba th regime) on Jordanian soil, while
the neighboring Syrian regime was still under the control of the
radical Ba'th faction that had first provided military training
and equipment to the PLO guerrillas and had thus precipitated the
1967 war. Both Ba'th regimes were open enemies of Arab monar-
chies in general and the Hashemites in particular.
On the positive side, to be sure, there was the hoped for
support of the United States and the often-declared policy of
Israel not to allow the establishment of a PLO state in Jordan.
Also on the positive side was the fact that Nasser was in the
same boat, though without the complication of the presence of an
armed PLO force on his territory. Like Husayn, Nasser's post-
1967 policy was based on a contradiction. While working for a
political solution within the context of the UN 242 Resolution,
he simultaneously was involved in an escalating military confron-
tation with the Israelis along the cease fire line on the Suez
Canal. Israeli superiority, especially deep penetration air
raids, forced him to accept the disengagement plan of Secretary
of State William Rogers in August 1970. The PLO ' s public criti-
cism of this from its Cairo-based radio resulted in the closure
of the station. Although it was infinitely more dangerous for
King Husayn to move against the PLO than for Nasser, it was
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reassuring that Nasser could not lend his weight to the expected
pan-Arab condemnation that such a move would surely entail.
Thus, Husayn acted without explicit prior assurances of support
from the United States and Israel, although he did appeal for
these assurances prior to his military confrontation with the
attacking Syrian armor. 4
The political position established through the success of
the Jordanian forces versus the PLO forces and the Syrians was
that Jordan was opting for a political solution. It would not
allow a military challenge to Israel from its territory and, most
importantly, the position of the PLO as a rival for the leader-
ship of the Palestinian-Jordanian population of the East Bank was
eliminated as a real option. As a whole, the Palestinian-Jorda-
nian population of the East Bank did not involve themselves in
the Civil War, with the exception of the refugee camps where the
fedayeen had their bases.
The West Bank, securely under Israeli occupation, was not
involved directly in the Civil War but its lesson could have
hardly been lost upon these Palestinians: the military option of
the PLO had been defeated and the major Arab states had accepted,
albeit with many warnings and protestations, the Jordanian policy
of a political solution. This made King Husayn the best, if not
the only, option for the removal of the Israeli occupation. For
the PLO, the war certainly served to reinforce its negative view
of the Hashemites but, on the other hand, Arafat had always
4. Interview, Ambassador (Ret.), L. Dean Brown, Washington, D.C.,
1986.
46
questioned the wisdom of the radical PLO parties policies of
challenging the Jordanian regime beyond its breaking point.
These actions, including the hijacking of Western airliners and
attempted assassinations of the king, meant that they shared the
blame for the debacle.
C. The United Arab Kingdom Plan. 1972
The results of the Jordanian Civil War initially marginal-
ized and externalized the role of the PLO. From a position where
it had been able to operate freely and share de-facto authority
with the Jordanian state, it was now forced into a new refugee
status in Lebanon. There it had to build a new political and
military base among a largely apolitical and much less numerous
population of Palestinian refugees. For their part, however much
the Jordanian-Palestinians might agree with the ultimate PLO aim
of an independent Palestinian state, they had to deal with the
existing reality of the Jordanian state, and the PLO could hardly
help them in those dealings. King Husayn's objective of negoti-
ating for the return of the West Bank appeared much more credible
than did the PLO * s position of seeking "a secular, democratic
state in all of Palestine" through protracted guerrilla war. The
PLO and its radical Ba • th allies in Syria had been defeated by
the Hashemite Arab Army and Air Force while the Arab states
looked on or passed ineffective resolutions. Indeed, the radical
Ba'th regime had been overthrown by the pragmatic General al-
Assad as a direct consequence of its failed, adventurous attempt
to overthrow King Husayn. Thus a military solution to the Pales-
tine question, which was the only solution then offered by the
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PLO, seemed remote indeed. On the other hand, King Husayn 's
actions had proved his ability to control Palestinians radicals
on the East Bank and that could only impress the Israelis that he
could be trusted to control them on the West Bank as well — as
the Hashemites had done before 1967.
The focus of Hashemite Palestinian policy thus shifted from
the East Bank to the segment of the Palestinians formerly under
Jordanian rule on the West Bank. Given the stated positions of
the major players—Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the United States —
negotiations for a settlement along the lines of UN 242 now
appeared to be merely a matter of time. This was all the more
likely following the 1970 withdrawal of Begin' s Gahal (the earli-
er version of the Likud Bloc) from Israel's national coalition
government in protest over Israel's acceptance of the principle
of withdrawal in the Sinai included in the Rogers Plan.
In later years, as in his speech of February 1986 suspending
the agreement between the PLO and Jordan, King Husayn referred to
his United Arab Kingdom Plan as an appeal to the PLO to demon-
strate Jordan's long term commitment to Palestinian political
rights beyond the mere acquiring of the territory lost in 1967.
It is not impossible that this considerations has some validity.
Even in the wake of the bitterness of the Civil war there were
moderate elements within the PLO who realized that Jordan contin-
ued to be vital to their ultimate goal of a Palestinian state —
and more might be achieved by cooperation than by confrontation.
Still, it is curious that King Husayn waited a year and a
half to announce this policy. The time sequence demonstrates, in
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fact, that the United Arab Kingdom plan was announced to give a
political foundation for the Hashemites regaining in practice the
representation of the West Bank Palestinians that they continued
to claim de jure . It was announced the month before municipal
elections on the West Bank and undoubtedly had some effect,
despite its repudiations by the PLO and by Egypt, which went so
far as to sever diplomatic relations with Jordan. Although it
might be supposed that the Hashemite regime which had never given
fair political representation to its Palestinian citizens would
have little attraction for the West Bank Palestinians when com-
pared to the PLO, this was not necessarily the case. 5 From a
practical point of view, the messianic vision of a secular demo-
cratic state in all of Palestine offered by the PLO was an impos-
sible dream -- and a dream that could be made a reality only by
military means. Jordan, on the other hand, offered the more
attainable goal of ending Israeli occupation rule by political
means. Any such a return of the West Bank to Jordanian rule,
with or without the participation of its inhabitants, would bring
grave consequences for anti-Hashemite elements returned to the
scrutiny of the Jordanian security services. Finally, the PLO
had never really developed its own power base on the West Bank.
Although founded in Jerusalem in 1964, the PLO s leadership had
always been overwhelmingly from the Palestinian refugees from
areas within Israel's 1949 borders. Its centers were in Cairo,
5. Shmuel Sandler and Hillel Frisch, Israel . the Palestinians and
the West Bank. A Study in Intercommunal Conflict (lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1984), p. 91. This book is one of the most
valuable background studies for the understanding of the current
problems raised by the intifadah .
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Beirut and Damascus, not on the West Bank. Prior to 1967 Jordan
had prevented the PLO from building a structure on the West Bank.
The PLO's activities were specifically launched in 1966. In the
years between 1967 and 1970 the PLO concentrated on building its
organizational and military bases on the East Bank although,
ultimately, its military strategy based on the experience of the
Algerian war of independence called for the mobilization of the
entire Palestinian population under Israeli control.
In his offer of a Jordanian version of Palestinian autonomy
("Hashemitism with a human face") King Husayn aimed to bolster
his supporters on the West Bank in preparation for the municipal
elections of 1972. On the West Bank itself, this policy was a
resounding success. Although pro-PLO mayors were elected in
Ramallah, al Bireh and Tulkarm, traditional stalwarts of the
Jordanian period were elected in Bethlehem, Nablus and Hebron.
In all, eighteen of the twenty-one mayors represented traditional
elements although many of them were from a new generation of
younger professionals. 6 Perhaps most significant was the fact
that participation was 85 percent (versus 50 percent under Jorda-
nian rule) despite the fact that PLO had totally rejected the
election. King Husayn clearly won the first round in his contest
with the PLO for the representation of the West Bank Palestin-
ians.
This election had immediate repercussions on the PLO, which
was forced to develop a program of political activity within the
6. Ibid. . p. 86.
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territories and with regard to achievement of its ultimate goal
through political as well as military means. Thus, at the 10th
session of the PNC in Cairo in 1972, a month after the United
Arab Kingdom Plan, resolutions called for the organizing of trade
unions and providing assistance to organizations and institutions
in the territories. In 1973 the PNC called first for mobiliza-
tion and second for arming the masses -- clearly, the mobiliza-
tion called for was the political mobilization within the terri-
tories. This mobilization was to be accomplished by the forma-
tion of a political organization which became known as the Pales-
tinian National Front. Finally, following the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War, came the PNC ' s June 1974 resolution for a plausible politi-
cal strategy, and one which appealed to the inhabitants of the
West Bank. This was the establishment of a "militant, "independ-
ent popular administration in every part of Palestine which is
liberated." 7
Bolstered by the greater self-confidence of the Arab states
as a result of their relative success in the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War, and by the PLO ' s adoption of a more realistic political
program, the Arab states endorsed the exclusive representational
role of the PLO for the Palestinian people at the Rabat Arab
Summit of 1974. King Husayn strenuously but futilely objected to
this. By the time of the 1976 municipal elections on the West
Bank the combination of the organizational work of the Palestine
National Front and the increased prestige of the PLO brought
7. Abdallah Frangi, The PLO and Palestine , (London: Zed Books,
Ltd., 1983), ,p. 141.
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about by Arab and international recognition — including Arafat's
speech at the United Nations General Assembly — resulted in the
overwhelming defeat of the pro-Jordanian officials elected in
1972. Only Elias Fray's of Bethlehem managed to survive. The
PLO had clearly won the second round of the contest to represent
the West Bank Palestinians. The most prominent pro-Hashemite
politician, former mayor Shaykk Muhammad Ali Ja'bari of Hebron,
was unimpressed. He wanted a new Palestinian party for the
people of the West Bank, not the PLO, to represent West Bank
interests: "The PLO is incapable of negotiating — it wrought
havoc in Jordan and now is destroying Lebanon. It would do the
same here given the chance. The West Bank people should author-
ize Jordan to negotiate on its behalf, so that afterwards the
people will have the opportunity of self-determination." 8
King Husayn continued to regard the Rabat decision as a
mistake. It raised once again the question of the representation
of the Jordanian-Palestinian on the East Bank. With regard to
the West Bank, it represented a needless complication to a polit-
ical settlement by making the total settlement, including the
establishment of a PLO government in the liberated territories,
the first step in the process. This was hardly likely to be
acceptable to Israel or its supporters. Instead, the first step
in a political settlement should be the ending of Israel's mili-
tary occupation. This was increasingly important as the occupa-
tion showed signs of becoming permanent with the construction of
8. Elie Rekkess and Dan Avidan, "The West Bank and Gaza Strip" in
C. Legum and H. Shaked, eds., The Middle East Contemporary Sur-
vey, Vol. One, 1976-77 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978)
.
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Israeli settlements and the growing strength of the
radical, religious Zionists of the "Eretz Israel" movement, who
rejected withdrawal from even an inch of the sacred soil of
Israel. By their decision at Rabat the Arab governments had
given up their responsibility for the Palestinians that they had
assumed in 1947 and which they had shared with the PLO since
1964. Now they had given a unit veto to the PLO over any future
settlement, but the PLO was itself scarcely an independent,
unified entity. Its various components were a mixed lot and
many, in fact, had connections with, including primary loyalties
to, other Arab — and even non-Arab — states.
The positions of all Arab parties regarding a negotiated
peace settlement remained static following the Rabat Summit of
1974. The PLO had the mandate from the Arab states and an offi-
cial policy favoring at least a partial settlement, but it lacked
unity, leadership or will-power to do so. Instead it concentrat-
ed on the building of its bureaucracy and military strength in
Lebanon. In this process it became increasingly drawn into the
self-destructive game of meddling in the internal politics of an
Arab state, thus repeating its mistakes in Jordan prior to 1970
with far less justification.
The Arab states most eager to negotiate for the return of
their occupied territory were Jordan and Egypt. As the leader of
the strongest Arab state and with the prestige of leadership in
the 1973 war, President Sadat was able to take the critical step
of flying to Jerusalem and accepting a formal peace treaty with
Israel. Jordan was not strong enough to follow such a policy; it
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could hardly survive the ostracism of the Arab world as Egypt
managed to do after the Baghdad Arab Summit of 1978. It soon
became clear, in addition, that the Israeli interpretation of
Palestinian "autonomy" advanced by the Likud government held
little attraction for either Palestinians or for Jordan.
D. Jordanian Policies of the Early 1980s
Jordan's three policies of the 1980s — the policy of al-
liance with Arafat; the break with Arafat and the contest with
the PLO for the support of the West Bank Palestinians and, final-
ly, the renunciation of Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank
— could all, in the final analysis, be considered as successive
responses to a single danger. The event precipitating these
policies was the internal charge in Israeli politics associated
with the victory of the radical wing of the Likud in the elec-
tions of 1981. The second Likud government, dominated by the
formidable figure of Ariel Sharon as Defense Minister, was much
more radical than the first Likud government of 1977 in both its
foreign policy in general and in relations to the West Bank in
particular. Almost as alarming was the change in United States
policy through its seeming collaborations with or complacency
towards the new Israeli policies. Combined of the strategic
importance of Israel to the formation of an anti-Soviet strategic
consensus in the Middle East and the view that the PLO repre-
sented an obstacle to this end or, in the worst case, a Soviet
client, the United States shifted its policies towards the Pales-
tinian issue. First, it withdrew its objection to Israeli set-
tlements in the occupied territories as illegal under interna-
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tional law. Second, it welcomed Israel's efforts to resolve the
position of the PLO by military means in its 1982 invasion of
Lebanon.
For King Husayn, the cooperation of the radical Zionists of
Likud with the radical right of the Reagan administration was no
less than a matter of life or death for his regime. This death
could be either slow and agonizing or rapid and violent but,
given the convergence of these policies, it was inevitable. The
aim of these policies, which Sharon at least made little secret
of, was the transference of the Palestinian population from the
West to the East Bank and turning Jordan into the Palestinian
state. On the slower schedule of pressures and settlements, the
discouraged Palestinians would realize that they had no hope or
future on the West Bank and would leave more or less voluntarily.
On a more precipitous scale, an incident would no doubt be found,
as in Lebanon in 1982, to justify a full-scale attack on Amman.
This would, most likely, precipitate the fall of the Hashemite
regime and a fight between the East Bankers and the PLO over the
ruins. This would lead to an Israeli protectorate, either over
the whole of Jordan or over a "security zone" — (as in Southern
Lebanon) extending from the Jordan to the crests of the crests of
the East side of the Jordan Rift Valley.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly how this new threat
endangered the very existence of Jordan. Two essential condi-
tions after 1967 allowed Jordan to survive, i.e., the tacit
support of Israel and the overt support of the United States.
Israel under the Labor Alignment favored its "Jordanian option"
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of a partial return of the West Bank under the terms of the
United Nations 242 Resolution as interpreted by the Allon Plan.
Even the Likud Bloc's "autonomy" formula adopted at Camp David
with the endorsement of the United States sought to involve
Jordan an active partner in the administration of the autonomous
West Bank Palestinians. Despite the absence of genuine progress
towards a final peace settlement, Jordan's policy of hostility
towards any serious Palestinian military or political activities
upon its territory coupled with its residual influence on the
West Bank made the day-to-day occupation easier for Israel.
Although these dangers were certainly genuine, the eventual
outcome of the events in Lebanon simultaneously created some
favorable conditions for a Jordanian peace policy. Those could
be seen across the board in the Arab world, within the PLO, in
the international environment and, eventually, within Israel
itself.
In the Arab world, the humiliating inability of the Arab
governments to do anything practical to aid the PLO in its un-
equal struggle with the Israeli Army, or even to protect innocent
women and children from deliberate massacre in Sabra and Shatilla
camps, finally forced them into endorsing a reasonable outline of
a political settlement at the Fez Arab Summit of 1982. These
were virtually the same proposals — the Fahd Plan — over which
they had deadlocked the previous year in the same city. The
direct defeat administered to Syrian forces, particularly in the
air, in Lebanon at least temporarily forced Assad into a lower
profile. All Arab leaders felt directly threatened by the Israe-
li occupation of an Arab capital and were rightly fearful of
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popular reactions among their own peoples. As had been the case
with the Americans in Viet Nam, the war in Lebanon was televised
throughout the Arab world. Undoubtedly as well, fears of popular
reactions were stimulated by the activities of the Islamist
elements inspired by the example of the Iranian revolution.
Another element stemming from the Iranian Revolution — the Gulf
War — had an indirect effect on the climate of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Military attacks on the Arab homeland in the gulf made
these regimes less concerned with Jordanian initiatives for a
peaceful settlement in Palestine. Thus, especially if these
efforts could be coordinated with the PLO, King Husayn could be
seen as fulfilling an Arab mandate and not acting in Hashemite
self-interest.
Such coordination with the PLO, at least with its chairman,
seemed all the more likely as a result of the Lebanon War. Yasir
Arafat's fortunes seemed to have hit their absolute nadir by the
end of 1983 and the Palestinians revolution appeared to be in
reverse gear as he lost his last base in a state bordering on
Israel. But these fortunes were not as low as they appeared as
they related primarily to the military option. As he had shown
in his speech before the United Nations, the Palestinian revolu-
tions carried a gun in one hand and an olive branch in the other.
The political options remained open. The Syrian-backed factions
within al Fatah under Abu Musa aimed at establishing an alterna-
tive legitimate leadership in place of Arafat, but in the end
they were unable to do so. Arafat survived while they and their
patron, Assad, isolated themselves from a position where they
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patron, Assad, isolated themselves from a position where they
could sabotage a political option from within. Hitherto, Arafat
had felt it necessary to appease the radical messianic wing of
the PLO in the interests of organizational unity. As late as the
abortive negotiations in 1982-83 for a joint peace approach with
King Husayn, Arafat had been forced to renege on his agreement
when he was unable to carry the majority — at least at an ac-
ceptable price — to back him. They instead called for reopening
negotiations with Jordan, an option which King Husayn bitterly
rejected.
Arafat, to be sure, had several options open in attempting a
political settlement. He could go it on his own, but this would
require a good deal more support than he possessed within the
organization. Almost certainly as well, such an approach would
be dismissed with contempt by both the Israelis and the United
States. Israel rejected the PLO as a negotiating partner as a
matter of principle, for it held that it was a terrorist organi-
zation dedicated to the destruction of Israel. The United
States, however, had stated that it would consider the PLO as a
negotiating party provided that it renounce terrorism and accept
the UN 242 Resolution which calls for, among other things, recog-
nition of Israel's right to exist. However, in the context of
late 1983, it is doubtful that the United States would have
accepted such a declaration from a position of such weakness,
since the hope existed that Arafat would soon become totally
irrelevant.
Arafat could certainly have approached the Saudis or the King
of Morocco, as the chairman of the last Arab Summit at Fez, for
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the convening of an international conference to implement the Fez
declaration. Such an approach might be feasible but it would
surely be time consuming given the Saudi anxiety to achieve Arab
unanimity before taking any action. Any reopening of the Fez
formula would face fierce opposition from Syria, which had insti-
gated and supported the split within al Fatah .
Egypt's President Mubarak was another possibility. Egypt,
of course, was the principal United States ally in the Arab world
and had the advantage of being the only Arab state with direct
ties to Israel. Anxious to remove the stigma of Arab isolation
imposed as a result of Egypt's Camp David policy, Mubarak would
certainly be eager to associate with the PLO in a peace negotia-
tion. However, the impact of Camp David was still too fresh.
Thus, although Arafat did visit Mubarak after his ouster from
Lebanon, he preferred to reactivate his approach through King
Husayn which had been stalled in the spring of 1983.
The war in Lebanon in 1982 also affected United States
policy. Immediately following the evacuation of the PLO from
Beirut, President Reagan's speech on September 1 offered what he
termed "a fresh start." Although this fresh start was put in the
context of the Camp David agreement — hardly a favorable refer-
ence for either the PLO or Jordan -- it did offer some major
concessions to Arab interests. The five year autonomy period of
Camp David was to lead to free elections for a self governing
Palestinian authority. The United States could not support any
additional Israeli settlements during this period. Although an
independent Palestinian state was not seen as a possible outcome,
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"self government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in
association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable,
just, and lasting peace." 9 Although there were a number of
points to which the PLO was opposed in this statement, especially
the denial of an independent Palestinian state as a feasible
outcome and the denial of the PLCs right to represent the Pales-
tinian people, it was very close to Jordan's policies. Certain-
ly, it was closer to Jordan's and to the PLO ' s policies than it
was to the policies of the Begin-Sharon government.
The changed position of the Soviet Union following the war
in Lebanon made it even more marginal than it had been since the
onset of the Camp David process in 1977. It provided little more
than sympathy to its friends within the PLO and even to its
formal ally, Syria, could provide little more than replacements
for the Soviet supplied missile batteries and fighters which had
been destroyed with such relative ease and little loss by the
United States supplied Israelis. Finally, in November 1982 came
the death of Brezhnev followed in rapid succession by three
Soviet leaders in the space of two and a half years.
Perhaps most important of all for the revival of a Jordanian
peace initiative in cooperation with the PLO were the internal
changes in Israel following the invasion of Lebanon. Although it
succeeded in driving the PLO out of Lebanon as a military threat,
and even as a political force, the Israeli strike did not elimi-
nate the PLO nor establish a client state in Lebanon. Sharon's
9. Quoted in Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls. The Politics of
the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: American Enter-
prise Institute, 1985), p. 174.
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nate the PLO nor establish a client state in Lebanon. Sharon's
actions forced his removal from his position as Minister of
Defense. The eventual condition of stalemate and guerrilla war
against the Israeli occupying army turned Israeli opinion against
a war it had originally supported enthusiastically. Even Begin
became too discouraged to continue in office, forcing Israeli
elections before the termination of the government's mandate.
The outcome of the 1984 elections, though not all that Jordan had
hoped for, still provided an opportunity for negotiations. On
the one hand, even given the unpopularity of the continued occu-
pation of Lebanon and the disastrous economic conditions at home,
the Israeli electorate still indicated the strength of the Likud
and its even more radical-right allies by giving it a virtual tie
in the elections. This indicated the long-term dangers of the
lack of a peace settlement to Jordan and the Palestinians. On
the other hand, the narrow plurality of Labor allowed the crea-
tion of a national coalition government with Likud under the
unique arrangement that Shimon Peres would be the prime minister
for the first two years and Yitzhak Shamir for the second two
year term. A narrow window was opened for peace negotiations and
the old antagonists — Yasir Arafat and King Husayn — would with
unaccustomed alacrity move to take advantage of the situation.
61
Ill
THE KING HUSAYN-YASIR ARAFAT AGREEMENT, FEBRUARY 1985
King Husayn had attempted to secure a political settlement
with Israel through international negotiations based on the
principle of the exchange of territory for peace, as embodied in
the UN 242 Resolutions, ever since 1967. But this goal had been
frustrated by, among other obstacles, the rise of the PLC- and its
international status as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinians people endorsed by the Rabat Arab Summit of 1974.
In the course of the 1970s, however, the mainstream of the PLO,
led by Fatah 's Arafat, in fact had opted for a similar political
process through the increasing emphasis on diplomacy over mili-
tary means. But its hopes were frustrated by the fact that the
Israelis -- with United States backing — refused to deal with
the political role of the PLO as representing the people of the
occupied territories. On the fundamental issue of negotiations
with Israel for the return of the occupied territories to Arab
rule, if one could accept their public declarations, Jordan and
the PLO were in broad agreement. An obvious solution to this
dilemma was through the cooperation of the two parties whereby
Jordan could combine its international status and acceptability
to Israel with the PLO's representative role and popular support
among the Palestinians in the Diaspora and the occupied territo-
ries in a joint political stand.
The obstacles to such an approach were, however, many.
First, there was the legacy of bitterness and distrust from the
Jordanian Civil War on both sides. From the Jordanian point of
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view, the dangers of cooperation with the PLO lay in the possi-
bility that the PLO would once again be tempted to assert its
leadership of the East Bank Jordanian-Palestinians and/or it
would resume its military activities and provoke a direct Israeli
retaliation against Jordan. This latter possibility was much
more likely under the Likud. Even if Arafat was personally
sincere, which they doubted, there was the reality that the PLO
was a coalition of many different groups, which in turn were
beholden to many different foreign patrons, thus subjecting the
largely moderate leadership of the Fatah mainstream to pressure
from the radical rejectionist and leftist elements. Arafat was
well aware of these restraints. Of course, he shared the Pales-
tinians bitterness from the 1970 Civil War and the fear that any
agreement with King Husayn would only mean that the PLO would be
used to give legitimacy to the narrow Hashemite interests of
returning its lost territories to Jordanian control.
Underlying these differences was the even more fundamental
question of the disparate nature of the two regimes, if one could
consider the PLO as at least an incipient government. Although
lacking the territorial basis for free elections (that being the
object of its existence) the PLO was the most democratic and
representative of all Arab regimes. On the other hand, although
Jordan was hardly the least representative and most oppressive of
Arab regimes, it was clearly different from either the Palestin-
ian ideal or reality. It was an authoritarian monarchy, which
had suspended political parties since 1957 and elections since
1967. Although there were democratic rights, institutions and
procedures embodied in its constitution, this document had been
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suspended for a much longer period of time than it had ever
functioned—and when it did function it was as it was interpreted
by the monarch. As one Palestinian former professor at a Jorda-
nian university, now a pro-PLO editor in the United States, put
it: "One cannot function as a human being, much less as an
educator in Jordan; I would continually have to worry that a joke
made to a taxi driver would be reported to the secret police. h1
In the period between the Syrian-inspired revolt in the
ranks of al Fatah forces in Lebanon (May 1983) and the conclusion
of the Husayn-Arafat Accord (February 1985) in Amman, Jordanian
and Arafat politics gradually converged. The chief motivations
for Jordanian policy remained the fear of the conseguences of
creeping or outright annexation of the occupied territories by
Israel. In September 1984, the national unity government agree-
ment in Israel put Shimon Peres back in the prime ministers'
seat, albeit for only a two year term. This created a brief
window of opportunity, but King Husayn knew that he needed sup-
port from a credible Palestinian source to take the risk of
negotiations with Israel. Practically, this mean Arafat and the
PLO, who still held the precarious mandate of the Rabat Summit as
sole legitimate representative. This mandate too was in serious
danger as the Arafat's credibility fell after his removal from
Lebanon and even further due to the "civil war" within al Fatah .
Strategically, these developments elevated the importance of the
occupied territories inhabitants' role in a peaceful settlement.
1. Interview with a Palestinian scholar, Washington, D.C., 1987.
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This meant that Hashemite policy needed to enhance the position
of Arafat within the occupied territories and, hence, within the
PLO.
The last meeting of the Palestine National Council (the
16th) had been held in February 1983 in Algiers. This had been
preceded by public criticism, led by the PFLP and DFLP, of Ara-
fat's earlier negotiations with King Husayn based on accepting
the Reagan Plan as a basis for international negotiations. The
16th PNC had rejected the Reagan Plan as "a sound basis for a
just and permanent settlement," but it had compromised on a key
provision of that plan—a confederation of Palestine and Jordan.
A confederation could be established after the independence of
Palestine on the basis of two independent states. 2 However,
following the revolt within Fatah , followed by renewed fighting
in Lebanon in which Arafat was driven from Tripoli by a combina-
tion of rival Palestinian groups with Syrian military support, it
was necessary for him to make a choice. Either a new Palestine
National Council would endorse a more militant strategy and thus
leave Arafat with the titular leadership of a united organization
or he would lead his moderate wing into an alliance with King
Husayn, based upon a joint negotiation team and a confederation.
Into the fall of 1984, the decision hung in the balance until the
final week. It was uncertain that Arafat would actually go
through with the scheduled meeting of the PNC in Amman which
would be boycotted by major parties of the democratic alliance,





the PFLP and DFLP, and perhaps causing an irrevocable split in
the PLO. 3
In the end, the advantages of the Amman venue proved too
tempting for Arafat. The facilities for propaganda to rally PLO
supporters on the West Bank through Jordanian television would
hold the pro-Arafat majority in the occupied territories to their
loyalty. Beyond that were the organizational and logistical
advantages of being able to reopen Fatah offices in Amman to
strengthen these contacts. There was always a danger that the
PLO's prestige would decline to such a low level that the Pales-
tinians of the West Bank would themselves support and cooperate
with an independent move by the king to enter into negotiations.
Although this might be seen at first glance to be a distant or
impossible dream, in fact the situation was rapidly changing in
the occupied territories. Even under the Israeli coalition, the
"iron fist" polities of Defense Minister Rabin were intensifying
pressures on the Palestinians under occupation. King Husayn's
arguments that Israeli pressures were a threat to the very exist-
ence of the community on Palestinian soil, along with the hope
that there was now a reasonable opportunity for negotiations
based upon an Arab consensus (the Fez Plan) , international
framework (UN 242 and 338), and the United States (the Reagan
Plan) positions with a plausible Israeli negotiator (Peres) , were
beginning to have an impact among even the most dedicated PLO
supporters. As one PLO official from the West Bank remarked
3. Rami G. Khuri, "How Close to Being Leaderless," Jordan Times
(Amman), 13 Nov 1984, p. 4, as reported in FBIS, 14 November
1984, pp. F-l, 2.
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privately, "If King Husayn really could negotiate the return of
most of the occupied territories, he would be a hero on the West
Bank, and Arafat would be finished." 4
In fact, in the wake of a common opposition to Camp David,
Jordanian-PLO cooperation had already been revived on the ground
in the occupied territories after 1977. On the Arab front, the
joint Jordanian-PLO committee supervised the distribution of Arab
aid designed to maintain the solidarity of the Palestinians under
occupation. Within the politics of the occupied territories the
National Guidance Committee, essentially a response to Camp
David, brought together the recently triumphant pro-PLO elite,
especially the mayors and town councillors elected in 1976, with
the defeated pro-Jordanians. Even though the remaining pro-
Jordanian elected officials, Fray's in Bethlehem and al-Shawwa in
Gaza, were not members, a pro-Jordanian faction did exist among
the ostensibly pro-PLO committee. Of its twenty-three members,
ten were mainstream Fatah supporters, four were from the PLO
rejectionist camp and four "exhibited pro-Jordanian tendencies." 5
Behind a facade of unity, these factions struggled for control of
the committee and weakened its effectiveness. A major bone of
contention to leftists was what they saw as an alliance between
pro-Fatah elements and pro-Jordanians arrived at containing the
hard line leftist forces. The moderates, they complained, were
too anxious in preserving and even increasing contacts with
4. Interview with a PLO official, Cambridge, MA., 1986.
5. Emile Sahliyeh, In Search of Leadership, West Bank Politics
Since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988, p. 23.
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Jordan and reluctant to confront the Israeli military government.
They even objected to Jordan's role in the distribution of pan-
Arab aid under the agreement reached at the Baghdad Summit of
1978. Even before its being outlawed by the Begin government in
1982, the National Guidance Committee had become ineffective
since 1980 due to these internal conflicts.
However, the cooperation of pro-Arafat "pragmatists" with
pro-Jordanians continued and even flourished as the PLC* lost its
bases in Lebanon. The struggle within the PLO served the pro-
Jordianians as Arafat's pragmatists attempted to broaden their
support. Fatah and Arafat periodically dealt and met with pro-
Jordanian leaders while some of the pan-Arab funds allotted to
the PLO were spent to gain the backing of pro-Jordanian politi-
cians, who now emerged in new respectability in the light of
direct contacts between Chairman Arafat and King Husayn. 6 Clear-
ly, there was a large and important constituency, at least within
the political elites on the West Bank and Gaza, that was suppor-
tive of a pragmatic alliance between Jordan and the PLO aimed at
securing Israeli withdrawal.
King Husayn 's speech to the 17th PNC on November 22, 1984
was a masterful appeal to this constituency. 7 He reminded them
of their struggle to preserve their independent decision-making
by defeating "attempts to impose tutelage upon you" in holding
6. Ibid. . p. 165.
7. "King Husayn 's Address," Amman Domestic Service in Arabic, 22
November 1984, as reported in FBIS , 26 November 1984, pp.
A-13-A-18.
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this meeting against Syrian opposition. Of course, he did not
mention Syria by name. He defended the "special relationship"
between Jordan and Palestine, receiving applause at the mention
of King Abdullah's name. He invoked the holy status of Jerusa-
lem, "the invader's threshold to Jordan," making play of words on
the name of a_l Fatah by adding, "just as Jordan is the Fatah
(conquest) gateway to Palestine." The future of Palestine seemed
dark because this special relationship had been eliminated from
Arab and Palestinian actions. The way of reversing this trend,
naturally, was to revive cooperation. A "Jordanian-Palestinian
option" required adherence to UN Resolution 242; "the principle
of territory in exchange for peace is our guideline for any
initiative we may present the world." This provides a framework
for an international conference under UN auspices and it is not
negotiable, but the PLO is to attend this conference on an equal
basis with other parties.
The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship in the future is a
matter for these two peoples alone, "no one has the right to
determine this relationship on their behalf or to interfere with
it, be he enemy, brother, or friend," Furthermore, involving
this issue in efforts to regain the territories would merely
provide another matter for obstruction by the enemy. Finally, he
again appealed directly to the people under occupation: "The
occupied territory can tolerate no courtesies or one-upmanship.
Both are weapons we place in Israel's hands in order to complete
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its plans and programs for annexing the territory and expelling
its inhabitants." 8
Chairman Arafat played his part by announcing in his speech
the policy of moving towards a political solution through an
international conference based upon "our adherence to interna-
tional resolutions over legitimacy" including the Fez summit
resolutions. Perhaps nothing in what Arafat said could equal his
commitment to the independence of Jordan beside an independent
Palestine.
"We clearly announce this so that no person or side will
have an illusions about any alternative homeland except
Palestine. . . . All of us will stand as one man, in solidar-
ity with our brothers and kinfolk in Jordan in order to
destroy Sharon and his dreams and to answer his serious
threats to Jordan." 9
Negotiations for a formal agreement were opened immediately,
intensifying in the new year when they reached a conclusion on
February 11, 1985. This agreement contained five clauses. Two
of these clauses were related to the broader aspects of the
Palestine question and did not focused on the occupied territo-
ries, i.e., solving the refugee problem in accordance with UN
resolutions and a catch all, "solving all aspects of the Pales-
tine questions." The operative clauses relative to the princi-
ples and mechanism for a settlement were:
8. Ibid. . p. A-17.
9. "Yasir Arafat Address," Amman Domestic Service in Arabic, 22
November 1984, as reported in FBIS, 26 November 1984, pp. A-13.
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"Land in exchange for peace as cited in the UN resolution,
including the Security Council resolutions."
The right to self determination "when the Jordanians and
Palestinians move to achieve this within the framework pan Arab
confederation that is intended to be established between the two
states.
"
Negotiations within the framework of an international con-
ference under UN auspices, consisting of the five permanent
member of the Security Council and all parties to the conflict
"including the PLO, which is the Palestinian peoples sole legiti-
mate representative, within a joint delegation—a joint Jordani-
an-Palestinian delegation." 10
The history of the Amman Agreement's attempted implementa-
tion is covered in elaborate detail in King Husayn's speech of
February 19, 1986, in which he announced the suspension, but not
the cancellation, of the agreement, and it is not our intention
to review this here. If we look, however, at the fundamental
causes for its failure we find two basic differences in interpre-
tation—differences that were left deliberately ambiguous in the
text. 11 First, the Security Council resolutions are cited in
10. The text of the Husayn-Arafat Agreement is given in Saunders,
op. cit. . p. 179. It was first officially released in a press
conference by the Jordanian Minister of Information on 2 3 Febru-
ary 1985, see "Hikmat Releases 'Text' of PLO-Jordanian
Agreement," FBIS. 25 February 1985. p. F-l.
11. These causes, as discussed here, relate to the internal Jorda-
nian and PLO policies and not to the external causes, especially
those having to do with the policies of Israel and the United
States. Arafat anticipated these difficulties in his airport
press conference following the signing of the accords with regard
to American views: "I am not optimistic over this administration.
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general and not as UN 242 and 338 by name and, secondly, the
achievement of self-determination and confederation between
Palestine and Jordan.
King Husayn clearly felt that the Jordanian and Palestinian
positions were close enough to achieve the degree of coordination
necessary to initiate negotiations. On the issue of the endorse-
ment of UN 242, which the United States held to be a precondition
for PLO participation in negotiations and which Arafat had always
skirted by saying that the Palestinians endorsed all UN resolu-
tions, the king felt that there were only three binding Security
Council resolutions, 242 and 338 and the resolutions against
Israeli annexation of Jerusalem. As the first point of the Amman
Agreement cited the UN resolutions in the context of the princi-
ple of "land in exchange for peace," which is the principal of UN
242, what Arafat had in fact endorsed was this resolution specif-
ically. 12
With regard to the future confederation between Jordan and
Palestine, Husayn felt that as soon as territories were given
back, whether all at once or in stages, Palestinian self-determi-
nation would take effect. The agreement called for this to take
place is the context of the confederation of Jordan and Pales-
tine. "Like the Jordanians, they will decide on the plan of
. . .Continued. .
.
It is completely biased to the Israeli point of view," see Sala-
mah B. Ni'matt, The Jordan Times (Amman), of 13 February 1985, as
reported in "West Bank and Gaza Reactions," FBIS . 13 February
1985, p. F-l.
12. "King Husayn Interviewed on Mideast Peace Prospects," Vienna
(Austria) Television, 25 February 1985, as reported in FBIS . 26
February 1985, p. F-l.
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confederation... I think details have to be worked out later,




On the procedural issue of negotiations through an interna-
tional conference under United Nations auspices and including the
PLO as an equal party within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian dele-
gation, it was clear that the international consensus meant that
such an invitation could only be issued by the United Nations to
parties who accepted the UN 242 and 338 resolutions. This had
been pointed out by King Husayn in his address to the PNC in
November. Arafat, in an interview with an Arab newspaper re-
printed in Palestine Perspectives with emphasis being added by
bold face type, stressed PLO support the international conference
under United Nations auspices. 14 On one point it was clear that
PLO-Jordianian cooperation was working, for the PLO eventually
nominated West Bank and Gaza representatives acceptable to the
United States, which in fact meant acceptable by Israel as well,
to begin a dialogue with the United States. Following this
dialogue PLO would declare its formal acceptance of UN 242 and
338, culminating in formal United States recognition of the PLO
as a party to negotiations. King Husayn, on the authorization of
Arafat, issued a statement in Washington in May 1985 that the PLO
had agreed to negotiate." On the basis of the pertinent UN
resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 242 and
13. Ibid.





338." 15 According to Husayn, Arafat again reaffirmed this
positions in a meeting in Amman on August 15, and this was again
conveyed to the United States. Although the United States sus-
pended talks on the composition of a Jordanian-Palestinian dele-
gation, talks on international conference continued. In January
1986 the United States stated in writing that if the PLO should
publicly (it had earlier said that this had to be in writing)
state its acceptance of the two resolutions, renounce terrorism
and be willing to negotiate peace with Israel, it would receive
an invitation to the international conference. Prolonged discus-
sions then ensued in Amman in late January and early February.
According to the Jordanian account, the PLO declared that it
would not accept UN 242 in an unamended form without prior ap-
proval of Palestinian self-determination in the context of a
Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. 16 However, a senior adviser
to Chairman Arafat explained that the PLO had offered to accept
UN 242, in writing, with the proviso that this text would be
released by the United Nations simultaneously with the American
commitment to recognize Palestinian self determination and both
declarations would then accompany the United Nations invitation
to the international peace conference. This adviser, Professor
Walid Khalidi, felt in his opinion that King Husayn was really
upset with the PLO's position on self-determination and not over
15. "Hussein's February 19 Speech on the Peace Process," op. cit. ,
Sec. 20.
16. Ibid. . Sec. 28.
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their position on UN 242, which had in fact accepted the sub-
stance of the Jordanian position. 17
It was clear from King Husayn's speech reviewing the
agreement with the PLO and its suspension, as well as from inter-
views given later, that the issue of self-determination was
crucial to his decision. To Husayn, self-determination and
confederation were matters for Jordan and the Palestinians to
decide, not for the determination of an international conference.
If the Palestinians had a worst case scenario for their relations
with Jordan, it was the possibility that they would agree to
negotiations led by Jordan which would then ignore the legitimate
rights of the Palestinians in the restored territory in a confed-
eration in name only, much like Jordan to 1967. King Husayn
would get the credit for ending Israeli occupation while the PLO
would get the blame for having sold out Palestinian self determi-
nation. A prior international, as opposed to a purely bilateral,
recognition of Palestinian self determination led by the United
States could not be so easily overturned by Jordan. But King
Husayn had his own worst case scenario—an internationally recog-
nized and guaranteed Palestinian state would have a more secure
status than Jordan itself and would well claim to represent the
Palestinian of the East Bank in addition, as they had attempted
in 1970. "We agreed on everything. Then they came to talk of
the issue of self-determination. In our dialogue with them we
have not reached this degree of detail... We wished that they
17. Interview, Dr. Walid Khalidi, Cambridge, MA, 1987.
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had said from the beginning: What is wanted is rule and not
regaining territory." 18
Jordanian distrust of the PLO returned to the fore, this
time overlaid with the bitterness of wasted opportunities that
might never return:
"We opened doors for them but they continued to move in
empty circles... We wanted to get results for this problem
before it was too late. We observe that every few years we
regret that we have lost certain opportunities because we
talk much and do little. The speech was intended to lead to
the appearance of a Palestinian side which reacts to its
cause in a responsible manner." 19
18. "Al Sivasah Interviews King Husayn on Speech," Al Sivasah
(Kuwait)
, 25 February 1986 interview published on 1 March, as




THE HASHEMITE-PLO STRUGGLE FOR THE WEST BANK
In 1986 and 1987, following King Husayn's February 19th speech
giving the reasons for the suspension of political coordination
with the PLO, the center of Palestinian-Jordanian relations
shifted to a bitter contest for influence on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. The King's speech has laid the blame for the break-
down of cooperation upon the leadership of the PLO. They had,
according to him, gone back on their pledges to endorse the UN
242 and 338 resolutions at the critical juncture when such an
endorsement would have earned them a seat at an international
peace conference as part of a joint delegation with Jordan. King
Husayn's attack on the PLO leaders reversed the major trend in
their relations since the period of Camp David, a trend towards
cautious but increasingly effective cooperation. They had both
opposed Camp David and, as a result of the decision of the Bagh-
dad Arab Summit of 1978, had jointly administered Arab funds to
aid the occupied territories. This kind of cooperation had, as
we have seen, important consequences in increased cooperation on
the West Bank between pro-Jordanian and pro-PLO leaders. After a
set-back in 1983, cooperation between King Husayn and Yasir
Arafat resumed in 1984, leading to the holding of the 17th Ses-
sion of the Palestine National Council in Amman in November and
the signing of the Amman Accord in February of 1985. The level of
cooperation included in the Amman Accord was really quite exten-
sive, for it involved not only the short term objective of a
negotiated peace with Israel through a joint negotiating team but
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the long term objective of a confederation of Jordan and Pales-
tine after Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.
King Husayn wanted to make clear his view that his quarrel
was with the PLO leadership, while the principles agreed to in
the Amman Accord were still applicable. The PLO leadership's
"word was not their bond" and they lacked "commitment, credibili-
ty and constancy"; however, "the principles and tenets" of the
Amman Accord would, in his view "continue to embody the founda-
tions governing the relations between the Jordanian and
Palestinian peoples with regard to equality of rights and obliga-
tions in facing our joint destiny." 1 In Jordan's view this
"equality of rights and obligations," to which the PLO had agreed
to in February 1985, meant that Jordan was now free to compete as
a equal candidate for the endorsement of the Palestinian people.
If the Palestinian leadership of the PLO has proved themselves to
be untrustworthy and irresponsible, King Husayn could not in good
conscience return the responsibility for the support of the
people in the occupied territories and any hope of progress to-
wards ending that occupation back to that same leadership. In-
stead, the matter of achieving peace based upon the Fez Arab
Summit Resolution was turned over "to the Palestinian fora in the
occupied territories and the diaspora as well as Arab capitals
and organizations"
.
2 The implication of this statement was that
it would be these fora, first of which being the occupied terri-
1. King Husssin's February 19 Speech with Peace Process," Febru-
ary 1986, op. cit.
,
p. 27.
2. Ibid. . p. 26.
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tories, and not just the leadership of the PLO, who would be the
ones to decide if the Jordanians. . .who shared equal rights and
obligations and a joint destiny with the Palestinian
people ... should be the ones who decided to continue with the
peace process even in the absense of the leaders of the PLO.
Obviously, King Husayn felt fully in control of the Jordanian
side. The PLO leadership controlled the Palestinian fora of the
diaspora, but this control was not unchallenged either within the
region or within the organization itself. The critical mass and
deciding point in the struggle to represent the Palestinian
people in the occupied territories would thus rest with the
"Palestinian fora" within these territories, and King Husayn put
himself forward as a candidate to lead these fora.
The problem, and from King Husayn ' s point of view also the
opportunity, was that these fora inside the occupied territory
existed only in a very rudimentary manner. It was true that the
last open contest between Jordan and the PLO on the West Bank in
the municipal elections of 1976 had ended in a humiliating defeat
for the pro-Hashemites. Since then, however, there has been many
developments within the occupied territories, in Israeli politics
and policies, in the region and in Jordanian-Palestinian rela-
tions. By the Amman Accord, even if it was signed by Arafat in a
moment of weakness in the PLO's position, the PLO had readmitted
Jordan to a major role in peacemaking and in the future of the
Palestinian people. Who could not believe, as the dispute in
January-February 1986 over the meaning and timing of "self-deter-
mination" revealed, that Jordan would not strive to interpret the
essence of "confederation" as the supremacy of Jordan? This was
79
just what the Palestinian critics of Arafat had pointed out as
the fatal flaw of the agreement.
The situation on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip was
substantially different from that of a decade before. There were
virtually no organized "Palestinian fora" to speak of in the
occupied territories due to a combination of the Sharon-Rabin
"iron fist" and the internal dissensions in the PLO. Under the
Amman Accord there had been an attempt to create a Palestinian
leadership in the occupied territories through joint Jordanian-
PLO efforts, but little had been accomplished. A few elite indi-
viduals had been identified as local candidates for inclusion in
a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to an international
peace conference, but what was their political base? Nobody
really knew, but it seems most likely that their political base
lay in the fact that they had been found to be acceptable by two
outside forces. . .Jordan and the PLO.
King Husayn felt that the "silent majority" in the occupied
territories would see that his policies offered the only realis-
tic hope of their ending the Israeli occupation. They would
agree with him that the diaspora leadership of the PLO had become
too self-centered and distant from the realities of Israeli
pressures and that their "Jordanian brothers" were in a better
position, being closer to the day-to-day realities of the occupa-
tion, to represent their interests.
In "the Arab capitals and organizations" the other critical
fora to which King Husayn entrusted the fate of the Palestinians,
he was aware of the fact that Arafat's prestige was none too
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great. Although all Arab states paid lip-service to the Rabat
Summit formula of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative"
of the Palestinian people, few actually acted towards the PLO in
this manner. Too often, the PLO was an embarassment , distraction
or even a danger to Arab rulers. Most desired an end to the
Arab-Israeli conflict on the terms of the Fez Summit, which
clearly implied UN 242 and the recognition of Israel. The paymas-
ters of both Jordan and the PLO, the oil states of the Arabian
peninsula and in particular Saudi Arabia, were much more worried
about dangers from Iran than from Israel. In a era of declining
oil demand and prices they also had little enough cash to spare
from their own defense expenditures, their subsidization of the
Iraqi war effort and the necessity of maintaining a high level of
social and economic expenditures to which their people had become
accustomed to over the previous decade. Even those states which
did not really believe in the possibility of an Arab-Israeli
peace settlement through negotiations, Syria and Libya, probably
detested Arafat more than they disliked King Husayn. The Hashe-
mites were the reactionary traditional lackies of the imperial-
ists, but Arafat was a pseudo-revolutionary who had betrayed the
revolution, sold out the Palestinian people, and had committed
treason against the Arab nation. King Husayn might expect rheto-
ric sympathetic to the PLO from Arab capitals, but he might as
well get substantial quiet support in private. The real opponents
of negotiations would give him no help, but they would give
Arafat even less.
As a practical matter and due to his habitual caution, King
Husayn left himself--and Arafat--an escape clause. The Amman
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Accord was merely suspended, not broken, and thus cooperation
could be resumed when "their (the PLO leadership) word becomes
their bond." Unlikely though this might be, it was not impossi-
ble. Arafat could respond to pressures and reverse his policies,
as he had between April 1983 and February 1985, and return to
cooperation with Jordan. Thus, in the contest for the support of
the occupied territories it was not necessary to destroy the PLO
there. Once the weight of opinion began to shift towards the
Hashemites, Arafat would be forced to conform to the wishes of
his principal constituency. Clearly, the politically active
sentiment in the occupied territories preferred Jordanian-PLO
cooperation. 3 It made life easier on a day-to-day basis and it
might be the most effective route towards ending the Israeli
occupation. Even though Arafat, if he shifted back to coopera-
tion with Jordan, would not be sincere, this would make little
difference. . .provided the road to peace negotiations was already
paved the momentum would be unstoppable. In 1986 and 1987 King
Husayn began to put more and more hope on the convening of an
international conference as a catalyst that would, by itself,
create the necessary pressures from within the occupied territo-
ries to force Arafat to resume cooperation with Jordan on the
basis of the Amman Accord. An actual invitation to such a con-
ference, even though offered on Jordanian terms of a joint dele-
gation and self-determination in the context of a confederation
of Jordan and Palestine, could not be refused by the PLO.
3. Interview with a PLO official from the occupied terroritories,
1986.
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Even should such a policy fail, in reality probably the most
likely outcome due to Israeli intransigence, the immediate situa-
tion would be more favorable for Jordan. Even a failed peace
effort, especially one based on a struggle with the PLO, would
confirm Jordan's status with the Israeli Labor Party as the only
possible Arab partner in negotiating a solution to the Palestin-
ian problem. In the long term, and maybe even in the short term,
Labor felt that Israel needed a solution to this issue for its
own self interest and even survival. The demographic realities
of the occupied territories and the policy of the Likud and
Israeli far-right would lead to annexation and this in turn would
lead to either an Israeli state with an Arab majority or to the
forced expulsion of the Arabs. An Arab majority would mean the
destruction of the original Zionist dream of the Jewish state to
which Labor still adhered, while the explusion of the Arabs would
result in a war that would make previous Arab-Israeli wars look
like picnics. Such a war would destroy, in one swoop, Israeli
democracy, United States support, support of the world Jewish
community and, possibly, the state of Israel itself. King Husayn
thus had a very important and strategically located Israeli ally
in the Labor Party. This party, until the fall of 1986 at least,
controlled the prime ministership in the National Unity govern-
ment and even after that, until 1988, it would control the For-
eign Ministry as Shamir and Peres switched jobs. Perhaps even
move importantly General Rabin, as Defense Minister, controlled
the administration of the occupied territories and could be
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expected to favor the building there of pro-Hashemite forces in
opposition to the PLO supporters.
In the nearly two years between the suspension of the Amman
Accord by King Husayn and the outbreak of the Palestinian intifa-
dah (uprising) in December 1987, Jordanian policy developed a
number of approaches to implement its aim of gaining influence in
the Occupied Territories vis-a-vis the PLO. These specific ap-
proaches were, in turn, coordinated with other aspects of Jorda-
nian domestic and foreign policy. Obviously, some of these poli-
cies would have been carried out for reasons of their own, but in
the context of the on-going struggle with the PLO they took on
added significance. Any enhancement of the regional or interna-
tional influence of the Hashemite Kingdom had the additional
benefit of reminding the Palestinian people that King Husayn, and
not Yasir Arafat, could deliver them immediate benefits and was
probably the only person who could deliver the end of Israeli
occupation.
Of course, it would be a mistake to believe that everything
went according to the Jordanian master-plan. The unaccustomed
level of intensified political activity, especially on the West
Bank and in the Gaza Strip, created counter policies of the PLO
to frustrate Jordanian policies. As we have already noted,
however, the contest was not completely a zero-sum game. The
preferred outcome of the contest for Jordan, and probably for
Arafat as well, remained the resumption of political coordina-
tion. . .though each felt that this coordination should be on their
own terms. King Husayn and official Jordanian spokesmen stated
that they considered the principles and tenets of the Amman
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Accord as governing their relations with the Palestinian people
and the PLO. It was only necessary for the PLO leadership to
agree to the terms they had rejected in February 1986, acceptance
of UN 242 and 338 and the realization of self-determination only
in the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, to-
together with the mechanism of participation in an international
conference under UN auspices in a joint delegation with Jordan,
for political coordination to be resumed. For its part, the PLO
leadership adopted a tone of injured innocence, denying that they
had caused the break with King Husayn or had gone back on their
word. They were thus willing to resume political coordination
on their terms: non-acceptance of UN 242 and 338 apart from other
United Nations resolutions dealing with Palestine, and the at-
tainment of internationally recognized self-determination prior
to a confederation with Jordan. Even as late as October 1986,
following the expulsion of Fatah offices from Amman, Arafat could
plaintively complain to an Egyptian editor: "The Jordanian-Pales-
tinian agreement still exists, at least so far as the Palestin-
ians are concerned. Only the Palestine National Council is enti-
tled to abrogate this accord... King Husayn's decision to suspend
the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement came as a surprise to us. We
strived to keep our reaction on calm, but the Jordanian Govern-
ment was under pressure to take tougher measures." 4
4. "MENA Cities Arafat Interview with Uktubar , " quoting an inter-
view in Uktubar (Cairo), to be published 19 Oct 1986, as reported
in FBIS . 21 Oct 1986, p. A-4
.
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Similar feelings were echoed by pro-PLO opinion on the West
Bank. Hanna Sinyurah, the editor of Al Fair (Jerusalem) and one
of the two Palestinians approved by Israel, the United States and
Jordan (and, in fact, nominated by the PLO) to participate in a
Palestinian-United States dialogue, visited the United States in
March 1986. He met there with State Department officials, includ-
ing Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy. When he was asked in a
Washington interview by an Arab newspaper regarding the Amman
Accord he answered that the Palestinian people, particularly
those in the Occupied Territories, had already given their opin-
ion that Resolutions 242 and 338 without self-determination were
unacceptable, but ..."co-operation and coordination with Jordan
on an equal footing are the most important accomplishment
achieved by both sides... The PLO has been wise and vigilant in
its response to the king's speech. It has not torpedoed the
bridges because Arab cooperation is the most important essential
of the Palestinian action." 5
The Jordanian campaign to replace PLO influence on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip was characterized by its comprehensiveness.
The traditional tools of Jordanian influence on the West Bank,
represented by visits of mayors, ex-mayors, notables, members of
the Jordanian parliament, etc., were reinforced by new and direct
appeals to ordinary citizens. New radio and television broad-
casts were aimed at the occupied territories featuring interviews
with Jordanian officials and some pro-Jordanian residents of the
5. "West Bank Leader Queried on Israeli, Jordan Talks," Al-
Maiallah (London, 9-15 April 1986, pp. 26-27, as reported in
FBIS , 18 April 1986, p. A-2
.
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territories (such as ex-mayor al-Shawwa of Gaza) . These offi-
cials announced what steps Jordan was taking, and planning to
take, to support the "steadfastness" of the Palestinian
brothers—restrictions and duties on agricultural and manufac-
tured goods exported to Jordan were lowered, and entry formali-
ties simplified.
The centerpiece, however, of the Jordanian campaign was a
five year plan for the development of the occupied territories
calling for the expenditure of 362.5 million Jordanian Dinars, or
about 1 billion US dollars. In contrast to previous aid given to
individual projects and towns, which amounted to something be-
tween a bribe and charity, the new plan was for comprehensive
development of the resources of the occupied territories to
create jobs and other economic resources to keep the people on
the land. It was clear that these promised economic benefits
depended on the acceptance of Jordanian political and economic
leadership as well. The funds were to be administered by Arab
mayors, nominated by Jordan but appointed by the Israelis. The
funds would be transferred through the re-opened branches of a
Jordanian bank, whose opening, of course, had to be approved of
by Israel. The first of the new Arab mayors, replacing Israeli
officials appointed after the dismissal of the elected Palestin-
ian mayors in the early 1980s, was Zafir al-Masri of Nablus. He
had actually applied for the appointment in November, 1985 with
the approval of both Arafat and King Husayn during their coopera-
tion under the Amman Accord. But al-Masri was soon assassinated
in March 1986, a deed which was blamed on the "Zionists." His
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funeral became the occasion of anti-Hashemite demonstrations in
which King Husayn's photographs were burned. A year later, the
Israelis announced that they had captured the hit-team that had
carried out this assassination, and other assassinations, on the
orders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Despite some understandable reluctance on the part of others to
come forward, eventually more Jordanian nominated mayors were
appointed. Along with these appointments came the "de-recogni-
tion" of the former mayors by Jordanian authorities. These pro-
PLO ex-officials, although they were not allowed to function in
office by the Israeli authorities, still maintained political
influence by being recognized by Jordan, which gave them the
right to be consulted by Amman on projects and developments in
their towns and to be used as intermediaries for their constitu-
ents in dealings with Amman authorities when in Jordan. In order
to operatate and supervise the plan, it was announced that eight
regional committees, composed of pre-1967 Jordanian officials
from the territories and "private sector individuals" had been
formed. 6
To reinforce these economic and political measures, more
direct support was organized. The weekly newspaper An-Nahar ,
subsidized by Jordan, became a daily and the leading media voice
of Jordanian policy in the occupied territories. It was pub-
lished in East Jerusalem. Another group identified as "The
Preparatory Committee of the Jordanian-Palestinian Grouping,"
6. "Dudin Discusses 5 Year West Bank Project," Jordan Times
(Amman), 10 March 1986, p. 1, as reported by FBIS, 11 March 1986,
p. F-l.
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identified in Israeli sources as "municipal leaders, business men
and academics from rural areas of Judea and Samaria" issued
statements. Its leader was identified as Jamil al'Amlah, a former
leader of the Israeli-inspired "village leagues" and then mayor
of the village of Baytillu near Hebron. Al 'Amlah said that his
group had not yet received recognition from Jordan, as it had
previously strongly opposed the village leagues. Now, however,
al-' Amlah hoped for Jordanian support. "We believe with King
Husayn, and we know exactly our problem. . .only King Husayn will
finish our problem." 7 Some even more ephemeral groups made
their presence known by leaflets, such as "The West Bank Labor
Movement of Support of the PLC," which advocated cooperation with
the Jordanian development plan and the resumption of PLO-Jordani-
an cooperation based on the Amman Accord and could have been
written (and probably were) by the Jordanian security services. 8
The distance King Husayn would have to travel to be accept-
able as the political leader of the occupied territories by their
inhabitants was made emphatically clear in a secretly conducted
public opinion poll in the summer of 1986. Devised and super-
vised by American and Palestinian professors teaching at al-
Najlah University, and financially supported by Newsday (Long
Island) , New York, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and
7. "Pro-Jordanian Movement Toward in Territories," Radio Jerusa-
lem, Domestic in Hebrew, 16 August 1986, as reported in FBIS, 12
August 1987, p. L-3.
8. "West Bank Labor Movement Pamplets Support PLO," An Nahar
(Jerusalem), 12 October 1986, as reported in FBIS , 22 October
1986, p. 1-2.
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al-Fair (Jerusalem) , the poll was published by al-Fair and its
other sponsors. It was substantially elaborated on by its authors
in The Middle East Journal in 1988. 9 The results were clearly
disturbing to Jordan and Israel and encouraging to the PLO . Its
findings were widely reported in the foreign press as well.
Israel showed its displeasure by refusing to renew the work
permits of the professors and closing al-Fair for two weeks. In
Amman, Jordanian officials and the press attacked the poll as
"unscientific" and part of a Zionist plot to show that the Pales-
tinians could not be trusted to govern themselves.
The questions getting most attention were those dealing with
representation and leadership of the people. Despite King Hus-
ayn ' s appeal for the people to repudiate the current leadership
of the PLO, 72.5 percent supported this leadership while only 3.3
percent opted for King Husayn as their leader. . .a lower per-
centage than those who supported the more radical Damascus-based
PLO opponents of Arafat (4.9 percent). King Husayn's highest
percentages of support were among the illiterate (10.8 percent)
and those over 40 years of age (9.8 percent).
However, there were other interesting responses that could
not have pleased the PLO leadership and which were, in fact,
seized upon by Israelis opposed to returning any territory. Less
than a majority (49.7 percent) favored, even as an interim solu-
tion , the official PLO (and Arab Fez Summit) policy of a Pales-
tinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while 43.2 percent
9. Mohammed Shadid and Rick Seltzer, "Political Attitudes of
Palestinans in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," The Middle East
Journal
.
Vol. 42, No. 1 (Winston 1988), pp. 16-32.
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favored the policy of the anti-Arafat factions of the PLO to
continue the struggle for a democratic state in all of Palestine.
Only 6.3 percent favored the interim solution of the return of
Jordanian rule. Also disturbing, and foreshadowing the intifadah
of a year and a half later, was a clear majority in favor of
armed struggle as the most effective tactic for solving the
Palestinian issue. A considerable number (36.9 percent) even
favored such attacks as those carried out by the Abu Nidal group
(Fatah Revolutionary Council) on civilians at the Rome and Vienna
airports in 1985. As to the long term future of Palestine after
independence, there was considerable support for the Islamic
alternative of a state based on the Shariat (26.5 percent), while
another large group called for a state based upon "Arab national-
ism and Islam" (29.6 percent). A clear conclusion of the survey
as a whole was the fact that the inhabitants of the occupied
territories were much more radical than the official leadership
of the PLO, even though they continued to endorse this leader-
ship. According to the authors of the survey: "If no political
solution is achieved in the near future, however, the PLO leader-
ship will have to move to the left or lose popular support. If
the current leadership looses popular support, the new leadership
might well be far more radical." 10
King Husayn's "silent majority" had found its voice, but its
message was not what he wanted to hear. On the other hand, King
Husayn's analysis of the building pressures on the West Bank and
10. Ibid. , pp. 31-32.
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Gaza Strip leading to the condition where rapid changes must
occur was, in fact, more in tune with the sentiment there than
the more leisurely pace of PLO political action. Also, the poll
had been taken at a time of maximum tension between the PLO and
the Hashemites, so the question of that kind of support there
might be for a joint initiative of King Husayn and Arafat under
the Amman Accords was not asked. Also unaddressed was the fact
that King Husayn as yet had nothing concrete to offer; any Israe-
li withdrawals from any of the occupied territories were still
highly speculative. Most Palestinians, in all probability, didn't
think that Israel would withdraw at all, despite the hints of
Shimon Peres.
If Hashemite prospects on the West Bank were still quite
limited and, in the best of circumstances, would still take some
time to mature, they retained the power to take significant
actions against the PLO on the East Bank which would, it was
hoped, eventually have repercussions on the occupied territories.
These, in turn, would pressure on the PLO leadership to resume a
more cooperative stance. In July, 1986, ostensibly in retalia-
tion for a critical statement from the Fatah Council, Jordan
closed a number of PLO offices in Amman which had been allowed to
open in the two years since the 17th PNC meeting in Amman. The
Jordanians claimed that this did not affect their official rela-
tions with the PLO or their recognition of that organization as
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, for
these were not offices of the PLO but were offices of one of the
PLO
' s constituent parties. .
.
Fatah . Of course, this was a dis-
tinction without a difference. Abu Jihad (Khalid al-Wazir) was
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th a high official of Fatah and the head of the military arm of
e PLO as a whole. When he was expelled from Amman on a few
urs notice it undoubtably affected the mission of the PLO. The
tablishment of these offices had been one of the chief attrac-
ons of the Amman Accord for the PLO, for it made it much easier
ir them to maintain political and military contact with their
ipporters and agents in the occupied territories. .. superior to
iirut before 1982 and far superior to Tunis.
The Israelis, of course, were well aware of the function of
liese Amman offices. There had been a number of scarcely veiled
irnings to Amman over the previous two years over the build up
C "terrorist" organizations on Jordanian soil. Now, there was
reat rejoicing in Israel when the offices were closed and in-
reased discreet cooperation with Jordan to undermine the PLO
jpporters in the occupied territories. Defense Minister Rabin
as able to claim that his policy against terrorism was succeed-
ing:
"King Husayn has partially come off the fence. . . It is
clear to me that without Jordan, there can be no local
leadership. With Jordan, we are currently creating an infra-
structure upon which we can hope to build a better future.
Jordan is not yet ready for direct negotiations, but there
is no denying that new found ground is being laid. Now that
Jordan and Israel have almost the same policies regarding
the areas, I see a chance for change in the
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territories. u11
By December 1987, Rabin was able to hold an unprecedented meeting
with virtually all of the West Bank members of the Jordanian
parliament. He urged them to "strengthen pro-Jordanian elements
in the territories" and promised that "Israel would continue to
support and strengthen the moderate personalities."
Although general and practical problems were discussed, such
as agricultural exports to Europe, so was the sensitive matter of
an international conference on Palestine. "The participation of
the PLO in such a conference was not raised at all." 12 Although
the significance of such views representing widespread popular
opinion in the occupied territories was, to say the least, de-
batable (it was only a week before the outbreak of the intifadah,
they are very significant as an indication of Jordanian policy.
Such a meeting would have been inconceivable without prior ap-
proval of King Husayn. The king was confident enough of his
position that he was willing to sanction such a meeting. The
message to the PLO and their supporters that Jordan was confident
enough in the wake of the Arab Summit meeting in Amman in Novem-
ber 1987, which Rabin correctly described as having pushed the
Palestinian issue to the sidelines, that he would go ahead with
international negotiations sanctioned by the Amman Summit and the
11. "Rabin on Cooperation with Jordan, U.S. Aid," The Jerusalem
Post Magazine
. 3 October 1986, p. 6, as reported in FBIS , 6
October 1986, p. 1-8.
12. "Rabin Meets With Jordanian Parliamentarians," Radio Jerusalem
in Hebrew, 3 December 1987, as reported in FBIS , 8 December 1987,
p. 27.
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PLO would have to catch up if it didn't want to be left out of
the picture completely.
In the contest over the West Bank, each side had indirect as
well as direct methods of attack. Each attempted to undermine
the other's home base of support. For his part, King Husayn
allowed the operations of an anti-Arafat PLO official, Atallah
Atallah (Abu Za'im, to use his PLO nom de guerre ) with his
"Corrective Movement in Fatah and the PLO." Although Jordan
never officially recognized Abu Za'im as the alternative to the
PLCs leadership based in Tunis, he was allowed to conduct ral-
lies and deliver well-reported speeches to Palestinian refugee
groups that could have never been attempted without the coopera-
tion of the Jordanian security services. Thus, on the eve of the
Amman Arab summit of November 1987, Abu Za'im addressed a rally
of reportedly 30,000 announcing. . ."by the support of the masses
of our people in the occupied territory, in Jordan, and else-
where, this .movement has become the PLO. . .Arafat does not repre-
sent us." 13 It was reported in a Gulf newspaper that Abu Za'im
had sent a letter to Shimon Peres stating his availability to
join a Palestinian peace delegation and his wish to be allowed to
open offices in the occupied territories." 14 Although not claim-
ing to be the authentic leadership of the PLO, Brigadier General
Na'im al-Khatib, the commander of the Palestine Liberation Army's
13. "Fatah 's Atallah Addresses Rally in Amman Camp," Al-Ouds
(Amman), 2 November 1987, pp. 1 and 16, as reported in FBIS, 6
November 1987, pp. 2-3.
14. "Atallah Ready to Participate in Direct Talks," Al-Itlihad
(Abn Dhabi), 9 May 1987, p. 1, as reported by FBIS , 12 May 1987,
p. p. -5.
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"Badr Forces" (the PLO * s regular army troops stationed in Jordan)
made it clear that he supported the Amman Accords: "I am speaking
in my name and on behalf of every member of these forces, we will
not allow anyone to break up this unity or the Amman
agreement. . .Why did King Husayn suspend coordination? I believe
this was caused by the fact that the Palestinian command failed
to implement the Amman agreement in view of Palestinian differ-
ences. " 15
It is doubtful that King Husayn actually hoped to unseat
Arafat within the structure of the PLO by someone like Abu Za'im,
but when combined with other rival factions of the PLO, including
the Syrian-controlled Fatah rebels of Abu Musa, such movements
tended to undermine and pressure Arafat from all sides. In
addition, underlying all of these movements was a widespread
distrust of Arafat's personal style, shifting policies and lack
of organization. Although these differences could usually be pa-
pered-over in the name of organizational solidarity, they extend-
ed into the inner circle of Fatah itself. 16 At the very least,
support for some of these dissidents had some effect among the
Jordanian-Palestinians in making the dispute between King Husayn
and Yasir Arafat less of conflict of basic rights and interests
between Jordan and Palestine.
15. "Army Chief Rejects Abrogators of Amman Accord," Al-Anba
(Kuwait), 7 April 1987, as reported in FBIS, 13 April 1987, p.
A-4.
16. Interviews with PLO officials, 1986-87.
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The efficiency of the Jordanian security services made it
much more difficult for the PLO to undermine the Jordanian regime
on its own territory. However, on the West Bank, aside from
dramatic incidents such as the assassination of Zafir al-Masri
(which was not claimed by the PLO) there were periodic anti-
Hashemite riots, particularly among students, and leaflets ap-
peared calling for the overthrow of the Hashemite regime in
Jordan. The arrests of Palestinian activists, communists and
nationalists in Jordan became the basis for protests on the West
Bank. In at least one case, rioting at Yarmuk University in Irbid
in May 1986 leading to the death of at least three students,
there was a direct conflict between the students (largely Pales-
tinian and many from the West Bank) and the security services.
When the PLCs offices in Amman were closed in July, this inci-
dent was not officially cited in the government's statement.
However, King Husayn at a subsequent press conference cited these
riots and the provision of funds from the PLO to a Muslim activ-
ist candidate in a by-election in Irbid as instances of PLO
interference in Jordanian internal politics. The king charged in
speaking to foreign correspondents that Fatah has engaged in "an
unholy alliance" with both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Commu-
nist Party. 17
Both the PLO and Jordan competed on a wider international
17. Mary Curtius, "Hussein Decries Arab Disarray, PLO," The Chris-
tian Science Monitor . 16 July 1986, pp. 1 and 28, see also re-
ported by Curtis Wilkes of the King's descriptions of an "unholy
alliance" of muslin Brethern and Communists, The Boston Globe .
July 16, 1986, and William Claiborne, The Washington Post . July
16, 1986. All of these reports have the direct quotation from
King Husayn regarding the "unholy alliance."
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and Arab stage as well, but the PLO was hampered by the need to
unify its own organization first. This proved to be difficult
and involved a number of foreign intermediaries, including Alge-
ria, Libya, and the Soviet Union. The process of the reunifica-
tion of the major factions of the PLO lasted for more then a year
following the speech of King Husayn in February 1986. Finally,
in April 1987 the 18th Meeting of the Palestine National Council
was held in Algiers. It was still impossible, however, to include
the Syrian controlled factions based in Damascus. But the most
important non-Fatah parties. . .George Habbash's DFLP and Nayef
Hawateymah's DFLP. . . did rejoin the Arafat-led PLO. The Commu-
nist Party of Palestine joined as well and while the Muslim
Brethren was not formally represented, there were contacts with
them too.
A major issue in the reunification talks had been the
status of the Amman Agreement of February 1985. Arafat's oppo-
nents had made the formal abrogation of this agreement as a
condition for their participation in the PNC and eventually
Arafat conceded this point. On the eve of the opening of the 18th
PNC the PLO Executive Committee formally repudiated the Amman
Accords in a meeting involving eight Palestinian groups. However,
Arafat's opponents had to concede that the 17th PNC held in Amman
in November 1984 had been a legitimate meeting, despite their
boycott. In fact, as everyone knew, the Amman Accords had been
frozen since February 1986 at King Husayn' s initiative; their
formal abrogation at Algiers was an insignificant concession that
Arafat had held in his pocket until it could be produced as his
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concession to PLO unity. Both Jordan and the PLO took the repudi-
ation of the Amman Accords in good spirit. The PNC stated its own
interpretation of their relations with Jordan in "Special Resolu-
tion Number Six," which essentially restated their interpretation
of the Amman Accords without naming them directly. These rela-
tions included a joint struggle against Zionist expansion aimed
at Jordan and the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to
self-determination. It further reaffirmed that "any future rela-
tionship with Jordan should be based on a confederate basis
between two independent states." 18
A revealing glimpse into the inner workings of the PLO re-
garding the Amman Accords was given at this time by Salah Khalaf
(Abu Iyad) in a interview in Al-Mustaqbal (Paris)
:
"As for me, everyone knows that I opposed and attacked the
agreement because I viewed it as the relinquishment of half
of our right to represent the Palestinian people. But I kept
silent when I knew we were required to relinquish everything
and cancel our entity. Therefore, there have been terrible
political, military, and material pressures and plans
against the PLO chairman not only from Israel and the United
States but also from Arabs. But when were asked to accept
Security Council Resolution 242 and to relinquish every-
thing, we refused to respond or even relinquish half our
18. "Eighteenth Session of the Palestine National
Council held in Algiers, April 20-26, 1987, Text" American-Arab
Affairs . No. 21 (Summer 1987), p. 157.
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right to representation." 19
At the very time Abu Iyad was speaking, Jordan was pursuing
alternative approaches to a political solution based on UN 242
and 338. Amman replied to the PLCs 's abrogation of the Amman
Accords by saying that this would not influence it to change its
policy. This policy continued to regard the Amman Accords as
"the beacon guiding Jordan in its serious, continuous efforts on
the pan-Arab, and international levels to liberate occupied
Palestinian territory and enable the Palestinian people to regain
their legitimate rights. . .It will not allow the Executive
Committee's decision to be an obstacle to Arab efforts to reach a
just and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict." 20 The
focus of these efforts continued to be the convening of an inter-
national conference at the invitation of the United Nations'
Secretary General based upon UN 242 and 338, consisting of the
five permanent members of the Security Council and all parties
involved in the dispute. It hoped, through negotiations to lay
the groundwork for the participation of the PLO as the Palestin-
ian people's representative.
Simultaneously with his campaign against PLO influence in
the occupied territories, King Husayn pursued two parallel tracks
of international negotiations in 1986 and 1987, with the ultimate
aim of convening a general international peace conference on the
19. "Fatah's Khalaf on Dialogue Issues," Al Mustaabal (Paris), 11
April 1987, pp. 22-23, as reported in FBIS, 14 April 1987, p. A-
4.
20. "Government Views PLO Abrogations of Amman Accord," Amman
Domestic Service in Arabic, 21 April 1987, as reported in FBIS ,
21 April 1987, p. F-l.
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Arab-Israeli conflict. One track featured direct secret negotia-
tions with Israel as well as open negotiations with the United
States, the Soviet Union and other interested parties, such as
the British and French. The second track was within the Arab
world to unify the Arab states to the extent that an Arab Summit
could be held which could, it was hoped, adopt a common approach
to a political settlement. The holding of an Arab Summit in Amman
would, by itself, be a significant coup for Husyan, consolidating
his role as the senior statesman of the Arab world.
There were, to be sure, sufficient reasons. . .even apart
from the Arab-Israeli conflict. . .to have such a meeting. First
of all, there was the danger from the Iran-Irag War, then reach-
ing its military crisis. Then there was the continuing civil war
in Lebanon and the bitter disputes between Syria and Iraq, each
contributing to the perpetuation of the Palestine conflict. In
the end, King Husayn hoped that a settlement of these intra-Arab
conflicts would lead to a political approach to negotiations with
Israel in the context of an international conference under United
Nations auspices. This would face the PLO with the choice of
either accepting Jordanian terms of UN 242 if it wished to par-
ticipate or becoming irrelevant to the settlement. One might
dispute the possibility that the PLO could become irrelevant to
the settlement of the Palestine problem but, in fact, it had
already become marginal in the Arab world as a whole following
its ouster from Lebanon by the Israelis and Syrians. Arafat had
been forced to enter into his alliance with King Husayan in
February 1985 (and in the words of Abu Iyad, give up half of
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Palestinian representation) to regain even a subordinate role in
the peace process, as well as to be able to maintain contact with
his principal Palestinian constituency in the occupied territo-
ries. The adoption of this political stance further alienated
the radical-messianic elements of the PLO as well as Syria, which
feared that a Hashemite-PLO settlement with Israel would leave
out Syrian interests in the Golan. Arafat's chief remaining asset
was the official Arab endorsement of the PLO • s status as "the
sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people granted
at Rabat in 1974. But should this recognition be withdrawn, even
if in a de facto manner, by making it conditional upon his enter-
ing into an international conference on the basis of UN 242, the
veto power given to the PLO over a political settlement might be
withdrawn.
Most indications are that King Husayn felt that Arafat would
be pressured back into political coordination with Jordan under a
renewed Amman Accords—as interpreted by Jordan. Thus, there was
the surprisingly restrained reaction in Amman to the formal abro-
gation of these accords at the Algiers 18th meeting of the PNC.
The prominent Israeli journalist Wolf Blitzer, normally the
Washington correspondent of The Jerusalem Post , reported from
Amman that top Jordanian officials still believed they could
cooperate in the peace process with Chairman Arafat, despite the
action of the PLO's Executive Committee. He reported that these
officials "welcomed Foreign Minister Simon Peres' s readiness to
participate in an international conference. . .Peres was even
more forthcoming and flexible on this issue than Secretary of
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State George Shultz and other United States officials." 21
It was clear that Arafat's own views were not too different,
as these were reported in an interview by a British journalist in
Tunis:
"No doubt there is now a consensus for the international
conference, which has been accepted at all international
levels... For the first time the American Administration has
accepted it in principle, also a part of the Israelis--the
Labour Party... It is true that they are looking for their
international conference, not our international conference,
but that's all part of the game." 22
To get around his break with King Husayn, which he believed to
have been caused by Israeli and American pressure, he could join
in a united Arab delegation to the international conference. Even
the obvious attempts of Jordan, Egypt and the Israelis to find
alternative Palestinian leadership to participate in an interna-
tional conference was given a favorable interpretation; it proved
that the Israelis "know in the back of their minds that they
can't bypass the Palestinians." The ultimate goal must still be a
confederation of Jordan and Palestine because. .. "we have a privi-
leged relationship with the Jordanian people." 23
21. Wolf Blitzer, "Jordan Determined on Conference Despite PNC,"
The Jerusalem Post . 22 April 1987, pp. 1 and 10, as reported in
FBIS, 22 April 1987, p. 1-2.
22. Andrew Gowers, "Arafat Interviewed on PLO Issues, Israel," The
Financial Times (London), 7 September 1987, p. 15, as reported in






VINTIFADAH: THE PALESTINIAN DIMENSION
"I do not have the same sense of responsibility for them
that I do for my own subjects. They never were, not even
between 1950 and 1970, when the territory east and west
of Jordan was united in a single state" .1
H.M. King Husayn ibn Talal
A. Significance for Jordan
King Husayn was one of the first Middle Eastern or external
actors to grasp the implications of the Palestinian uprising that
began in Gaza in early December and spread rapidly throughout the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Although his formal disengagement
decision from the claims to sovereignty over the occupied Jorda-
nian territories lost in 1967 did not come until July 1988, this
drastic strategic change was foreshadowed as early as the inter-
view, from which the quotation above was taken, in January. As
we have already noted, King Husayn' s policy towards the Palestin-
ians divided them into three groups. The first of these, the
Jordanian-Palestinians of the East Bank, were the most important
for Jordanian security and the survival of the Hashemite monar-
chy. The second group consisted of the Palestinians of the disa-
pora, whose politically active segments had given their support
to the PLC-. Finally, there were the Palestinians of the occupied
territories of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. It was this latter
group that became the focus of cooperation and competition be-
tween the PLC- and Jordan in the 1970s and 1980s.
1. "King Husayn Comments on Uprising, Peace Process," Interview
in Per Spiegel (Hamburg), 1 February 1988, pp. 125-29, as report-
ed in FBIS
. 3 February 1988, p. 30.
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It was a focus of interests because both the PLO and the
Hashemites regarded the people of the occupied territories as
instrumental to larger concerns vital to their very survival.
The PLO, of course, was divided between those who sought the
maximum objective of regaining all of Palestine, which was en-
shrined in their Charter, and those who has accepted the lesser
objective of a mini-state in the territories occupied in 1967
following an Israeli withdrawal. This latter option, provided
that it included all the territories lost, including East Jerusa-
lem, and provided for a sovereign Palestinian state, became the
official policy of the PLO led by Arafat and was endorsed by the
Arab summits in Fez in 1982 and Amman in 1987. Whether this was
to be a final or an interim solution was still not clear; state-
ments of PLO leaders could be cited on either side. What was
clear was the fact that this official "minimalist" PLO policy was
the only one which could obtain the endorsement of the Arab
states and the USSR, even if it did not have the approval of the
United States or Israel.
Even this minimalist policy faced formidable obstacles to
its realization; first and foremost being Israel. With the excep-
tion of a few politically and numerically inconsequential groups,
the entire spectrum of Israeli politics and public opinion utter-
ly rejected the idea of a sovereign Palestinian state on the West
Bank, much less a state run by the PLO. To them, the PLO was
merely a terrorist organization dedicated to the destruction
oflsrael and the Jewish people, which could only be dealt with by
force. The realistic choice in Israeli politics was between the
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Labor and Likud options for the occupied territories and both of
these involved Jordan.
Likud's policy was heavily influenced by its ideological
roots in Zionist revisionism as well as by its views of Israeli
security needs. On both grounds, it rejected any territorial
concessions in the de facto situation obtained as a result of the
1967 War and the 1978 Camp David negotiations. After withdrawal
from the Sinai, any further withdrawals would mean relinquishment
of part of the sacred Land of Israel. The policy regarding the
Arab inhabitants of the territories had its own maximalist and
minimalist divisions. The official Likud position was former
prime minister Begin 's "autonomy plan". This held that there
could be no compromise on borders or sovereignty and the aim of
gradually settling Jews in the territories, but the Arab inhabi-
tants could remain as guests, or poor relations, provided that
they accept the fact that autonomy related solely to their per-
sonal status and purely local government, and not to any politi-
cal rights. In fact, they would loose their status in interna-
tional law as inhabitants of occupied territory and would not
gain the status of Israeli Arabs, which was in theory that of
full citizenship.
The maximalist Likud position was associated in particular
with Ariel Sharon. Like the maximalist position within the PLO,
it was probably a minority but a very important position never-
theless, since it represented the deeply held views of extremist
Zionist ideology as well as presenting a logical security policy
for those who believed that the Arab-Israeli conflict was a zero-
sum game. This view held that the bulk of the inconvenient Arab
106
population could induced to leave by pressure and, ultimately, be
expelled by force if necessary. Their Palestinian national ambi-
tions could be satisfied by the establishment of a Palestinian
state on the East Bank of the Jordan in place of the obsolete and
"foreign" (since it had originated in the Hejaz) Hashemite re-
gime. Jordan was already the only state in the world with a
Palestinian majority. The Hashemites there could follow in the
footsteps of their Iraqi cousins into oblivion. This new Pales-
tinian state would be nothing more than an Israeli satellite,
much like the regime that Sharon attempted to establish in Leba-
non and could present no security threat to Israel.
Labor's position on the occupied territories and their
inhabitants stemmed from their understanding of Zionism which
emphasized the People of Israel over the Land of Israel. It also
had a secular, democratic and socialist heritage from its Euro-
pean background. For Labor, as for Likud, the problem of the
occupied territories lay in the fact that there were too many
Arabs there, but the autonomy plan of Begin and Shamir was, at
best, merely a temporary solution to this problem. It was impos-
sible for a democracy to have two kinds of inhabitants—those who
had political rights and those who did not. This was all the
more true when one realized that the demographic facts would turn
the Arab minority of Eretz Israel into an Arab majority in a
generation or two. Autonomy would thus be an "apartheid" solution
as in South Africa and would not be supported by Israel's friends
and allies. Labor thus favored its "Jordanian option" of the
return of the major areas of heavy Arab population to Jordanian
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sovereignty, while keeping strategically valuable positions for
security reasons in a new partition of Palestine. The demographic
basis of Labor's argument could be seen in the fact that it
wanted to give the Gaza strip, which had never been under Jorda-
nian control, to Jordan as well as parts of the West Bank. In a
larger sense, Israeli security would be guaranteed by the self
interest of the Hashemites, who had demonstrated in 1970-71 that
they knew how to handle challenges to their rule from Palestin-
ians. The Labor position had the advantage of being more realis-
tic in its assessment of the international situation, for it
could be implemented through the internationally sanctioned
mechanism of a conference based upon the UN 242 and 338 resolu-
tions. In this way it conformed in process but not in outcome to
the minimalist position endorses by the Arab summits.
If the PLO did not exist, or if it could be ignored, King
Husayn's preferred solution would be to get as much territory as
he could from the Labor position, just as his grandfather King
Abdullah had gotten as much as he could in negotiations with Ben
Gurion in 1948-49. The improbable and artificial Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan had not existed in the Middle East for nearly
seventy years by being ruled by romantics. Abdullah and Husayn
were both realists with a keen appreciation of international
politics and Zionsim. As much as he would have liked to ignore
the role of the PLO, the fact remained that this was a reality
endorsed by pan-Arab consensus. To accept some version of the
Labor "Jordanian option" thus required the cooperation of Yasir
Arafat. It was impossible for Jordan to go it alone in a bilater-
al deal with an Israeli Labor government, at least for anything
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ess then complete withdrawal from every inch of occupied terri-
ory... hardly a likely prospect.
It was also impossible for King Husayn to wash his hands of
he occupied territories and concentrate on governing and improv-
ng his existing kingdom on the East Bank, although this was a
:ourse urged upon him by a number of his East Bank advisers,
including his brother Crown Prince Hassan. The king's continued
issertion of Jordanian legal sovereignty over the West Bank and
lis genuine concern for the plight of its inhabitants was an
important political asset, even if it could not be implemented in
practice. Certainly, even the most contented, well-integrated and
upwardly mobile Jordanian-Palestinian of the East Bank felt a
deep sense of kinship and sympathy for his brethren in the occu-
pied territories. In many cases these "brethren" were also liter-
ally brothers, families divided between tne Hashemite Kingdom and
Israeli occupation. To wash his hands of these people would seem
to demonstrate an indifference to their fate. This would be a
shameful, humiliating and dishonorable course unworthy of his
family or his character, and especially so since it was his
decision to go to war in 1967 that had put them in their present
state. In the long-run, the internal political stability of
Jordan could not survive such a decision which would bring out
the latent divisions between the Jordanian-Palestinians and the
native East Bank population.
This disastrous consequence of a total disengagement from
the Palestine issue would soon be evident in the international
and regional arenas as well. Jordan's prosperity and even its
very existence had depended on the good will, and the monetary
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subsidies, of major Arab oil states. Such subsidies would be hard
to find for a "frontline" state which, seemingly, had opted-out
of the Palestine conflict. As for the Israeli enemy and its
American ally, the position of Jordan as a potential recipient of
at least part of Palestinian territory and population in a set-
tlement gave it a special international status. This led, in
turn, to American military and economic aid and to the Labor
Alignment's policy of keeping the Hashemite regime in being so
that one day it could implement its "Jordanian option" . This was
vital consideration, since American and Labor support for their
Jordanian option served to restrain Ariel Sharon's version of
Jordan as the Palestinian state.
Jordan's Palestine policy in the 1980s had been governed by
an inescapable fundamental reality. This was the fact that the
trend in the treatment of the occupied territories by Israel was
working against the accidental, unfortunate, but still tolerable
status quo existing since 1967. Despite the check brought about
through the indecisive war in Lebanon and the consequent drop in
Sharon's prestige, the trend was clearly in favor of the Likud
policy. From Jordan's point of view, Begin 's and Shamir's autono-
my plan was merely a slower version of Sharon's rapid transforma-
tion of Jordan into the Palestinian state, for it was autonomy
coupled with Israeli settlements, land and water confiscations.
These would, ultimately, put enough pressure on the inhabitants
of the occupied territories to leave, and most of them would
leave for Jordan. However, the Lebanon War did produce a window
of opportunity as a result of the elections of 1984 in Israel
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which put Shimon Peres back in the prime ministership, even
though this was in a National Unity Coalition with Likud and was
to last for only two years. This was the first opening since
Likud's ouster of Labor in the decisive election of 1977 for a
realistic chance for negotiations based on UN 242 and 338.
King Husayn's urgent need after 1984 was to obtain Arafat's
cooperation in such a policy while this window remained open.
This was accomplished in the Amman Accords of February 1985, but
by the time that negotiations seemed (at least in King Husayn's
view) to be imminent in early 1986 Arafat stood firm on the PLO's
minimal program. .. that Palestinian self-determination meant an
independent state that would then seek confederation with Jordan.
Although the direction of the intifadah and the identity of
its leadership was at first unclear, two facts were perfectly
clear from the beginning. One of these was the fact that the
segment of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation had
demonstrated that it would play a leading role in the debate over
the future of Palestine. After the twenty year long bitter
contest between the Hashemites and the PLO as to which one should
speak for the Palestinians of the occupied territories, it had
become evident that these Palestinians wished to speak for them-
selves. Thus, the center of gravity of the Palestinians struggle
for freedom, which before had moved from Damascus, Amman, Beirut
and Tunis now shifted to Gaza, Nablus, Hebron, Jerusalem and to
hundreds of previously anonymous villages and refugee camps in
the occupied territories. Despite the fact that the intifadah
soon declared its allegiance to the external leadership of the
PLO, particularly to Arafat and to Abu Jihad, it necessarily had
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an independent existence due to the fact of Israeli control.
Located as it was on the front line of confrontation with Israel
and dedicated to an active policy of resistance and institution-
building, it could only be subordinated in a general manner to
the PLO's formula of the organization being "the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people." For the first time in
fifty years, since the British suppression of the Palestinian
uprising in the mandate from 1936 to 1939, the masses of the
ordinary people had taken the forefront of the struggle and their
leaders has to hasten to catch up. This popular, universal and
mass nature of the intifadah formed the second inescapable fact
which shaped Jordanian reactions to it.
Taken together, these two characteristics of the intifadah
had both positive and negative potentialities for Jordanian
interests, but it was clear that a major readjustment of policy
was needed. The positive aspect stemmed from the fact that the
Palestinian struggle was now centered on the issue of the libera-
tion of the occupied territories. This viewpoint, in fact, had
been consistent with Jordanian policy since 1967. If the inter-
ests of the people in the occupied territories in gaining freedom
from Israeli occupation became paramount, the conflict became
capable of negotiation with at least some of the Israeli leaders.
However, if the maximalist and messianic views of the radical
wing of the PLO were to prevail, views which rejected the idea of
a Palestinian mini-state on the West Bank and Gaza in favor of an
armed struggle for all of Palestine, there would be nothing to
negotiate with the Israelis. Instead, the hard-line Zionist
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extremist views would be reinforced. It goes without saying that
these views were the most dangerous to the very existence of the
Hashemite state— for they called for Jordan to become the alter-
native homeland for the Palestinians. Another equally dangerous
consequence of the radical PLO views might be a repetition of the
scenario of 1968-1970, with their attempt to take over Jordan as
the base for the military liberation of Palestine. Thus, the
essence of Jordanian policy in the 1980s had been to get the
external leadership of the PLO to commit itself to negotiations
on the basis of the UN 242 and 338 resolutions to secure Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories. To be sure, Jordan
hoped that the old-line pro-Hashemite leaders in the territories
would play a major, if not predominant, role in representing the
views of the people of the occupied territories; however, the
most important consideration was to have their interest in ending
the occupation influence the views of the PLO leadership towards
negotiations. Since 1974, the official position of Arafat and the
Fatah mainstream had been moving in this direction, but it was a
fitfull and by no means irreversible movement. They were ob-
sessed with the need to maintain as much organizational unity as
possible on such a basic issue, given that they were already
beset by foreign interference, distracted by personal rivalries
and ossified by bureaucratic empire building (not to mention
having to fend off the determined efforts of the Israelis and the
United States to eliminate their role entirely) . Arafat was thus
forced to vacillate between the poles of the military and diplo-
matic options.
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The popular nature of the intifadah gave it a legitimacy and
an urgency which was impossible to ignore. It reinforced the
views of the Israeli Labor politicians that the Likud's autonomy
plan was impossible of realization. Alternatively, the "iron
fist" occupation policies pursued by the Labor Minister of De-
fense, General Rabin, has resulted in a crackdown on all nation-
alist and pro-PLO activities that had made the resultant explo-
sion all the more violent and its leadership all the more ob-
scure. The attempt to foster a pro-Hashemite leadership in the
territories had proven to be an illusion and wishful thinking.
While the old, established pro-PLO leadership was being sup-
pressed, exiled or imprisoned a whole new generation of youthful
and much more militant leaders were nurtured—often within Israe-
li jails. In the long run, the intifadah reinforced the Labor
viewpoint that negotiations for territorial concessions were the
only possible solution, although only after the violence of the
intifadah had been contained. Of course, the Labor leaders still
hoped that King Husayn would either be authorized by the Pales-
tinians or be confident enough of his strength to be able to
negotiate with Israel. Failing that possibility, which soon
became more and more remote, they hoped that a new intifadah
leadership would develop its own negotiating position independent
of the PLO. On the other hand, the hard-line policy of Sharon and
his allies became even more prominent on the opposite side of the
Israeli political spectrum. Various definitions of autonomy had
one common denonimator, and that was that the Palestinian people
were essentially inert, while the essence of the intifadah was
popular activity. The bankruptcy of autonomy solutions was masked
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by the existence of the National Unity government, which had
adopted this policy as their lowest common denominator on the
occupied territories.
Jordan's Palestinian policy in response to the intifadah can
be understood as an attempt to support the focus on the occupied
territories. Clearly, the segment of the Palestinian people under
Israeli occupation were defining their interests in an unmistaka-
ble fashion.. to put an end to Israeli occupation. Their means of
expression was through militant mass action posing a political
challenge to the occupation authorities. One of the most remarka-
ble aspects of the intifadah was the avoidance of military con-
frontation and the almost universally respected ban on the use of
firearms. The intifadah posed a problem for the PLO as well as
the Israelis; how was the PLO going to help achieve the objective
of the end of the occupation when the people on the ground were
daily risking their freedom and their lives? It had been King
Husyan's consistent view, emerging as the Arab consensus after
the Fez Arab Summit in 1982 and reinforced as recently as the
Amman Arab Summit of November 1987, that this could be achieved
on the basis of negotiations through the UN 242 and 338 resolu-
tions leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state linked
to Jordan on the West Bank and Gaza strip. This position had been
endorsed as well by the PLO external leadership under Arafat.
However, the PLO had been unable to implement this view in
coordination with Jordan in 1985 and 1986, at least in King
Husayn's estimation. But if the hitherto "silent majority" of the
occupied territories were to add their views to the pragmatic
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tendencies of the PLO, the PLO might be irrevocably committed to
negotiations for territorial compromise and formal recognition of
Israel. It had been the objective of Jordanian policy since the
breakdown of the Amman Accords in early 1986 to bring this
"silent majority" into the equation to influence the PLO's lead-
ership. Now the occupied territories were speaking and they were
agreeing with King Husayn's assessment. He might have wished
that they would have spoken through pro-Hashemite spokesmen, but
the vital consideration was that their voices should be heard and
heeded by the PLO's external leadership. Perhaps the Palestinians
would never accept the best of advice from King Husayn or from
the old-guard pro-Hashemite elite of the West Bank, but they
could hardly ignore the demands of the entire population of the
occupied territories, especially when these demands were accompa-
nied by militant defiance of Israeli authority. This was the
opportunity created by the intifadah for a decisive alignment of
Palestinian and Jordanian interests. If Jordan, the occupied
territories and the PLO worked in concert for a negotiated set-
tlement, it would be impossible for the Israelis or their Ameri-
can backers to ignore them.
The focus on the interests of the occupied territories could
not help but affect the Jordanians of Palestinian origin on the
East Bank as well. The development of Palestinian nationalism on
the territory of Palestine was of prime importance to the exist-
ence of the Hashemite kingdom. The PLO's maximalist demands has
always emphasized that the primary loyalty of the entire Pales-
tinian people, including those in Jordan, should be to the cause
of Palestine. This view, particularly associated with George
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Habbash, held that the road to Jerusalem lay through Amman. The
Hashemite state, even after its loss of the West Bank in 1967,
was still a prime oppressor of the Palestinian people. They held
that the Hashemites and the Zionists had a coordinated policy of
suppressing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
However, if Palestinian national rights could be obtained through
negotiation with Israel in the occupied territories of historic
Palestine, the focal point of Palestinian politics would surely
be on that territory and people and not on the Jordanian-Pales-
tinians of the East Bank. To be sure, eventually an independent
Palestinian state might form an attractive alternative for the
Jordanian-Palestinians, but this was a much more remote danger
than the almost inevitable outcome of the dominant trend in
Israeli politics towards driving the remaining Palestinians from
the land of Palestine and turning the East Bank into the Pales-
tinian state. Thus, the territorial emphasis of the intifadah on
the occupied territories served to emphasize the territorial
separateness of the East Bank and its population, which might in
turn serve to reinforce the feelings among the Jordanian-Pales-
tinians that Jordan was their real home.
The serious immediate danger to the Hashemites from the
intifadah stemmed not from its goal, but rather from its popular
and emotional character. The daily spectacle of ordinary people
confronting the armed might of the enemy brought home to all
Arabs, particularly those of Palestinian origin, the reality of
their struggle for freedom. This had been noted in the popular
response to the siege of Beirut in 1982. There was the danger
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that an aroused public opinion would be frustrated by the inac-
tion of Arab regimes, and what Arab regime was more vulnerable to
these frustrations than the Hasemite kingdom? It not only had a
majority of citizens of Palestinian origin, but it claimed sover-
eignty over the territory where these confrontations were taking
place. Leaving aside the national nature of the intifadah, its
fundamental demand was for free and representative government to
give people control over their own lives. Although the Hashemite
regime was by no means the most repressive of Arab governments,
the fact remained that political parties had been banned since
1957, the last national non-partisan elections had been held in
1967, and martial law had been enforced since the 1967 War. In
practice, the Hashemite state was almost as unrepresentative as
the Israeli occupation and perhaps even more repressive on a day-
to-day basis.
The dilemma posed by the intifadah to King Husayn was clear.
Its overt political message regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict
was a welcome one; it brought an authentic, powerful and perhaps
decisive Palestinian voice down on the side of pragmatism. It
would be difficult if not impossible for the PLO ' s external
leadership to ignore it. Once the PLO did accept this message, it
would in turn begin to affect the policies of the United States
and the internal politics of Israel. At the very least, the
ascendancy of the Zionist right wing and its dangerous policies
for the future of Jordan would be checked. At best, a settlement
involving substantial territorial withdrawals might be concluded.
Simultaneously, however, the symbolic message of the intifadah
posed a challenge to all Arab regimes, but particularly to the
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Hashemites. This was the message that the people were demanding
political control over their own lives. If this broader message
spread beyond the borders of occupied Palestine to the East Bank,
it would have revolutionary implications for the Hashemite re-
gime.
King Husayn's solution to this dilemma turned out to be a
dual one. Internationally, it was to encourage the pragmatic
voice of the intifadah within Palestinian politics. Internally,
it was to contain, limit and guide the symbolic impact of the
intifadah within the Jordanian political system.
One can identify several specific lines of action within
Jordan's broad policy of supporting the intifadah internationally
while limiting its effects internally:
1. To insure that the radicalism of the intifadah's
populism did not spread to the East Bank, where it could pose
two distinct dangers to Jordan. First, it could lead to open
defiance of the authority of the government, and second, it could
lead to direct actions to aid the struggle of the intifadah. Such
actions would inevitably lead to Israeli retaliation, regardless
of the Jordanian government's lack of involvement.
2. To reopen cooperation with the Arafat-led PLO leader-
ship to encourage the pragmatic tendencies of both the intifadah
and of Arafat. These could lead to significant breakthroughs on
both the international and Israeli political fronts. They also
had the advantage of countering those elements in the intifadah,
both secular and Islamic, who favored a much more radical policy
for the intifadah.
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3. To realize fundamental changes in Jordanian politics
towards democratization. If the intifadah were to fail, or if it
dragged on indefinitely, the frustrations of the Palestinians
would be taken out on the easier target of Arab regimes. Radical
Zionist policies in Israel would gain renewed vigor and focus on
the need for Jordan to serve as the Palestinian state. If the
intifadah succeeded in obtaining an end to occupation, then the
question would arise of a confederation with Jordan, for this was
the official policy of the PLO, Jordan and the United States. In
the past, King Husayn had promoted such a union because he felt
confident in his ability to dominate it. It would be Jordan that
provided the key to Israeli withdrawal and the terms of the union
or confederation with Palestine would, in fact, have to be gua-
ranteed by both Israel and the United States. However, if such a
confederation were to be accomplished through the combined ef-
forts of the intifadah and the PLO, Jordan would be the junior
partner. In that case, its authoritarian regime would not appear
attractive when compared to a successful, popular and representa-
tive Palestinian regime. Whether to join in such a confederation
or to compete with a neighboring democratic Palestinian state,
the Hashemite state needed a more representative form of govern-
ment.
B. Containment of the Intifadah
Jordan's policy of isolating itself from the spread of the
intifadah to its territory began in the first weeks of the
uprising and has continued unabated until today. In a larger
sense, the entire course of Jordanian policy towards the Palestin-
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Palestinians in this period, including cooperation with the
external leadership of the PLO, the ending of Jordanian sover-
eignty over the West Bank and the democratization of the Jordani-
an political system has been aimed at the containment of the
intifadah through alignment with the objectives of the Palestin-
ians. However, a number of policies have been directed more
specifically to contain the security risks of the intifadah in
the narrower sense. We can distinguish several aspects of these
security dangers and corresponding policy responses. First, there
are the direct terrorist attacks against Jordanian targets aimed
at the destabilization of the Jordanian political system. Second,
there are the broader-based incidents in the nature of demonstra-
tions and riots, perhaps instigated by agitators, but involving
more popular participation by Palestinian groups--particularly
refugees and students. Finally, there are armed attacks from
Jordan across the cease-fire lines with Israel, ostensibly to aid
the intifadah but more likely aimed at the destabilization of
Jordan by provoking Israeli retaliation.
In the first months of the intifadah between 50 and 60
Palestinian security risks, mainly associated with the PFLP, and
including PFLP central committee member Hamdi Mattar, were de-
tained by Jordanian security authorities and some 70 more were
reported to have been expelled. 2 On January 24, 1988 the PFLP
issued a statement in Beirut protesting the arrest of 33 of their
members in Amman. The same day Jordanian prime minister Zaid
2. David Clark, "Government View of Intifadah Described, " The
Israeli Economist , February 1989, pp. 7-8, as reported in JPRS,




al-Rifai announced in parliament that 2 3 members of the PFLP had
been detained along with a document from PFLP headquarters in
Damascus with instructions for them to organize demonstrations to
shake "the Jordanian agent regime" and to create "a revolutionary
atmosphere". Press reports noted that some 150 demonstrators
chanting "Revolution until victory" had staged a protest march in
Amman, which was quickly broken up by security forces with sever-
al more arrests. 3
By April, however, security challenges from the intifadah
went beyond the stage of demonstrations and pre-emptive arrests.
Car bombs were exploded in Amman and its suburbs, one in the
parking structure of the Amman municipality. Statements claiming
responsibility for these were made in Beirut by the "Black Sep-
tember" organization: "The explosions resulted in the burning of
a nine story building which intelligence organs use as an opera-
tion room to plan their filthy operations against our kinfolk's
revolution in Palestine and against the sons and strugglers of
our Arab, Jordanian-Palestinian people in Jordan." 4 One news-
paper columnist in Amman immediately charged this explosion to
Zionist terrorists and linked it to the assassination of Abu
Jihad in Tunis. This view was not taken by the responsible
authorities, Interior Minister Raja'i al-Dajani said that those
responsible were known but that investigations would continue
3. Ishan A. Hijazi, "Palestinians Held in Jordanian Capital," The
New York Times . January 25, 1988.
4. "Black September on Amman Car Bomb," An-Nahar (Beirut), 18
April 1988, p. 8, as reported in FBIS . 19 January 1988, p. 41.
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until the actual perpetrators were found. He added that these
explosions were aimed at influencing the policy of the Jordanian
government. . .as in the 1950s and 1960s, but in fact merely aided
the enemy:
"I believe that the perpetrators are hostile to the Arab
Nation and to the Jordanian pan-Arab approach. Such acts do
not serve the cause, but serve World Zionism directly and
indirectly, trying to make the region agitated and uneasy
and therefore ripe for the taking." 5
A year later, a new group calling itself "The Generation of Arab
Anger" issued a statement in Beirut claiming responsibility for
the July, 1989, bombings in Saudi Arabia and announcing its
decision to "liquidate" both King Husayn and Yasir Arafat as
"agents of Israel", and warning the Saudi royal family to review
its calculations less it suffer the same fate. 6
Suppression of demonstrations at refugee camps in Jordan
were reported periodically. According to the pro-PLO newspaper
Al-Fair (Jerusalem) , large demonstrations at the Al-Buqgah and
Al-Husayn refugee camps in Amman were suppressed in February
1988. 7 The clandestine "Al Quds Palestinian Arab Radio" (broad-
casting from Syrian-occupied Lebanon) claimed that large-scale
5. "Interior Minister Examines Security Apparatus After
Bombings," interview in Al-Watan (Kuwait), 20 June 1988, p. 18,
as reported by JPRS . 3 August 1988, p. 25.
6. "AFP: Group Threatens King Husayn, 'Afafat," as reported by
FBIS, 17 August 1989, p. 26.
7. "Jordanian Suppression Revealed," Al-Fair (Jerusalem), 11
February 1988, p. 1, as reported by FBIS , 12 February 1988, p.
38.
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demonstrations in solidarity with Palestinian Land Day were held
in the Amman camps in March 1988. 8 Part of the Jordanian re-
sponse was reported by Israeli sources to include warnings to
youths that further arrests for participation in demonstrations,
rock-throwing, etc., would include a 500 dinar fine on their
families. 9 Although the Jordanian-Palestinians as a whole were
conspicuously quiet in both the anti-regime riots of April, 1989
and the elections in November 1989, it seemed as if the relaxa-
tion of the security forces later in that year contributed to
unprecedented large scale demonstrations and incidents marking
the second anniversary of the intifadah in December. A thousand
demonstrators from Al-Buqgah camp, many of them masked, blocked
the main Amman-Damascus highway, burning tires and shouting
slogans against the new government of Mudar Badran as well as in
support of the intifadah. Leaflets were distributed in the name
of a new organization calling itself "The Unified Leadership of
the Uprising in Jordan," an obvious copying of the name of the
intifadah leadership in Palestine. This organization was said to
be backed by both the Syrian-based radical Palestinian groups and
Islamic fundamentalists. 10 Whatever may have been the role of
Islamic elements, the demonstrations were particularly praised by
8. "Mammoth Marches in Amman Camps onLand Day," as reported in
FBIS, 31 March 1988, p. 34.
9. "Dan Avidan, "Jordan Takes Steps to Curb Spread of 'Upri-
sing'," Al Hamishmar (Tel Aviv), 15 July 1988, p. 4, as reported
in FBIS . 19 July 1988, p. 41.
10. "More Than 1,000 Demonstrate at Camp," Radio Jerusalem
(Arabic), 4 December 1989, as reported in FBIS . 11 December 1989,
p. 37.
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Radio Teheran's Arabic service in their "Behind the News" feature
on 13 December 1989 as an example of a new trend in the intifadah
towards greater awareness and participation in the intifadah
throughout the Islamic world. This trend revealed "the deep gulf
between Arab masses and their reactionary regimes over what
concerns the Palestinian issue." 11
The potential scope for the escalation of popular
demonstrations was most clearly seen not in the violent
demonstrations outside of refugee camps, but perhaps more
significantly in the heart of Amman on the second anniversary of
the intifadah. These were largely a more spontaneous and peaceful
outcome of a "Week of Solidarity With the Intifadah" organized
by the Professional Associations of Amman. Over several days a
series of demonstrations of groups ranging from several hundreds
to 12,000 chanted pro-intifadah, pro-PLO and anti-Israel and
anti-United States slogans. Many of these demonstrations spilled
over from official events, and included such slogans as "Pales-
tine and Jordan, one people, not two." 12 Although some demon-
strators wished to go the American embassy to burn an American
flag, they backed down when confronted by security forces, as
well as being dissuaded by prominent Palestinian leaders, includ-
ing ' As'ad 'Abd-al Rahman, a member of the PNC and Faris al-
Nabulsi, a member of parliament. 13 The potential for further
11. "Behind the News," Tehran Radio (Arabic), 13 December 1989,
as reported in FBIS (South Asia) . 20 December 1989, pp. 54-5.
12. "Amman March Gathers 12,000," Jordan Times (Amman), 13 Decem-
ber 1989, p. 3, as reported in FBIS , 13 December 1989, p. 36.
13. Ibid.
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escalation of instability in the new atmosphere of freedom of
expression was further emphasized in riots at Yarmuk University
in Irbid between Palestinian-Jordanians and native "East Bank"
Jordanian students. The latter objected to what they considered
to be "anti-Jordanian" slogans and attacked a Palestinian cul-
tural heritage exhibit displayed at the university in honor of
the intifadah anniversary. 14
Direct armed attacks on Israeli-held territory included some
organized by Palestinian groups from Lebanon and others which,
seemingly, had an Islamic motivation. Arrests were announced in
October 1989 of twelve PFLP members for their involvement in the
firing of Katyusha rockets at the occupied territories from
Jordan. In an attack in early January 1990 in commemoration of
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of Fatah, forces of
the "Fatah-Uprising" (the Syrian-backed dissidents of Abu Musa)
announced several attacks on Israeli-held territory through
Jordan. They also claimed that they were aided by machine-gun
fire from "nationalist soldiers in the Jordanian army", fire
which allowed their forces to return to safety. Involvement by
Jordanian forces was also claimed by Israeli sources, but it was
also reported that Jordanian forces in the area had been rein-
14. "PFLP Official Reportedly Hiding, Not Arrested," Al Puds al-
Arabi (London), 20 October 1989, p. 1, as reproted in FBIS, 24
October 1989, p. 31.
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forced to set up lookout posts and road blocks to prevent further
infiltrations and to search for those responsible. 15
Marwan al-Qasim, the Jordanian deputy prime minister and
foreign minister, declared that a number of these incidents were
"unprovoked shooting at Jordanian territory. . .to distract atten-
tion from its (Israel's) internal pressures in other areas." 16
However, another Jordanian soldier who crossed to the occupied
territories where he was killed by Israeli forces was said to
have left behind a message that he had gone to join the Jihad. 17
Prime Minister Badran downplayed these incidents, stating that
there were only ten shooting from Jordan's side. However, he
added that "Jordan is determined to control the cease fire line.
The world at large knows this." 18
Most important, of course, was the reaction of Israel.
Despite some pointed references from Defense Minister Rabin that
Jordan would be judged not only by its intentions but by the
results of its intentions, Rabin also noted that half of the
Jordanian army were Palestinians or of Palestinian descent. 19
15. "Amman Beefs Up Forces," Radio Jerusalem (Hebrew), 7 January
1990, as reported in FBIS, 8 January 1990, p. 21.
16. Faysal al-Shubal, "Foreign Minister Comments," Swat al-Arabi
(Amman), 7 January 1990, p. 1, as reported in FBIS, 8 January
1990, p. 25.
17. Randah Habib, "Missing Conscript Was On 'Jihad' for Pales-
tine," Radio Monte Carlo (Paris) , 8 January 1990, as reported in
FBIS . 9 January 1990, p. 35.
18. Ibid.
19. "Jordan to be Judged by 'Outcome' of Intentions," Radio
Jerusalem (Hebrew) , 8 January 1990, as reported in FBIS , 8 Janu-
ary 1990, p. 22.
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Overall, therefore, there seemed to be a certain restraint in
Israeli reactions, realizing that these operations were aimed as
much at destabilizing the Hashemite regime as in giving aid to
the intifadah. The officer most directly concerned, Major Gener-
al Yitzhaq Mordekhay, commander of the Israeli Central Command,
stated that he knew that the Jordanians are making every effort
to keep the border quiet. 20 It was probably fortunate for Jordan
that the National Unity government and the position of Yitzhak
Rabin as defense minister was available for Jordan in restraining
Israel's traditional policy of massive retaliation. In a larger
sense as well, as noted by newspaper columnist Pinhas 'Inbari of
Al Hamishmar (Tel Aviv) , the destabilization of Jordan through
the intifadah would most likely not result in the establishment
of an alternative Palestinian government, but rather in a radical
"Khomeyniite Islam", which would be unacceptable to either Syria
or Iraq. .. resulting in armed clashes between Israeli and Arab
armies on the territory of Jordan. 21
C. Resumption of Cooperation With the PLO
The initial movement towards the resumption of cooperation
and coordination between Jordan and the PLO was tentative. Both
sides, it seemed, were still in the process of assessing the
intifadah' s leadership and direction. From the Jordanian side,
20. "IDF General on Jordanian Border Incidents," Radio Jerusalem
(Hebrew) . 5 January 1990, p. 29.
21. Pinhas 'Inbari, "Jordan's Stability Clear Israeli Interest,"
Al Hamishmar (Tel Aviv), 13 December 1989, p. 8, as reported in
FBIS
. 21 December 1989, p. 25.
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one of the first public assessments of the intifadah was made by
King Husayn in his address to the graduating class of the Command
and Staff College on December 16, 1987, barely a week after the
start of the uprising. Here, he emphasized his criticism of the
Israelis for their failure to recognize the consequences of their
outmoded concepts of occupation and colonialism:
"Has it not realized the meaning of the consecutive
uprisings by the Arab people under occupation in Gaza,
Hebron, Jerusalem, Ramalah, Nabulus, Golan, and in
every camp and city in the occupied territories? Brutality,
repression, deportation, and collective punishment are
ineffective weapons and tools and cannot undermine the will
of freedom which is deep-rooted and growing in the minds and
hands of the Palestinian Arab people under occupation." 22
The monarch, however, did not identify the PLO as the leader of
this movement. His terms for the resumption of political dialogue
with the PLO remained those proposed nearly two years before,
i.e. , that they would resume from where they were broken off and
not from the beginning. This was emphasized by the spontaneous
nature of the intifadah and the fact that "the citizens in the
occupied territories themselves have assumed the task of resist-
ing occupation. This is something new." He hoped that the PLO
leadership would now recognize the need to resume dialogue with
Jordan. .. "from the point where we left off.. Jordan would like
the PLO to be invited to the proposed international conference
22. "King Husayn Addresses Graduate Officers," Amman Domestic in
Arabic, 16 December 1987, as reported in FBIS , 17 December 1987,
p. 35.
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for peace in the Middle East... If the PLO goes to this gathering,
it must accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338,
renounce violence, and declare its readiness to discuss every
aspect of the Palestine problem." 23
Dialogue was in fact resumed through a visit of a high-level
PLO delegation, headed by Executive Committee member Mahmud
Abbas, to Amman in late January, 1988. Another member of the
delegation told Paris Radio Monte Carlo that the PLO side had not
changed its own views over the past two years regarding coordina-
tion with Jordan. They based their actions on the Palestinian
people's full right to self-determination and the establishment
of an independent state..."in line with the spirit of the upris-
ing and the importance of using it politically." 24 There were
some positive aspects to the discussions. Both sides emphasized
that they agreed to support the intifadah along the lines that
had been decided to at the Arab foreign minister's conference in
Tunis earlier that month, but both sides noted that the discus-
sions had been "frank".
In his Amman press conference following the discussions, the
delegation spokesman for the PLO, Executive Committee member
'Abdullah Hurani, characterized the discussions as "extremely
frank", and went on to state... "We have not come to Amman either
to discuss the reactivation of the Jordanian-Palestinian agree-
23. "King Husayn on Dialogue with PLO, 'Uprising'," Amman Televi-
sion in Arabic, 28 January 1988, as reported in FBIS, 19 January
1988, p. 46.
24. "Al Hurani Comments," Paris Radio Monte Carlo, 29 January
1988, as reported in FBIS , 29 January 1988, p. 46.
130
ment or to discuss the idea of concluding a new Jordanian-Pales-
tinian agreement." 25 Instead, the discussions had been based on
the need to exploit the new developments created by the intifa-
dah. These had already had an international impact through world-
wide publicity that had resulted in new Security Council resolu-
tions that had been concurred in by the United States. These
referred to "the Palestinian people" and to "occupied Palestinian
and Arab territories", including Jerusalem. Although the PLO
wanted to participate in an international peace conference, it
continued to reject the UN 242 Resolution"
"We have not discussed the issue of a joint Jordanian-Pales-
tinian delegation (to the peace conference) , as the interna-
tional conference was not seriously discussed by the super-
powers. Jordanian-Palestinian relations had not been good
and it was impossible to resolve them in a few days of
discussions .. Frankly , the talks did not start 'from the
phase that has been reached 1 it is said, as there are new
developments represented by the Amman summit resolutions as




An even more detailed account of the discussions and contin-
uing differences between Jordan and the PLO was provided from PLO
25. "More on News Conference," WAKH (Manama), 30 January 1988, as
reported FBIS, 1 January 1988, p. 56.
26. Ibid.
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sources in an article in Al-Oabas (Kuwait). 27 The Amman talks
were there characterized as the longest and most important held
since the suspension of the dialogue between Jordan and the PLO
in January 1986. The basic decision reached was to continue the
dialogue towards achieving joint cooperation and action, but no
decision was reached on "the form of participation for action in
the coming stage." At the final session of the Amman meetings
Mahumd Abbas had stated that the PLO would stand on its right to
an independent delegation to a peace conference even though it
agreed with Jordan that this would lead Israel and the United
States not to attend. Therefore, in the PLO ' s view there was a
need to change political stands, and it asked Jordan to help them
do so. The PLO held that the UN 242 Resolution was not sancro-
sant; it could be amended and the changed international atmos-
phere after the intifadah could be used to help achieve this
amendment. Prime Minister al-Rifai, however, said that Jordan and
the Arab countries had accepted UN 242 and it was not possible to
amend it. Jordan hoped that this could be done but one had to
deal with realities rather than with hopes. 28
Jordan's official spokesmen continued to emphasize their
views that there were no fundamental differences with the PLO.
The issue Palestinian representation in an international peace
conference was not a fundamental issue, but "an Arab issue and a
technicality", according to Information Minister Hani al-
27. Raken al-Majali, "Joint PLO Talks Focus on Cooperation,
Action," Al-Oabas (Kuwait), 1 February 1988, p. 21, as reported
in FBIS . 5 February 1988, p. 35.
28. Ibid. . pp. 35-6.
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Khasawinah. Jordan was not in competition with the PLO for the
right to represent the Palestinian people. 29 Both sides were in
favor of an international conference but Jordan saw a need "to
return to the spirit" of the Jordan-PLO accord of February 1985.
Talks between Jordan and the PLO were resumed in mid-
February, as Jordan reported its conversations with American
Assistant Secretary of State Murphy to Mahmud Abbas. Neither
side (Jordan or the PLO) had changed their basic stands on the
peace process which had led to the suspension of their coordina-
tion in 1986. According to Marwan Dudin, the Minister for the
Occupied Territories, the Amman Accord had not been officially
abrogated by the PNC... "in essence the accord is still there". 30
The basis of Jordanian hesitancy in the resumption of coordina-
tion with the PLO was clearly indicated by Dudin in this same
interview, and it was the fact that Jordan viewed that the nature
of the intifadah leadership was still unclear:
"We do not have enough information to judge if there is
indeed a unified command for the uprising and if there is
such a thing we are not sure of its identity and whether it
adheres to a fundamentalist religious trend, the PLO, or the
Communist Party.. for we receive leaflets signed by the
29. Salamah B. Ni'matt, "No Fundamental Differences With PLO,"
The Jordan Times (Amman), 9 February 1988, pp. 1,3, as reported
in FBIS, 9 February 1988, p. 44.
30. Lamis K. Andoni, "Official' Position on Peace Visit
Outlined," Jordan Times (Amman), 23 February 1988, pp. 1, 5, as
reported in FBIS , 23 February 1988, p. 43.
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Jihad, the Palestine Communist Party and the Unified Command
among others". 31
Jordan would be willing to talk to a new leadership, if it should
emerge but it would not view it as a substitute for the PLO..."if
such a leadership emerged it would find a place within the ranks
of the PNC." 32
A coordinated Jordanian-PLO response to the demands of the
intifadah seems to have taken a turn for the better with the
visit to Amman by Hani al-Hasan, political adviser to Arafat and
member of Fatah' s central committee, at the end of February.
Agreement was reached on a common approach to the initiative of
Secretary of State Shultz to revive the peace process by the
presentation of a list of detailed questions regarding the posi-
tions of the United States. 33 They agreed to continue their
meetings and to discuss the American response following the visit
of Secretary Shultz to Amman. It was clear that Jordan did not
wish to be accused of having accepted Shultz' s proposals ad-
vanced during a visit to Amman in early February, when it had
given a non-commital answer. .. stating that Jordan felt that there
were a certain positive aspects which merited further discussion.
Thus, when Shultz visited Amman again in early April he was
presented with a list of six questions, prepared in consultation




33. Rakan al-Majali "Senior Officials, PLO Discuss Shultz Visit,"
Al-Oabas Kuwait), 27 February 1988, pp. a and 21, as reported in
FBIS . 1 March 1988, p. 39.
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regarding "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people",
Palestinian self-determination and the interpretation of the UN
242 resolution's call for withdrawal from the occupied territo-
ries. When Shultz's airport press conference on his departure
gave preliminary answers to these questions which included the
fact that the United States continued its refusal to recognize
the PLO, to accept self-determination or to have Israel withdraw
to its 1967 borders, the conference was not broadcast nor was it
reported directly in the Jordanian press. 34
A press conference by Prime Minister al-Rifai and Informa-
tion Minister al-Khasawinhad distributed the text of the Jordani-
na-PLO questions presented to Mr. Shultz. 35 The prime minister
then proceeded to explain each of them in detail. Three of the
points related to Jordan's traditional views on the peace proc-
ess: the fact that withdrawal included all the territories occu-
pied in 1967, the mechanism for negotiations was through an
international conference, as envisaged in UN 338 to reflect the
full weight of the UN Security Council, and that this conference
must not be merely ceremonial. The final point of the questions
put to Mr. Shultz went to the heart of Jordan's negotiating
posture and elaborated an issue which had never been fully ad-
dressed in the negotiations during the active phase of the 1985
34. Mahmud al-Sharif, "Shultz Plan," Provocative' Statements
Viewed," Al-Dustur (Amman), 12 April 1988, p. 11, as reported in
FBIS . 14 April 1988, pp. 40-41.
35. "Al-Mustaqbal Cities Al-Rifa'i on Shultz Tour," Al-Mustaqbal
(Paris), 16 April 16, 1988, pp. 26-27, as reported in FBIS , 21
April 1988, pp. 39-40.
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Jordanian-PLO accords. Now, al-Rifai fully endorsed the PLO • s
view. Jordan would attend an international conference in a joint
delegation with the PLO if the parties agreed to this, but this
did not mean that some Palestinian individuals could be included
in a Jordanian delegation as representatives of the Palestinian
people. Instead, it would mean that a joint delegation would have
half of its members from the PLO and half from Jordan. An invita-
tion to the conference would have to be addressed to the PLO
executive committee. "When we talk about Palestinian representa-
tion we mean the PLO", according to al-Rifai.
In May two interviews by King Husayn, one to the West
through AFP and another to the Arabs through a Kuwaiti newspaper
elaborated on the evolution of Jordan's Palestine policy. When
asked by the AFP if Jordan's stand on a PLO component in joint
delegation meant an end to Jordan's claim to the West Bank, the
monarch replied that there was no change, since the issue of
Palestinian representation had been settled at the Rabat Summit
of 1974: "Jordan cannot represent the Palestinians. Jordan has
nothing to do with this issue." 36 Instead, it was obvious that
the king's concern had shifted to the East Bank: "We are very
concerned about remaining united here in Jordan. We want every-
one, whether he is of Palestinian, Iraqi or Syrian origin to
understand that all citizens are equal in their rights and du-
ties." 37 According to the king, the instruments for the union
36. "King Husayn on Arab Force, Mideast Conference," PETRA-JNA,
in Arabic (Amman) , citing an AFP interview, as reported in FBIS .




of the two banks, including the parliament, had been intended as
means to achieving the final goal of the implementation of Pales-
tinian rights in a final settlement. In his interview with Al
Qabas (Kuwait) he reviewed his version of the entire history of
Hashemite involvement with Palestine. This he presented as a
burden and a duty, to which Jordan had to response because of its
views on Arab unity and the dangers of Zionism. Although he still
held out his "United Kingdom" plan of 1972 as the ideal Jordani-
an-Palestinian relationship for the future, because it best
represented the ideal of Arab unity, he claimed that Jordan
adhered to the Rabat Summit's designation of the PLO as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The impor-
tant thing was for the Palestinian people to regain their land,
then they could chose any form of relationship with Jordan that
they wished. . .unity or an independent state.. "we will bless their
decision and support them with all our power." 38
In contrast to a number of analysts, he asserted that Jordan
had nothing to fear itself from the intifadah. The intifadah had
been a positive action in refuting Israel's claims that it could
secure peace by seizing Arab territories. Although the intifadah
was, perhaps, necessary, it could not by itself liberate Pales-
tine. "Personally, I do not think that the uprising can liberate
the land, but it may lead to a guick treatment of the problem.
38. "Al-Oabas Interviews King Huseyn on Arab Issues," - Al-Oabas
(Kuwait) 11 May 1988, pp. 12-13, as reported in FBIS , mideast
Conference, 13 May 1988, p. 22.
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Otherwise, the collapse will continue and the consequences could
be disastrous for everybody in the region 1'. 39
The Jordanian message was beginning to get through to Is-
rael. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin told the Labor Party's
political committee that he considered that King Husayn had
retreated from his previous positions by announcing that he could
not assume responsibility for negotiating on behalf of the Pales-
tinians. 40 Foreign Minister Peres hoped, even at this late date,
that a deal could be struck with Jordan. He explained his concept
that the Jordan river should remain Israel's security border but
that Jordan should be responsible for heavily Arab populated
territories: "If the Jordanians are responsible for Hebron, they
will do things differently, and possibly even better." 41 Howev-
er, the usually well-informed Israeli journalists Uri Horowitz
and Pinhas Inbari reported in mid-May that the decision had
already been taken by Jordan to cancel all their commitments to
the West Bank as part of its policy of recognizing the PLO as the
sole representation of the Palestinians. This was made clear,
they said, to the PLO representatives visiting Amman in May. This
decision was attributed to a debate in the palace, where King
39. Ibid.
40. Sholmo Shitzky and Asher Shiloni, "Rabin Seeks 'Modus Viven-
di' With Palestinians," Al-Hamishmar (Tel Aviv), 13 May 1988, p.
3, as reported by FBIS, 17 May 1988, p. 22.
41. "Peres Proposes Jordan River as Security Border," IDF Radio
(Tel Aviv), 8 February 1988, as reported in FBIS . 9 February
1988, p. 34.
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Husayn had come under pressure to disassociate himself from the
West Bank due to unrest in Jordan. 42
Indications of a fundamental change in Jordanian policy
continue to multiply. A routine statement of support for Jorda-
nian policy and urging the PLO to bring about co-ordination with
Jordan from West Bank leaders resident in Amman was banned at the
last minute by Jordanian officials. The king, it was said,
wanted to make it clear that he recognized the PLO as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 43 In a
series of "fast breaking" meetings with provincial leaders during
Rahmadan, King Husayn elaborated on his concepts of Jordanian-
Palestinian relations and put particular emphasis on the unity of
Jordan and the equality of all Jordanian citizens, regardless of
origin with regard to their rights and duties.
At the extraordinary Arab Summit held in Algiers in early
June King Husayn gave a detailed and frank explanation of Jorda-
nian-Palestinian relations, the intifadah and the response of the
Arab world in general and Jordan in particular to the intifadah.
In what he termed the "second phase" of Jordanian-Palestinian
relations, the phase since 1967, Jordan had only two aims: to
support the steadfastness of the people under occupation and to
reach a political settlement to recover the occupied territories.
However, he admitted that the intertwining of these two goals
42. Uri Horowitz and Pinhas 'Inbari, "Jordan Ready to Cancel West
Bank Commitments," Al-Hamishmar (Tel Aviv), 16 May 1988, as
reported in FBIS . 17 May 1986, p. 24.
43. "Statement by West Bank Figures in Amman Banned," Paris Radio
Monte Carlo . 21 May 1988, as reported in FBIS , 22 May 1988, p.
27.
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gave rise to misunderstandings and charges that Jordan merely
wished to exercise hegemony over a liberated Palestine:
"Why should we preserve the legality of our institutions on
the West Bank?... Why do we not satisfy ourselves with a declara-
tion of support for the PLO and its position, since our efforts
are construed as competition and bring on ourselves misunder-
standings and lack of confidence, with all the troubles and
burdens they entail and which we could well do without?" 44
King Husayn answered his own question by reference to the "spe-
cial and distinctive relationship", which was a natural
development of geography, demography and history, and not a
matter of choice. Ironically, he pointed out, Israel recognized
this relationship and was continually trying to solve the Pales-
tinian issue through Jordan and at the expense of both Jordan and
Palestine.
Aware of Arab and Palestinian suspicions, King Husayn had
offered in 1972, two years before the Rabat Summit decision on
the PLO ' s exclusive representational role, a choice of three
options to the Palestinians, one of which was complete independ-
ence, should the occupied territories be regained from Israel. In
the most significant portion of his address, Husayn renewed this
offer with an important addition. If the Arab Summit and the
PLO wanted to make recognition of a Palestinian state a precondi-
tion to the holding of an international peace conference, "even
if this does not lead to the convening of the conference," Jordan
44. "Husayn Addresses Summit," Amman Domestic Service in Arabic,
8 June 1988, Text, as reported in FBIS, 9 June 1988, p. 11.
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would agree to whatever the Arab brothers unanimously agreed to
support. 45 Finally, he reminded the "Arab Brothers" that moral
support was fine enough, but that Jordan, Syria and the Palestin-
ians needed financial support as well. In fact, Jordan had re-
ceived only half of the sums pledged to her at the Baghdad Arab
Summit nine years before.
D. Disengagement from the West Bank
In July, hints of Jordan's decision on disengagement
multiplied, and on July 28 it was officially announced that the
Five Year Plan for the occupied territories was terminated. The
statement from the cabinet said that this would "put an end to
any attempt to suggest that Jordan's motives in supporting the
steadfastness of the Palestinian people under occupation are
suspect or conducive to promoting what has been referred to as a
sharing of administrative responsibility in the occupied territo-
ry and are constraining and undercutting the role of the PLO." 46
Besides the PLO, senior army officers and Israeli Foreign Minis-
ter Peres has been warned in advance of the decision.
Finally, on 31 July, King Husayn addressed "the Arab Nation"
to explain his decision, which reversed the course of Hashemite-
Palestinian relations established by his forefathers and
continued through his own reign. Although he denied that he had
45. Ibid.
46. "Council of Minister's Statement, Text," Amman Domestic
Service in English, as reported in "Occupied Territories Develop-
ment Plans Cancelled," FBIS, 28 July 1988, p. 24.
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ever had any motive save to support the people and to liberate
occupied Palestine, he admitted: "There is a unanimous conviction
that the struggle for liberating the occupied Palestinian terri-
tory can be bolstered by disengaging the legal and administrative
relationship between the two banks, then we must perform our duty
and do what is required of us." 47 He continued, nevertheless,
to emphasize that this decision concerned only the Palestinian
territory and its people and most emphatically did not concern
Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan:
"All of them have citizenship rights and commitments just
like any other citizen regardless of his origin. . .Jordan is
not the Palestinian state and the independent Palestineian
state will be established on the occupied Palestinian terri-
tory after its liberation, God willing." 48
Similarly, Jordan continued to uphold its belief in Arab unity,
as the merger of Arab groups on its soil into one Jordanian
people testified. Neither did Jordanian renounce its pan-Arab
duty towards the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestinian ques-
tion. Aside from the fact that it was a confrontation state with
the longest Arab border with Israel (including a Palestinian
border of the West Bank and Gaza, if it were a state)... "No one
outside of Palestine has ever had or will have connection with
47. "King Husayn Speaks on 'Separation 1 From West Bank," Amman
Domestic Service in Arabic, 31 May 1988, as reported in FBIS, 1
August 1988, p. 40.
48. Ibid.
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Palestine or its cause that is stronger than the connection of
Jordan or my family with it." 49
Although doubts continued to be expressed about the tactical
or strategic nature of King Husayn's decision, evidence rapidly
mounted that it was indeed final. Salary payments were stopped
for some 21,000 on the West Bank and Gaza, with the exception of
some 2,000 employees of the courts and religious
establishments. 50 Perhaps an even more telling indication was the
fact that the King sent messages to Hashemite supporters on the
West Bank that he would not receive the traditional delegations
pledging their loyalty and requesting him to reconsider his
decision. 51
A royal press conference in Amman, televised in English, on
7 August gave a more informal but elaborated explanation of the
move to disengage. The monarch did not feel that Jordan's posi-
tion on the peace process had been changed at all. It remained
based on a comprehensive peace through the means of an interna-
tional conference including PLO representatives. Although Israel
had declared that it would accept a joint Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation at a peace conference, this had obviously not led
anywhere. He took great pains to elaborate on the theme that all
citizens in Jordan were equal, regardless of their origins. At
49. Ibid. . p. 41.
50. Joel Brinkley, "Jordan Will Stop Employee's Wages in the West
Bank," The New York Times . 1 August 1988, p. 1.
51. Ori Nir and Aquiva Elder, "Jordan's Husayn Rjects West Bank
Visitors," Ha ' aretz (Tel Aviv), 3 August 1988, pp. 1, 6, as
reported in FBIS, 3 August 1988, p. 22.
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the same time, however, he refuted suggestions that Palestinians
composed sixty per cent of the population, saying that they were
less than forty per cent. 52 Many Palestinians in the occupied
territories hadn't looked on Jordan's motives correctly. "There
were doubts and suspicions ... it (Jordan) had been taken for
granted by so many in this world as a whole." 53 When asked if
he believed that the disengagement would cause the PLO to come up
with a new and creative approach to peace, he admitted that this
was a possibility:
"I hope that the pressure of events, particularly in the occupied
territories and the responsibilities that we have chosen to
give them will contribute to their ability to come up with
the right answers to serve the Palestinian cause and to
safeguard Palestinian rights." 54
Yet, it was clear that his overall attitude as reported by
those present, was cool and distant towards the PLO. Their
representatives in Jordan would be accorded the status of foreign
delegations or embassies "so to speak", but with unaccustomed
frankness, the King stated: "We have nothing to say to the PLO.
We'll hear what they will have to say to us. And I am sure we
will keep in touch in the future." 55 The New York Times report-
er indicated that a notable coolness towards the PLO existed with
52. "King Husayn Hold's News Conference on West Bank," Amman TV
in English, 7 August 1988, as reported in FBIS, 8 Auguat 988, p.
33.
53. Ibid. . p. 35.




the King's advisers as well. "They strongly hinted they had
little faith in the ability of the PLO to do the job of negotiat-
ing an Israeli withdrawal or arriving at the creation of an
independent Palestinian state." 56 However, King Husayn did
reply that he would unhesitatingly recognize a Palestinian gov-
ernment immediately, should that be the decision of the PLO.
56. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Hussein is Forsty on New PLO Role," The
New York Times , 8 August 1988, p. 1.
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VI
BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP
A. Introduction.
In less than two years following the disengagement of Jordan
from the West Bank the fundamental bases of the Hashemite-
Palestinian relationship have been changed. The disengagement
was the first major political decision taken as a consequence of
the intifadah and one of its most noteworthy successes. In
effect, it removed one of the three traditional claimants to the
sovereignty over the occupied territories, the Hashemites, and
left the contest to the struggle between the Israelis and the
PLO. It is easy, perhaps, to see with hindsight that the Hashe-
mite, claim was the weakest of the three, for it had neither the
popular support of the PLO nor the physical presence of the
Israelis. But real life international conflicts are rarely
settled by a clear choice between absolute opposites, and the
Jordanian claim had the advantage of being the prime choice of
several important actors and the second choice of virtually
everyone else.
Thus, there had much truth in King Husayn's often repeated
lament that everyone took Jordan's role for granted in the Pales-
tine conflict. Those parties who looked to some form of territo-
rial compromise, but without a Palestinian state, such as the
Israeli Labor Party and the United States, had assumed that
Jordan would always be available to reassert its legal claims and
pan-Arab ambitions in the occupied territories to provide the
basis for an effective government following Israeli withdrawal.
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Whether this return would be largely a Hashemite military occupa-
tion replacing an Israeli one (and probably being more effective
in suppressing the PLO) , or whether Jordan would be able to build
on its traditional constituency by attracting the "silent majori-
ty" who, above all, wanted to be free of Israel's "iron fist" and
creeping annexation, was a matter of indifference to
outsiders. . .though certainly not to King Husayn. For the extreme
right of Israeli politics, who utterly rejected any territorial
compromise in "Eretz Israel," but were forced to acknowledge the
problem of a million and a half Palestinians in "Judea, Samaria
and the Gaza Strip," Jordan served a convenient function as well.
It was, in their view, already the existing Palestinian state
from the point of view of demography, although without a Pales-
tinian government. It was thus an ideal repository for both the
political ambitions of Palestinians for a national identity and a
convenient dumping ground for the Palestinians of "Eretz Israel"
who were unwilling to accept a permanent status of personal
"autonomy," which was the best that the Likud and its allies were
willing to offer them.
The PLO ' s view of the Hashemites was more complex. In part,
this was inevitable since the PLO was a disparate and shaky
coalition under the largely nominal leadership of Arafat at best,
or at worst they were a series of conflicting factions engaged in
a bloody struggle for power in which neither women nor children
were spared, as in the "War of the Camps" in Lebanon. The PLO
radicals, symbolized by George Habbash, had a view of Jordan that
was largely parallel with that of the Israeli radical Zionists.
They, too, viewed it as the Palestinian state and would get rid
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of the Hashemites at the first opportunity. Of course, unlike
the Israelis, they saw this as only the first step towards the
regaining of first the West Bank and then of all Palestine to the
Mediterranean Sea, using Jordan as their forward base. The
mainstream PLO view symbolized by Arafat and most of the Fatah
leadership, although not without challenge, had come to prevail
as the official view of the PLO adopted at meetings of the
Palestine National Council, particularly the 17th in Amman (1984)
and the 18th in Algiers (1987)
.
Although the mainstream PLO might agree in their hearts that
Jordan was part of the Palestinian nation and the Hashemites
would have to go, they felt it wiser to keep quiet about this.
In fact, they were so discreet as to be able to formulate an
official view on the unity of the Palestinian state and Jordan
that was acceptable to King Husayn. . . that they were a single
people who would be joined in a confederation immediately after
gaining independence. Since this was the basis for King Husayn'
s
own claims and had been offered to the Palestinians as an option
in 1972, he could scarcely object. Thus, for the Palestinian
mainstream, Jordan had the vital role of offering a plausible, if
difficult, opening for a political option leading to the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state. Even the bravest and most
dedicated Palestinian nationalist, and it would be difficult to
challenge Arafat's credentials in these areas after the siege of
Beirut (although many did challenge his wisdom, honestly and
administrative ability) would be forced to admit that the "mili-
tary option" appeared to be more and more ephemeral as the PLO
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headquarters moved from Amman to Beirut to Tunis. A continued
political option was a necessity for the PLO mainstream to main-
tain its credibility. It was part of the Arab consensus ex-
pressed at the Fez Summit in 1982 and the Amman Summit in 1987.
They were dependent on this consensus for their recognition as
the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people"
conferred on them by the Arab Summit at Rabat in 1974, as well as
for the major source of their financial support from the Arab
Gulf states. Simultaneously, it was the preferred option of
their major great power supporter, the Soviet Union, which wished
to avoid another confrontation with the United States, as in
1973, or another defeat for their Arab ally as administered to
Syria in 1982. Arafat realized that the only possible admission
ticket to a political solution would have to be delivered from
the Israeli Labor Party, through American mediation, to be picked
up in the form of participation in a joint delegation with Amman.
For its part, the PLO held the bargaining chip of providing
legitimation to King Husayn to take the lead in negotiating with
Israel for something that he knew full well would be much less
than the return to the 1967 borders. But the legitimacy of any
exiled political organization is, historically, an unstable
mandate. As exiles, they are dependent on the good will and self
interest of their hosts. Lacking the practical responsibilities
of governing or the restraints of electoral politics, they are
notoriously subject to factionalism and the influence of dema-
gogues. However unpopular the occupying power, it has the advan-
tage of representing the status-quo with the administrative power
to control living conditions. Obviously, any occupying power
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will attempt to create a puppet leadership and there are always a
few traitors available in any society. More importantly, howev-
er, is the fact that a high level of political mobilization is an
unnatural condition. Even the most efficient and/or repressive
of totalitarian governments have to spend a great deal of effort
to achieve this, and they are dealing with their own people.
Thus, far more important than the Quislings and Babrak Karmal's
of the world for the occupying power is the political indiffer-
ence of ordinary people who wish to get along with their daily
lives with the least possible difficulty. As an American offi-
cial observed regarding the Israeli occupation of the West Bank
in 1986:
"You think that the occupation is so intolerable that the
Palestinians will do anything possible to get rid of it.
Though this might seem logical, in actuality the occupation
doesn't effect most of the people to a great extent. They
get along pretty well and are most interested in their own
lives and private concerns. It isn't too difficult for the
Israelis to administer either." 1
Following the war in Lebanon, as the external supports of
the PLO's legitimacy fell away one-by-one (including the illusion
of a credible military option) they were more dependent on being
able to present a credible political option. It was obvious to
1. Interview with a State Department official, Washington 1986.
One of the best descriptions of the response of populations to
foreign occupation is that of John Lukacs, The Last European War .
September 19 3 9 /December 194 1 (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor
Press/Doubleday, 1976) .
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all that King Husayn was dependent on the PLO, or possibly the
Palestinians of the occupied territories could they be organized,
for the legitimation of his political role as the spokesman (or
co-spokesman) of the Palestinian people in negotiations with
Israel. 2 It is less obvious but equally true that Yasir Arafat
depended on King Husayn for the legitimation of his role in
representing the occupied territories in the absence of a credi-
ble military option. There could be no political option without
the role of King Husayn. It was evident in the occupied territo-
ries after the King Husayn-Yasir Arafat agreement in Amman in
February 1985 that the Palestinians of the West Bank were the
major basis of support for the Hashemite-PLO alliance. Although
the occupied territories rallied to the PLO after the suspension
of the agreement a year later, it was clear that Arafat was
anxious to present the split with the King as an unfortunate
incident which did not cancel the resumption of the political
co-option with Jordan.
To the extent that the Palestinians of the occupied territo-
ries felt that a political settlement was their best, or only,
hope in ending Israeli occupation and the growing threat of
annexation, they too felt that Jordan would always be available
at some unknowable time in the future when a conjunction of PLO,
Israeli, Arab and international politics would make negotiations
possible. In the interim, however, the Jordanian role on the
West Bank was encouraged by the occupation authorities. It
helped to make life more tolerable and provided a window of
2. Interview, Professor Asher Susser, Ithaca, N. Y., 1987.
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opportunity to the Arab world and beyond through education,
employment, travel and emigration, all of which were dependent on
a Jordanian passport. Jordan thus was a giant safety valve
keeping the pressures of the occupation from building to intoler-
able levels.
The attitudes of the Jordanian-Palestinians of the East
Bank, seemingly the most accessible to observation, were the most
difficult to bring into focus. Politically and socially, these
ranged from ministers and Royal Hashemite Court advisers to
impoverished refugees living in camps as did their fathers before
them. Here, there was none of the hyperactivity and debates of
the PLO activists and intellectuals in the diaspora, which pro-
vided a wealth of information even if there were six different
versions of each event. Neither were there the semi-open (as
long as it did not lead to political organization or action)
politics of the West Bank, which came to be symbolized in the
East Jerusalem newspapers. Substantial information on elite
politics of the West Bank was thus available, although the inci-
dent of the survey published by Al Fan r (Jerusalem) in 1986
demonstrated that the Israelis viewed with deep suspicion any
survey of popular opinion that might be construed as a substitute
election. In Jordan, however, there was virtually no political
activity or expression on the Palestinian issue, particularly
from Jordanian-Palestinians, except that sanctioned or inspired
by the authorities.
Although general prosperity and an efficient security
apparatus had kept most Jordanian-Palestinians quiet for the past
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two decades, and those who disagreed were free to leave, it was
also clear that Palestine remained a sensitive domestic issue.
As King Husayn constantly pointed out in his references to the
closeness of the Jordanian and Palestinian people to justify his
interest in the fate of Palestine, this was also a two-way
street. If he knew that the Palestinians of the West Bank were
not really his people, he could hardly repudiate the Jordanian-
Palestinians of the East Bank or he would have very little left
to govern. The more than forty years of integration of the two
societies, especially in the past two decades, had made it impos-
sible for Jordan to function as a modern state without the par-
ticipation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. In fact, with
the exception of the military, the Palestinians were the modern
Jordanian state.
Yet, with them the personalized, patriarchal, religious and
traditional political style of the Hashemites, so effective in
dealing with the people of the East Bank, could not be applied.
Although the rival appeal of the PLO parties in 1970 to represent
the Jordanian-Palestinians in Jordan has clearly failed, and not
merely because of the superior fire-power of the Jordanian
military, the legitimacy of the Hashemites to rule over the East
Bank depended, at least in part, on their role in the ultimate
realization of the goal of liberating the people of the Palestin-
ian homeland from Zionist occupation. If the Hashemites were to
prove indifferent or irrelevant to this goal, their legitimacy
for the Jordanian-Palestinians would be reduced to a purely
pragmatic appeal as the relatively effective and not too
oppressive de facto regime. But without the commitment to
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Palestine, there would be no moral or emotional core of loyalty
based upon the shared hopes, fears and ambitions of either the
Palestinian or Arab nation... or, in other words, no legitimacy.
In addition, as with the occupied territories themselves,
Jordan's practical role in the occupied territories and as an
outlet for their inhabitants made it easier for the Jordanian-
Palestinians to maintain their ties with their brethren under
occupation.
King Husayn's disengagement decision was a necessary
preliminary for the reformulation of a new Jordanian-Palestinian
relationship, forcing both sides to look at their relationship in
the absence of the assumptions that had guided each since 1967.
We will examine how these new relations have developed with each
of the three segments of the Palestinian people relevant to
Jordan--the PLO, the occupied territories and the Jordanian-
Palestinians of the Hashemite Kingdom itself. Developments in
each area have taken some novel twists in less than two years,
and the over-all results are still less than firm, but to date
they have tended to confirm the wisdom of King Husayn's decision
of July 1988.
B. Hashemite-PLO Relations
Although the king certainly had hoped that the disengagement
decision would finally lead Arafat to come off of the fence and
adopt his own personal preference for a political solution, most
of the King's advisors seriously doubted if this could be done.
The fact that the PLO did move in this direction with unaccus-
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tomed alacrity to adopt a political position on the recognition
of Israel's right to exist, support for UN 242 and 338 in isola-
tion as well as in conjunction with all UN resolutions on the
Palestine question, and the renunciation of terrorism, was a
pleasant and favorable outcome. The king might well have regret-
ted that this decision had not come sooner, such as in January
1986 when he had American assurance that such a policy would lead
to an international conference including representatives of the
PLO. However, it was clear that the new conditions due to the
pressure of the intifadah for a political solution and the ending
of the assumption that Jordan would always be available to repre-
sent the political option while the PLO pursued its struggle for
internal unity had forced Arafat to embrace the political option.
When this was followed by the opening of a dialogue with American
officials in Tunis, the wisdom of the disengagement decision was
all the more obvious.
On the one hand, this removed the burden of Jordan having to
be the spokesman for the Palestinian political option. This role
had been a prime source of Arab and Palestinian criticism over
the years, as King Husayn had complained of in his speech to the
emergency Algiers Arab Summit, and the intifadah had made this
role even more onerous. Now, Jordan could no longer be accused
of undermining Palestinian national goals in the self-interests
of the Hashemites. On the other hand, the assumption of this
role by the PLO, although not fully acknowledge by the United
States and completely repudiated by the Israelis, served to keep
the political option open as a rational goal for the sacrifices
of the intifadah.
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The basis of the new relationship between Jordan and the PLO
was a broad mutual agreement on the fundamental issues facing
both states in the light of the intifadah. The PLO • s reply to
Jordan's strategic decision to disengage from the West Bank was
their own definition of their national interests in their decla-
ration of independence issued by the PNC on 15 November 1988.
This defines their interests and aspirations in both geographical
and political terms. Geographically, these were the entire
territory of mandate Palestine occupied by Israel as a result of
the 1967 war and politically it was complete sovereignty and
independence for the Palestinian people within this territory.
Although a clause in the declaration reaffirmed the goal of a
confederation with Jordan, this was clearly subordinated to the
goal of the attainment of independence. .. it spoke of "future
relations between the states of Palestine and Jordan." 3 The
Palestinian national aims were to be achieved, as President
Arafat's later clarifications in Europe made clear, through
negotiations on the basis of the UN 242 and 338 resolutions.
These statements were accepted by the United States as satisfying
the "Kissinger requirements" for the opening of political talks
with the PLO.
The PLO ' s strategic decision was, primarily, intended to
reassure Israel and the United States that the demands of the
Palestinian National Charter for all of mandate Palestine had
been canceled. Simultaneously, however, they served to reassure
3. "Palestine National Council, Political Resolutions, Excerpts,"
Palestine Perspectives . November/December 1988, p. 7.
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Jordan that the PLO had no designs upon Jordan based on the
demographic strength of the Jordanian-Palestinians. The PLO has
always been suspicious that the Hashemites, as well as the Israe-
lis, had wanted to end any PLO role and (at least the Labor
Party) engage in a new partition of Palestine. But ever since
1970, despite periodic attempts at coordination between King
Husayn and Yasir Arafat, Jordan has harbored suspicions that the
PLO wanted to eliminate the Hashemite state as the preliminary to
the regaining of Palestine. Now, even the officials of the
Popular Front and Democratic Front, who had always led the anti-
Hashemite wing of the PLO, appeared in Amman and were officially
received by the prime minister. This emphasized that the entire
PLO, not just its moderate wing, shared the view of a common
danger to both Jordan and Palestine. PFLP member of the Politi-
cal Bureau (and member of the PLO Executive Committee) Mustafa
al-Zibri spoke of Palestinian-Jordanian relations during his
first visit to Jordan in twenty years:
"...We think the Israeli threats against Jordan are also
threats against the Palestinian's national cause. There-
fore, we do not stand idle or neutral about these threats.
On the contrary, we feel we are in the same battle in the
face of the Israeli schemes, especially when they talk about
the alternative homeland. The issue of the alternative
homeland will not only harm Jordan and the Jordanian people,
but it will primarily harm the Palestine question. There-
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fore, we are as interested as Jordan in resisting this
Israeli proposal." 4
On its part, Jordan had to pay little for this endorsement, for
Prime Minister Badran claimed that the matter of opening PFLP
offices in Jordan had not been discussed in his meetings with the
PFLP delegation. . ."and it will not be discussed in the future." 5
Although the militant PLO's threats to Jordanian security
had been downplayed for some time, the intifadah clearly posed
the danger that they could be renewed, as did their actions in
the spring of 1988 when the Jordanian government claimed to have
captured instructions from the PFLP in Damascus to their support-
ers in Jordan to destabilize the Jordanian regime. But the
clarification of Palestinian territorial demands brought about by
the intifadah made it clear the target was no longer Jordan. The
evaluation of Arafat adviser and Fatah Central Committee member
Hani al-Hasan could not be improved upon from the Jordanian point
of view:
"...by the alternative homeland Israel does not mean giving
Jordan to the PLO, but dividing Jordan among the Jordanians
to the south, the Palestinians to the North, and the Israe-
4. "PFLP's Al-Zibri on Israel, Arab Relations," Al-Ouds Al-'Arabi
(London), 3 May 1990, p. 5, as reported in FBIS, 7 May 1990, p.
5.
5. "Premier Badran Discusses Political Problem," Al-Maiallah
(London) , 15 May 1990, pp. 18-20, as reported in FBIS . 11 May
1990, p. 17.
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lis in al-Salt heights and the Jordan rift area. Israel
regards itself as a partner in Jordan." 6
There was a fundamental agreement between Jordan and the PLO
as to the goal of a political settlement on the territory of
Palestine and the rejection of any solution that Jordan was part
of the Palestine state. This was fundamental to Jordan's
perceptions of the dangers to its own existence heightened by the
intifadah—at the same time that the intifadah provided a possi-
ble opening for their solution by involving the PLO in the polit-
ical process. These dangers stemmed from either the Palestinian
side or the Israeli side, should either decide to take over the
Jordanian state. The danger from the Palestinians, which had
been latent since 1970, had been aroused by the renewed political
activism of the intifadah, which had spilled over into Jordan.
Fortunately, this was offset to some extent by the renewed focus
of PLO efforts on the territory of occupied Palestine. However,
the removal of the illusion in Israeli and American circles that
the status quo could go on forever with little cost, or the
underlying problem of the Palestinians could be solved through
Likud's political option of Jordan as the Palestinian state was
shattered as well by the intifadah. This renewed the dangers
posed from the Israeli right wing to the existence of Jordan.
But aside from the immediate issues of Jordanian-PLO
relations there were the questions of the long-term future
relations should a Palestinian state actually be established.
6. "'Arafat Political Adviser Calls for Arab Front," Al-Anba
(Kuwait), 28 March 1990, p. 29, as reported in FBIS , 3 April
1990, p. 11.
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Salah Khalaf, the number two man in the PLO and Fatah, still
spoke of them as virtually agreed upon and inevitable in the
context of an immediate confederation, or even union:
"I say that on the day immediately following the
establishment of the Palestinian state, we will begin unity
with Jordan. I am not concerned what kind of unity this may
be, because we are one people and have the same history.
You cannot make distinctions between a Jordanian and a
Palestinian. . .We indeed constitute one people .. .When the
Palestinian state and unity is established, this problem
will not exist. The Jordanian will be a Palestinian and the
Palestinian a Jordanian. The problem is solved as far as we
are concerned." 7
It was not, however, so clear to King Husayn. Rather, the
whole confederation question would now have to be reexamined in
the light of the new conditions. He even went so far as to
attribute this idea to the PLO, and to forget his often repeated
reference to his own United Arab Kingdom plan of 1972 with his
preferred option to the Palestinians of a confederation:
"Regarding this idea of a confederation, the PLO often has
presented this idea, which it is trying to achieve in the
light of its distinguished and special relationship with
Jordan. However, a confederation can only be established
between two independent states or entities .. .We will not
7. "Khalaf on U.S., Hamas, Jordanian Relations," Al-Ra 'v (Amman),
8 December 1989, pp. 8, 15, as reported in FBIS , 15 December
1989, p. 4.
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take the initiative in presenting any idea. But we are




Clearly, the new situation required rethinking the confeder-
ation issue. In the past, the confederation had been part of the
political package to secure PLO participation in a political
option. In reality, it was a reassurance demanded by the United
States for the Israeli Labor Party that whatever territory was
returned to the Palestinians and whatever the Palestinian entity
there was called, it would in fact be dominated by the Hashe-
mites. Now, the intifadah and the acceptance of the UN 242
(resolution by the PLO had opened a direct link for the PLO to the
peace process, even if it was still mediated by the Americans.
This removed the issue of confederation to part of the future,
the post-independence condition instead of a requirement for the
peace process to begin.
It could be expected that Hashemite-PLO relations would
improve following the two strategic decisions of King Husayn in
July 1988 to end Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank and the
PLOs decision in November 1988 to opt for an independent state on
Palestinian soil to be obtained through political means. It
could also be anticipated that the reopening of cordial relations
between Jordan and the PLO would lead to very important practical
(measures necessary to sustain the intifadah and, not
unimportantly, to help Arafat maintain his leadership. What was
8. "King Interviewed on Peace Process, Elections," Al-Dustur
(Amman), 21 October 1989, pp. 1, 17, citing an interview with the
BBC of 20 October, as reported in FBIS, 25 October 1989, p. 31.
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truly startling, however, was the fact that the PLO was able to
give Jordan important and perhaps decisive aid when it was faced
with a challenge to domestic stability from the hitherto quiet
native Jordanians of the south in April 1989. At the same time,
the Jordanians were able to aid the PLO in its relations with the
militant Islamic groups in the occupied territories, which re-
mained independent of the official "Unified National Leadership"
controlled by the PLO. In the end, these events only went to
demonstrate the closeness of the various segments of the Pales-
tinian people and the fact that, even in the absence of formal
ties of confederation, it was impossible to separate the effects
of actions in one sphere from the others.
C. The Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza.
Although the end of Jordanian sovereignty claims seemingly
settled the issue of the West Bank as a focus of Jordanian-
Palestinian conflict or cooperation, the fact remained that
Jordan had a very strong interest in the outcome of the struggle
there and still had influence of its own. The essence of the
struggle for both the PLO and Jordan was to keep the intifadah in
being as a challenge to Israel and the United States that could
not be ignored, while at the same time keep it under control to
prevent it from being taken-over by more militant elements who
rejected any political settlement. The traditional "radicals" of
the PLO... the PELP and DFLP. . .were now included in the Unified
National Leadership and in the PLO executive committee. Along
with the participation of the Palestine Communist Party, this
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strengthened the secularist political wing of the intifadah. The
radicals of the PFLP-GC of Ahmad Jibril and the Fatah rebels of
Abu Musa had virtually no support on the ground inside the occu-
pied territories. The major struggle to control the direction of
the intifadah was now between the PLO supporters and the Islamic
groups of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. These latter groups
rejected any political settlement and instead called for the
establishment of an Islamic state in all of Palestine. In such a
struggle, Jordan still had an important role to play. First,
there were the old pro-Hashemite stalwarts. Although former Gaza
mayor Al-Shawwa had died, Elias Frayj remained in office in
Bethlehem. Frayj, an Israeli analyst aptly remarked, ..."has
many merits, but it is impossible to speak of him as representing
any trend within the leadership of the intifadah." Yet, he was
included by President Mubarak in a list of suggested Palestinians
to begin talks with the Israelis regarding elections. 9 At the
same time (October 1989) Mubarak suggested that, while he sup-
ported an independent Palestinian state, it might be best... "for
the stability of the region"... if it were to enter into a confed-
eration with Jordan. 10 Significantly, this call came immediately
after a meeting in Sa'na of the leaders of the Arab Cooperation
Council (of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Yemen, founded in February
1989) , and could only have been made with the consent, if not the
inspiration, of King Husayn.
9. Pinhas "Inbari, "Proposed Palestinian Delegates Contrasted,"
Al Hamishmar (Tel Aviv), 12 December 1989, p. 8, as reported in
FBIS, 12 January 1990, p. 10.
10. Ibid.
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At the same time, the Israeli Labor Party continued to press
its traditional ties to the Hashemites through Frayj , who went to
Amman following talks with a Labor minister in the Unity
Government. While Shamir was suggesting that Jordan should be
the Palestinian state, Labor was considering the creation of a
tripartite confederation of Jordan, Israel and an autonomous
Palestine. In facing threats from Likud as well as Islamic ideas
of an Islamic Palestine, King Husayn has been most sensitive to
emphasize the religious diversity of both Jordan and Palestine.
This has included repeated references in speeches and interviews
to the "document of 'Umar," referring to the second caliph's
guarantee of religious freedom to Jerusalem following the Islamic
conquest of 638 A.D. Talks with the Christian, and pro-Hasemite,
Major Frayj, emphasized the shared view of both Jordan and the
PLO that the Palestine issue was part of an Arab nationalist,
secular struggle rather than a religious Jihad .
Yet, King Husayn s position as an Islamic ruler and a
descendent of the Prophet, as well as long-standing Hashemite
policy to compromise with the Muslim Brotherhood in both the West
Bank and the East Bank, continued to give him influence with
Hamas. Israeli reports noted that these contracts were being
intensified in order to secure the participation of Hamas in any
elections that might be held for a Palestinian peace delegation. 11
11. "Jordan Stepping Up Contacts With Hamas on Talks," Jerusalem
Television, in Arabic, 21 December 1989, as reported in FBIS, 28
December 1989, p. 30.
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Jordan's relationship with the Islamic element in the
occupied territories became even more complex, but potentially
even more important following the reopening of parliamentary
politics as a result of the elections of November 1989. The
strongest single political force to emerge in these elections was
the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Israeli reports, two of the
newly elected MPs, Layth Shubaylath and Yusuf al-'Azm, had helped
to finance arms for the Islamic underground of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin
in Gaza as early as 1983. 12 Still, Faysal al-Husayni, the most
prominent spokesman of the intifadah and a staunch Arafat sup-
porter, preferred to downplay the Islamic influence, saying that
they would get about 18 seats in a 120 member parliament in a
free election. He also felt that there were "moderate" elements
within Hamas as well. 13
D. The Jordanian-Palestinians .
Certainly, the most unexpected outcome of the decision of
disengagement has been the impact of the decision in Jordan
itself. As we have remarked, this portion of the Palestinian
people are the least considered in discussions of Jordan's Pales-
tine policy, yet in all probability they are the most significant
for the Hashemites. In one sense, King Husayn was fully aware
that his decision would have serious internal repercussions
12. "'Yehuda Litani,' Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood MPs Funded
Arms," The Jerusalem Post . 13 November 1989, p. 1, as reported in
FBIS, 14 November 1989, p. 47.
13. Avitar Inbal, "Al-Husayni Interviewed: Sees 'Possibility of
War'," Davar Hashavu'a Supplement , 5 January 1990, pp. 4, 5, as
reported by FBIS , p. 31.
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within Jordan. Indeed, one of the earliest indicators of such a
decision were a series of meetings during Ramadan . 1988, in which
King Husayn personally explained the need for unity between all
inhabitants of Jordan. .. regardless of their country of origin.
The problem was seen as a dual one. On the one hand, the Jorda-
nian-Palestinians might be tempted to give their allegiance to
the PLO, now that they had replaced the Hashemites as the hope
for a political option to regain Palestine. On the other hand,
there were many East Bank Jordanians who were tired of the entire
Palestine issue and suspicious of their ability to disrupt Jor-
dan's stability, prosperity and unity. The king wished to strike
a balance to assure the Jordanian-Palestinians that they were
welcomed as loyal citizens with equal rights and duties, and to
capitalize on the fact that there was no longer any basis for
conflict between Jordan and the PLO for the right to represent
the Palestinians of the occupied territories.
It was necessary, as well, to reorganize the entire
constitutional basis of the kingdom, for this was based on the
union of the two banks of the Jordan. King Husayn 's political
acumen, which came to serve him well in less than a year, was to
see that the reorganization of Jordanian society and politics
could best be accomplished through the reopening of normal elec-
toral politics, which had largely been suspended since the sup-
pression of political parties more than thirty years before.
Obviously, this affected Jordan most directly, but it had an
equal affect on the intifadah as well. Both King Husayn and the
Palestinians realized that they would be in a better position to
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criticize Israel's denial of political rights to Palestinians if
they were to show that they could grant these democratic rights
in Jordan. Ultimately, a political settlement with Israel would
depend, at least in part, in convincing Israeli public opinion
that a Palestinian state, or entity, could be governed rationally
and responsibly. The Labor Party has always hoped that Jordan
would be able to accomplish this, although it was not too worried
about the democratic nature of Jordan's control. But the intifa-
dah had demonstrated, above all, that any stable government in
the occupied territories would have to be based on political
participation instead of force. A successful transformation to
democracy in Jordan would serve to demonstrate that the Palestin-
ians (who were, in fact, the majority in Jordan) could be trusted
to act responsibly following Israeli withdrawal. If the Pales-
tinians could cooperate with their traditional enemy, King Hus-
ayn, they could probably cooperate with their own elected leader-
ship in Palestine. This demonstration role of Jordan's political
liberalization was carefully noted by the leading pro-PLO news-
paper in the occupied territories:
"Jordan's move to democracy dispels Israel's claim that it
is the only 'democracy' in the Middle East. It will also
help block Israeli hardliners' efforts to pass off the Jordan is
Palestine' nation. The hardliners were hoping that instability
and ethnic differences in Jordan would create trouble for the
present regime and lead some disgruntled Palestinian to carry out
a coup to overthrow the monarch, thus turning the country into
real anarchy and chaos. .. Democracy in Jordan is bound to reflect
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positively .paon the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and eventually
in an independent Palestinian state." 14
The threatened descent into chaos in Jordan came, against
all expectations, not from the Jordanian-Palestinians, but rather
from the native Jordanians of the south--the group always
considered to be the backbone of the Hashemite regime. The
impetus of the rioting in Ma' an and Kerak in April 1989 came from
a combination of economic austerity, heightened by price rises in
basic commodities including gasoline imposed as part of an IMF
economic package, along with charges of corruption in the govern-
ment of Zaid al-Rifai. 15 Embarrassingly, they happened at the
precise moment that King Husayn was in the White House for his
first official visit with President Bush. The Regent, Crown
Prince Hassan, acted swiftly to go to the disturbed area and the
king cut short his visit to return. In the short run, al-Rifai,
although a life-long friend of the monarch and the son of a
former prime minister himself, was summarily dismissed to be
replaced by the former chief of staff and head of the Royal
Hashemite Court, Sharif bin Shaker, a distance relative of the
King. The arrested rioters were soon released from jail and
Jordan moved quickly to secure immediate foreign loans and depos-
its to shore-up the economy. In the long term, a more realistic
economic policy was introduced by a highly respected economist
14. "Al-Fajr Views 'Jordan's Move to Democracy'," Al-Fair (Jerusa-
lem), 25 December 1989, p. 4, as reported in FBIS, 29 December
1989, p. 33.
15. Robert Saltoff, "Jordan Looks Inward," Current History ,
February 1990, pp. 57-60, p. 33.
168
and banker. Most importantly, however, was the decision not only
to go ahead with scheduled elections, but to actually liberalize
their conditions even further. The restrictions on political
parties in force for 32 years were dropped one by one in a de
facto fashion as the electoral date approached, and freedom of
the press was restored. The elections held in November 1989
resulted in a stunning victory for the Islamist trend, led by the
Muslim Brotherhood, but the new Chamber of Deputies, including
most of the Islamists, voted to confirm the government of Mudar
Badran, a former prime minister as well as a former security
chief. Two other trends came to be represented in the Chamber,
the government supporters and the secularist "Democratic" trend,
who could be identified with the former Arab nationalist opposi-
tion. Together, these elements held a majority. Although the
Muslim Brotherhood did enter into negotiations to join the gov-
ernment, its demands for cabinet posts were considered excessive.
In any case, the Islamic element has not voted consistently as a
bloc against the government.
The electoral results have two important effects for
Jordan's Palestine policy. On the one hand, the Muslim
Brotherhood's official policy is fully in accord with that of
their brethren in the occupied territories. It totally rejects
any compromise with Israel and demands the entire land of Pales-
tine as a sacred Islamic land, which can be regained only through
a iihad .
"The land of Palestine is an Islamic land and it belongs to
the Muslins until the end of the world. It is forbidden to
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concede one inch, regardless of any justification and pres-
sures . . .
All UN resolutions
—
particularly Resolutions 181, 242 and
338—which call for any concession of the Islamic land in
Palestine are, by the stand of right and justice and from an
Islamic perspective, are rejected and considered null and
void. .
.
"The international conference is an enormous trick and a
cloak under which Arab regimes might concede large parts of
the land of Palestine, approve conciliation with the Zionist
enemy and the consequent normalization, and allow the ene-
mies of God to have power in the Muslims' land...
"Supporting the blessed intifadah and entrenching and de-
veloping it so that it can constitute the beginning of the
road toward launching the continuous jihad to liberate the
entire Palestinian soil...
"Frontline states must be considered forward positions from
which to liberate Palestine. Their populations must be
mobilized for jihad in preparation for the hour of attack
and liberation. . .
"
16
The second important outcome of the elections was to confirm
the non-interference policy of the PLO in the internal politics
of Jordan... a policy which worked to strengthen the Hashemite
position at the same time it emphasized their wish to avoid
giving anyone the impression that Jordan was the Palestinian
16. "Islamic Movement Outlines Election Program," Al-Ra '
v
(Amman),
25 October 1989, p. 16 (Text), as reported in FBIS, 27 October
1989, pp. 24-5.
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state. Although this might seem to be a temporary advantage for
the liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian organizations were
virtually unanimous in their view that this would only encourage
Israel and the United States to carry out the Likud policy of
solving the Palestine problem in Jordan instead of in Palestine.
It is safe to say that this policy was confirmed, rather than
inaugurated, in the elections, for the PLO and the Jordanian-
Palestinians acted swiftly in April to stay out of the anti-
regime riots. Whether this position was from direct orders from
the PLO or a spontaneous action is debatable. Robert Saltoff
believes that it was spontaneous. 17 However, a Palestinian
newspaper published in Jerusalem claimed that official
instructions were sent by the PLO once it was clear that the
issues in the riots were internal Jordanian ones. It gave a
number of arguments in support of this policy:
1. Instability in Jordan would divert attention from the
Palestinian intifadah.
2. King Husayn's relations with the PLO had greatly im-
proved.
3. Jordan was playing a prominent role in the current
Palestinian political effort.
4. Disturbances over prices were an internal matter, and
as in similar disturbances in Tunisia and Algeria, the PLO did
not interfere in the domestic affairs of an Arab state.
17. Saltoff, op. cit.
. p. 60.
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5. The Palestinians might be drawn into actions by hostile
forces. 18
It also stated that the PLO's assurances of non-interference had
been conveyed to King Husayn. Whether the PLOs role was formal
or the result of a local decision of its supporters in Jordan,
King Husayn made a public statement of thanks immediately follow-
ing his return to Jordan in April:
"We want to record the fact that the Palestinian brothers
played a positive role and were completely distanced from
the riots. The PLO role is appreciated because of its
pacifying nature. . . "I 9 "
The Jordanian-Palestinian position on the elections was
clarified in an interview given by Ibrahim Bakr, a member of the
PNC, former high official (twenty years ago) of the PLO and
former chairman of the Jordanian Lawyer's Union. Mr. Bakr was
characterized by his interviewer as a prominent and influential
Palestinian figure in Jordan who did not belong to any PLO fac-
tion. He stated that "the Palestinian circle connected with the
PLO" had been eager to have the new Chamber of Deputies have a
"Trans-Jordanian" character, so as to refute Israel's statements
that Jordan was the Palestinian state. Thus, "an intrinsic,
voluntary, spontaneous, and unanimous decision was made to ex-
clude any Palestinian deported from the occupied territories
18. Palestinian-Jordanian Relations Going Through a New Stage,"
Al-Bayadir Al-Sivasi (Jerusalem) , 6 May 1989, p. 16, as reported
by JPRS . 13 July 1989, pp. 5-6.
19. Ahmad al-Jarallah, "King Husayn Interviewed on
'Disturbances'," Amman Domestic Service in Arabic, 27 April 1989,
as reported by FBIS, 28 April 1989, p. 40.
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since 1967 (which he claimed numbered some 3,000), any Palestin-
ian who is a member of the PNC, and any Palestinian who has held
or now holds an executive position from the PLO from running for
election." 20 Even those parties of the PLO that had formed local
Jordanian parties for the election did so because they had been
part of the old Arab Nationalist Movement, and they nominated
only East Bank candidates. The PLO organizations went even
further than their agreement, and did not support even those
candidates that it felt were most sympathetic to its cause. An
exception to prove the rule, in Mr. Bakr's eyes, was the success-
ful campaign of a young Circassian, Mansur Sayf-ed-din Mansur, in
Amman. Although not a prominent member of the PLO and a native
of the East Bank, he had been a fedayeen fighter imprisoned for
the hijacking of an El Al plane and had fought in Lebanon as a
volunteer in 1982. Although relatively young (39) and unknown,
he defeated prominent Circassians and overcame Islamist opposi-
tion to win on the strength of his record as a fighter for Pales-
tine. 21
In the end, both the elder statesman lawyer and the young
fighter agreed that the success of Jordan's democractic experi-
ment would enhance the chances of success of the PLO's political
20. "Relations With PLO, Hamas Described," Al-Yawm Al-Sabi'
(Paris), 15 January 1990, pp. 10-12, as reported in JPRS. 2_1
February 1990. p. 52.
21. Ibid. . loc. cit. . Stephen Hubbell, "Jordan Votes the Islamic
Ticket," The Nation . Vol 249, No. 22 (December 25, 1989), p. 786.
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policy. Ibrahim Bakr's view of the role of the PLO and the views
of the Jordanian-Palestinians as complementary:
Jordan is strongly attached to the Palestinian cause. The
Palestinian cause does not feel alienated in Jordan. This
does not mean that he abandons Palestine. I am convinced
that the democratic climate prevailing in Jordan at present
will allow the PLO presence to be comfortable and political-
ly and informationally effective. .
.
I believe that the PLO will find numerous facilities in
Jordan under the canopy of the new situation, especially in
connection with its political and information activity and
with its efforts to strengthen contact with the occupied
Palestinian territories. This motivates the PLO to be eager
to protect and strengthen Jordan's security because a suc-
cessful democratic experiment is the greatest support for the PLO
generally and for the intifadah in particular." 22
Deputy Murad also believed that Jordan's experiment must succeed
for the sake of Jordan and for Palestine. "If there is no democ-
racy in Jordan, the situation will explode." 23 In another inter-
view he supported the disengagement decision, but said that steps
would have to be taken to alleviate some suffering these caused
for the Palestinian people. "The establishment of the state of
Palestine is a major step to complete liberation. Those who make
daily sacrifices in the occupied territories, under the leader-
22. "Relations With PLO, Hamas Described," Al-Yawm Al-Sabi
'
(Paris), op. cit. , p. 54.
23. Hubbell, loc. cit.
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ship of the PLO, have the right to determine their own future
without having anyone bargain for them." 24
The political situation in early 1990 had clarified a good
deal of the old ambiguities of Jordanian-Palestinian relations.
Although not likely to be overthrown by an internal force, King
Husayn's Palestine policy is now influenced by the internal
political situation in Jordan to an extent unknown since 1967.
The clearest internal danger to his policies stems from the
position of the Muslim Brotherhood, for their electoral program
constituted an open attack on both the PLO and King Husayn's
policies. Jordan will do its utmost to support the PLO •
s
political option and the intifadah, and the PLO will do its best
to support the stability of Jordan. Both fear that the failure
of either the intifadah to secure political gains or of Jordanian
democracy's failure to stabilize politics in Jordan would lead
only to chaos in both Jordan and Palestine. The Islamists might
win the first round in the contest over the pieces, but Israel
would win the second and proceed to eliminate the Islamists, the
PLO and Jordan.
It is by no means assured that the combined efforts of the
PLO and Jordan will succeed in their efforts at stabilization.
The rise of religious fundamentalist feelings both within the
Zionist movement and within the intifadah and Jordan could well
succeed in undermining the moderates now in charge of the intifa-
dah, the PLO and Jordan, as they have already undermined the
24. Sa'd al-Silawi, "Deputy Murad Lists Parliamentary Priorities,"
Sawt Al-Sha'b (Amman), 19 November 1989, p. 3, as reported by
FBIS, 22 November 1989, p. 22.
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moderates who recently shared the National Unity Government in
Israel.
In the current situation, it is clear that Jordan cannot and
would not take a lead in any new political effort at an Arab-
Israeli settlement. With the suspension of talks between the PLO
and the United States in June, 1990, there may well be renewed
pressures from both Israel and the United States for some kind of
reopening of the Jordanian role, if not the "Jordanian option."
In fact, although the distrust between Yasir Arafat and King
Husayn has dissipated to a great extent, the issue of a political
role for Jordan has been fundamentally changed by the intifadah
and the rise of the Islamist movement in the Palestinian arena.
As long as the cause of Palestine was a secular, political and
nationalist movement a compromise as to who represented Pales-
tine, as well as a compromise on the borders of Palestine, was
barely feasible. Although Arafat and Husayn were old enemies,
they had something of the fraternity of boxers who had fought
each other many times. But to the overwhelmingly youthful Pales-
tinian population who are the backbone of the intifadah, King
Husayn is a remote figure from another planet, and it is diffi-
cult enough for Arafat to assert his populist authority himself,
without thinking what would happen to this authority should he
delegate even more of it to King Husayn.
On the other hand, the long range prospects for the stabili-
ty of a settlement, should one be reached , have perhaps improved.
Should an Israeli government seek a compromise with the intifa-
dah, the common effort of the PLO, the intifadah and Jordan could
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lead to a possible conferation of Israel, a Palestinian entity on
its way to statehood, and Jordan... or perhaps an even broader
regional grouping involving Egypt as well. As Jordan becomes
more democratic, the long-term threat posed by the union of a
traditional monarchy with a hyperactive, politicized Palestinian
population becomes less of an obstacle. After a peace settle-
ment, such an arrangement could lead to a stable peace. Why
would Israel opt for such a solution? At least some in Israel
and among its foreign supporters might well find this preferable
to the most likely alternative, e.g., the renewal of an even
bloodier conflict over Palestine. If the history of this con-
flict for its first twenty years was a war between governments,
and the next twenty years added the war between a militant na-
tionalist movement to the contest, the war of the 90s would be
inherited by absolutist fanatics on both sides, each confident
that God has promised them the same land. This would have intol-
erable consequences for all, including Israelis, Palestinians and
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